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Despite the overwhelming global presence of Islām – in its multiple religious, political, 
social, cultural, and intellectual forms – the history of early Islām continues to elude 
historians.  Written over a century after the death of Muḥammad, extant Arabic sources 
reveal little about the history of early Islām.  In the last century, source-critical, tradition-
critical, and skeptical historians have grappled with the sources without reaching a 
consensus.  Recent studies demonstrating the unreliability of sources once held to be 
foundational have only further compounded the problem.  As a result, early Islāmic 
historiography has reached an impasse.  Narrating Early Islāmic History tackles the 
central methodological questions looming behind the problem.  This research project 
thoroughly answers three questions: (i) How is the problem of early Islāmic history 
framed?  (ii) What is the entry point into the past?  (iii) How can early Islāmic history be 
reconstructed?  Consequently, this dissertation mainly addresses methodological issues in 
order to rethink past approaches and develop new ones.  To this end, the dissertation 
incorporates authoritative primary and secondary sources from Arabic, Persian, German, 








The significance of this doctoral research rests in the fact that it has discovered fresh 
approaches to the entrenched problem of historical reconstruction.  (i) In terms of framing 
the problem of early Islāmic history, this dissertation has formulated the concept of 
‘proto-Islāmic’ history.  This concept bypasses the negative false dichotomies 
perpetuated by current chronological divisions.  (ii) This dissertation has identified in the 
annals of Islāmic history a unique entry point into the proto-Islāmic period, namely, the 
ridda or so-called Apostasia Arabum.  (iii) Based upon these findings, this dissertation 
has developed the ‘narrative method’ for reconstructing the damaged, fragmentary 
history of proto-Islām.  In particular, it restores the socio-economic, political, and 
geographic context of late antique Arabia.  The results produced by this boundary-
breaking method prove to be astounding.  Narrating Early Islāmic History is organized 
into two sections: Historiography and Historical Reconstruction.  Chapter 1 advances 
solutions to longstanding historiographical problems surrounding early Islāmic history.  
Chapters 2 through 4 reconstruct proto-Islāmic history with special reference to the 
Musaylima movement in central Arabia and the Muḥammad movement in western 




Julius Wellhausen’s “Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams” inaugurated the 
source-critical phase in Islāmic historiography.1  This groundbreaking work sought to 
accomplish for Islāmic studies what Wellhausen’s influential documentary hypothesis 
had done for biblical studies just two decades earlier.  Made possible by the recent 
availability of al-Ṭabarī’s (d. 923 C.E.) chronography,2 Wellhausen sought to identify 
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stratified layers hidden beneath the homogenous narrative of later historians such as Ibn 
al-Athīr (d. 1233 C.E.).3  Sifting through the heterogeneous – and supposedly 
unprocessed4 – reports preserved in al-Ṭabarī’s compilation, Wellhausen identified two 
dominant schools of early Arabic historiography, namely, the ‘Irāqī and Madīnan.  
Wellhausen maintained that the individual compilations produced by each of these 
schools constituted self-contained units, each with its own overarching bias imposed 
upon the material by its compiler.5  Juxtaposing these two sets of reports culled from al-
Ṭabarī, Wellhausen was intent on determining their relative value for the purpose of 
historical reconstruction.  Detecting a tribal bias at work in the reports of the Kūfan Sayf 
b. ‘Umar al-Tamīmī (d. ca. 800 C.E.), Wellhausen subjected the ‘Irāqī school to a 
devastating critique.  He concluded that the Madīnan reports merited more credence.   
Source-criticism attracted many practitioners.  Noteworthy among these were 
M.J. de Goeje, N. Mednikov, and L. Caetani.  For instance, in his monumental Annali 
dell’Islām, Caetani’s reconstruction largely followed Wellhausen’s lead by adopting a 
preference for the Madīnan sources.6  On the basis of the self-contained unit thesis, the 
source-critics devised a threefold method: (i) the assessment of each collection of 
traditions in toto, (ii) the juxtaposition and evaluation of the collections, and (iii) the 
determination of the relative value of one compilation over the other for the purposes of 
arriving at a synthetic history.7  
For over half a century, the source-critics went unchallenged.  The first serious 
critique was offered in 1971 by A. Noth who scrutinized Wellhausen’s assumptions.8  
Noth determined that al-Ṭabarī’s early sources did not individually represent unified 
conceptions of history.  Since the early historians were primarily compilers, their works 
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preserved multiple reports from divergent, even antithetical perspectives.9  Furthermore, 
since multiple biases and tendencies pervade the different collections, there is 
consequently no overarching outlook within each collection.  As a result, a single 
collection cannot be considered to be a homogenous self-contained unit.10  In other 
words, by attempting to locate stratified narrative layers, Wellhausen’s theory of schools 
unintentionally masked the underlying heterogeneity inherent in the earliest source 
material.   
After Noth’s critique, scholars’ attention shifted to the reliability of the early 
compilers as credible authorities.  Sayf b. ‘Umar was front and center in this debate.11  
Whereas Wellhausen and the source-critics had once considered Sayf “unreliable” and 
his sources fictitious, subsequent scholars exculpated Sayf from these “charges” on 
“topographical” and “chronological grounds.”12  Meanwhile, Islāmic scholarship took 
another turn away from Wellhausen after scholars recognized the role played by ‘oral 
transmission’ in the earliest sources.13  This tradition-critical school (N. Abbott, A.A. 
Duri, F. Rosenthal, and F. Sezgin) became primarily concerned with history as a literary 
process.14  The orality thesis ‘undermined’ the assumption of an exclusive written 
transmission underpinning Wellhausen’s documentary hypothesis.15  As a result, 
skeptical scholars soon judged the transference and ‘application’ of biblical methods to 
Islāmic history to be untenable.16 
Nevertheless, the utility of methods derived from biblical scholarship did not 
escape the attention of two historians.  Taking their cue from critiques of the 
documentary hypothesis in biblical studies, A. Noth and L. Conrad introduced form-
criticism into Islāmic studies.  Premised on oral transmission, form-criticism sought to 
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evaluate a representative cross-section of all the sources.17  In effect, Noth and Conrad’s 
method proposed to excise and recompile a homogeneous body of source material on the 
basis of commonalities of (i) conceptions of history (Themen), (ii) forms (Formen), and 
(iii) biases (Tendenzen).18  They argued that the order which emerges from the analysis of 




Significantly, the study of the ridda – the so-called apostasy of the Arabs – commenced 
with Wellhausen’s “Prolegomena.”  Ridda reports formed the basis of Wellhausen’s 
critique of Sayf.  Although Caetani followed suit, his studies contributed tremendously to 
standardizing the chronology of the ridda.20  The results of Caetani’s assiduous treatment 
of the ridda sources prepared the way for future research.21  Unfortunately, however, 
Caetani’s voluminous research was largely inaccessible, because it was published in 
Italian.  Nonetheless, his findings made their way into C.H. Becker’s general historical 
work published in 1913.22  Then, after a four-decade hiatus, two ridda works came to 
light: (i) the collected fragments of Wathīma b. Mūsā’s (d. 851 C.E.) early ridda treatise23 
and (ii) the assembled fragments of al-Balansī’s (d. 1237 C.E.) Ta’rīkh al-Ridda.24   
In 1973, E. Shoufani published his definitive monograph on the ridda.25  
Shoufani’s work is exemplary not only in the sheer number of primary and secondary 
sources perused, but above all for the care and discernment with which these sources are 
sifted, evaluated, and integrated into a synthetic history of the ridda wars.  Shoufani’s 
approach to the sources is based upon the Tamīmī-bias thesis.26  For example, Shoufani 
observes that al-Ṭabarī’s chronography suffers from his heavy reliance on Sayf b. 
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‘Umar.27  Shoufani even goes so far as to discount Sayf as a ‘story-teller.’28  
Nevertheless, given the fragmentary nature of the other extant sources, Shoufani 
judiciously weighs Sayf’s reports against those of other compilers.29  In fact, in certain 
instances, Shoufani deems Sayf reliable, warding off any charges of fabrication.30    
In the decades following Shoufani, the Jerusalem school published a number of 
specific studies, represented principally by E. Landau-Tasseron,31 M.J. Kister,32 and M. 
Lecker.33  In addition to these works, M.I. ul-Haq conducted a study focusing on ridda 
poetry.34  During this period, two printed editions of Ibn Ḥubaysh’s (d. 1188 C.E.) Kitāb 
al-Ghazawāt – available to Caetani only in manuscript form – were published.35  Soon 
afterward came the publication of three separate editions of al-Wāqidī’s (d. 823 C.E.) 
Kitāb al-Ridda, all based on the same unique manuscript.36  Thereafter, a damaged 
manuscript of Sayf b. ‘Umar’s treatise was discovered.  However, even though this work 
is now published, its ridda portion remains lost.37  The study of the Banū Ḥanīfa and 
Musaylima (d. 633 C.E.) also attracted the attention of researchers.  M.J. Kister’s copious 
work collected a substantial body of source material on Musaylima.38  A. al-Askar’s 
research determined the social, political, geographic, and economic conditions in al-
Yamāma.39  Finally, A. Makin’s application of critical theory (e.g., in his ‘re-reading’ of 





Historians have at their disposal an abundance of narrative sources for early Islām.  There 
are however three shortcomings inherent in this extant literature.  To begin with, the texts 
7 
 
are of late composition.  In other words, there is a gap between the event and the 
recording of the event.  For example, more than a century separates the death of the 
prophet Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh (d. 632 C.E.) and the earliest hagiography (sīra) 
composed about his life.  A further example is the literary account written about the so-
called ‘apostasy wars’ (ḥurūb al-ridda) waged in Arabia roughly from 632 to 634 C.E.  
The earliest surviving manuscript on this subject is by the historian al-Wāqidī, whose 
death in 823 C.E. marks a two-century gap between the events of the ‘apostasy’ (ridda) 
and their commitment to writing.  The second intrinsic problem of literary sources is the 
high loss of texts over time.  For instance, of the nine or so known original ridda works, 
six are lost, two are fragmentary, and only one survives intact.41  The greatest 
shortcoming of narrative sources by far, however, is the literary genre itself.  Four 
problems stand out, which can be classed under the rubrics of memory and fallacy. 
 
Memory 
Memory is the past remembered, it is not the past itself.42  Space and time intervene as 
barriers between the historian and past events.  Not forgotten, the events of the ridda 
lived on in the collective memory of the ‘Irāqīs.  Consider the ridda historian Sayf b. 
‘Umar who, well over a century after the events unfolded, gathered ridda narratives that 
were circulating not in Arabia, but in ‘Irāq.43  His clan, the Usayyid b. ‘Amr of Tamīm, 
settled with the Banū Ḥanīfa in the ‘Irāqī garrison town of al-Kūfa after they had yielded 
in the ridda wars.44  Kept alive generation after generation through countless telling and 
retelling, the ridda narratives grounded the Kūfans’ unique and independent identity, 
thereby temporarily safeguarding it from being overshadowed by a universalizing 
Umayyad and later ‘Abbāsid umbrella.  Kūfan memory preserved indispensible facts 
8 
 
about the ridda that had been forgotten elsewhere, but nonetheless, it continually shaped 
and reshaped these facts to fit a particular mold of communal mnemohistory (historical 
memory).  In fact, Sayf’s history is a final testament bearing witness to this dying Kūfan 
tradition that shortly thereafter was subsumed by the emergent caliphal counter-order. 
Counter-memory is a corollary to collective memory.  Competing interests and 
perspectives, along with the changing composition of communities and the ceaseless 
imagining and reimagining of communal identities, give rise to counter-memory.  In fact, 
the annals of Islāmic history abound with counter-memory in the form of contradictory 
reports.  For instance, the ridda reports make no fewer than seven different counterclaims 
about who killed the ‘rebel’ leader Musaylima (d. 633 C.E.).45  Whereas the Banū ‘Āmir 
b. Lu’ayy clan of Quraysh claim that it was one of their own, the Banū Umayya clan of 
Quraysh counterclaim that it was no one less than Mu‘āwiya, the founder of their 
dynasty, who slew him.  A series of counterclaims coalesces into a counter-memory that 
defines a community’s boundaries.  The sustained communal transmission of this 
counter-memory, in turn, transforms it into a counterhistory.   
There is no such thing as a stand-alone history.  Each history, relative to other 
histories, is a counterhistory.  The triumph of one counterhistory over all the others 
results in official history.  Firmly set within a master narrative, official history retrojects 
its worldview onto the timeline.  So in this case, this newly minted minority elite 
(Umayyads, ‘Abbāsids) projected back into history the origins of their legitimacy to rule 
over the majority.  Therefore, official history assumes an ahistorical, timeless quality.  
Take for instance the earliest surviving version of Muḥammad’s religious biography by 
Ibn Hishām (d. ca. 835 C.E.) that was based upon a redaction of Ibn Isḥāq’s (d. ca. 761 
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C.E.) earlier work.46  Ibn Isḥāq had crystallized the collective memory of al-Madīna 
(Yathrib) – the city of the prophet – into a powerful counterhistory wrapped in the mantle 
of prophetic authority.  As a de facto official history, Ibn Hishām’s later version trumped 
all other communal memories of the past, eclipsing even the historical memory of al-
Kūfa.  This official history situates Muḥammad within the framework of salvation 
history.  The pre-Islāmic period becomes the theatrical backdrop to Muḥammad’s 
prophetic mission.  Inaugurating the Islāmic phase in history, Muḥammad’s prophethood 
takes center stage in the master narrative.  Ultimately assuming extra-historical qualities 
such as infallibility (‘iṣma), the person of Muḥammad consequently escapes 
historicization.  That is, Muḥammad becomes larger than life, a ‘figure of memory,’ and 
not of history.47  Thus, as constructions of communal identity and alterity, these late 
narrative sources – set within emergent theological discourses of sacred history – reveal 
more about the milieux of their composition than they do about the history of early Islām. 
 
Fallacy 
Since narratives are finite constructions, historians select what to include and exclude in 
their final narrative report.  The late composition of Islāmic literary sources makes them 
especially susceptible to fallacies of narration.48  Two fallacies predominate, namely, 
presentism and tunnel history.  Regarding the first of these, later historians who perceive 
the historical timeline only through the lens of the present fall prey to the anachronistic 
fallacy of presentism.  Akin to the problem of official history, presentism projects 
present-day concepts and categories back onto history.  A noteworthy example is the 
reading of the so-called ‘Constitution of al-Madīna,’ otherwise known as the umma 
(‘community’) document.  The text exhibits distinct semantic usages of the terms 
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‘Muslims’ and ‘Mu’mins’ (‘believers’).  However, Ibn Isḥāq and modern historians 
conflate these two terms.  As a result, they commit the fallacy of presentism by 
retrojecting an eighth-century conception of the term ‘Muslim’ upon this seventh-century 
document.  This fallacy is represented in the following tables (SEE TABLES 1.1 AND 1.2).49  
The first depicts an ideal series of times (ranging from the sixth to the tenth century) as 
well as historical events (E–M) that a tenth-century historian could potentially choose 
from to narrate the past.  Committing the fallacy of presentism, the historian selects 
events exclusively from their tenth-century perspective.  Accordingly, the historian’s 
narrative account is uneven and tends to systematically neglect other events that seem ir- 
 
 TIME EVENTS 
6th Century E F G H I 
7th Century F G H I J 
8th  Century G H I J K 





PRESENT 10th Century I J K L M 
 
Table 1.1: Ideal Series 
 
relevant from a present-day vantage point.  The result is an obstructed view of the past, 
namely a historical blind spot. 
 
 TIME EVENTS 
6th Century     I 
7th Century    I J 
8th  Century   I J K 





PRESENT 10th Century I J K L M 
 
Table 1.2: Fallacy of Presentism 
 
Taking a narrow, singular view of the past, late Islāmic historians are also prone 
to the fallacy of tunnel history (SEE TABLE 1.3).  The genealogy of Muḥammad that 
comes at the beginning of Ibn Isḥāq’s hagiography is a prime example.50  A product of 
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contested memory, this genealogy traces Muḥammad’s ancestry from his birth in the 
second half of the sixth century all the way back to the primordial Adam.  Perpetrating 
the fallacy of tunnel history, the historian links the birth events of select mnemohistorical 
figures to the conception of a single individual.  Therefore, the narrative account 
generated resembles a tunnel in time.  Accordingly, a lack of empirical evidence, 
combined with the late provenance of textual sources, their high attrition rate, and their 
memory and fallacy shortcomings, together mark the source limits for narrating the 
history of early Islām.  
 
 TIME EVENTS 
Genesis     I 
…    I  
…   I   
…  I    
6th Century I     
7th Century      
8th Century      










10th Century      
 
Table 1.3: Fallacy of Tunnel History 
 
Narrative Processes 
Historians report their research findings in the form of narratives that have a beginning, a 
middle, and an end.  Consequently, historians narrate events in a sequence that naturally 
progresses from one event to the next.  However, they are not privy to all the facts, and 
even less do they share in knowledge of the causal relations governing events.  Given 
their fragmentary knowledge, historians have frequent recourse to a pair of literary 
devices, topoi and schemata.51  These devices nonetheless expose historical writing to a 





Topoi (sing.: topos) are transferable reoccurring literary stereotypes that derive from 
specific events.  Once severed from these events, they become independent of their 
original context.  Characteristic types of topoi include scene setting, naming, numbering, 
detailing, and arrangement.  Narrators deploy these portable motifs in one literary 
environment after another.52  As a result, topoi tend to reoccur in a variety of more or less 
plausible situations.  In addition to enriching narratives, these literary fillers also serve a 
legitimizing function by advancing the interests of one group over another.  For example, 
the aforementioned controversy over the identity of Musaylima’s slayer reveals several 
tendencies and biases.  The Umayyad counterclaim is especially instructive.  ‘Abd al-
Malik, the Umayyad caliph, once queried as to who it was that struck the final blow 
against Musaylima.53  According to an unnamed eyewitness from Musaylima’s tribe, 
Mu‘āwiya was not responsible for Musaylima’s death.  ‘Abd al-Malik retorted, passing 
judgment in favor of his ancestor.  The memory of Musaylima, including claims to his 
legitimacy and authority, was a controversial subject at ‘Abd al-Malik’s Damascene 
court, particularly at a time when ‘Abd al-Malik’s own tenuous hold on the caliphate was 
contested.54  By using the topos of ‘naming the slayer,’ the caliph buttressed his own 
family claim, while simultaneously defaming and barring the rise of any possible 
counterclaimants to his throne.  Therefore, history is generally perpetuated when it retains 
some relevance to the present.   
Schemata (sing.: schema) are connectors that associate and link narrative units 
into a more or less coherent and meaningful sequence of events.  Put differently, they 
move the narrative along.  Schematic types include transitional rhetorical formulae (e.g., 
‘then,’ ‘and’), pseudo-causes (e.g., anecdotes, letters), pseudo-etymologies (e.g., of 
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proper names, toponyms), systematization (i.e., parallel modeling), and undifferentiated 
reports (i.e., a string of topoi fitted into an ideal narrative mold).  The original corpus of 
historical facts about early Islām comprised a scattering of disparate atomic reports 
varying in length from a single sentence to a page.  Historians employed schemata to 
combine and recombine these reports that were devoid of their original causal links.  In 
other words, none of these historians were aware of the real causes behind the events they 
were narrating.  For this reason, the principal function of schemata, as connectors, is to 
fill this explanatory vacuum.55  The conquest of al-Yamāma, for example, marks a 
turning point in the ridda.  The historian al-Balādhurī (d. ca. 892 C.E.), juxtaposing two 
atomic reports when narrating the surrender of al-Yamāma, ends the first report about 
Mujjā‘a’s subterfuge with “O Mujjā‘a you deceived me!”56  The second report begins, 
“And (wa-) the people of al-Yamāma converted to Islām, so the alms tax was exacted 
from them.”57  As clearly evidenced, these two atomic reports are only loosely linked by 
the coordinating conjunction wa- (‘and’ or ‘but’).  The reader is therefore left to assume 
that one event immediately followed the other.  Any sense of temporal perspective is 
consequently lost; the result is a fallacy that correlates narrative continuity with 
causality.58      
 
Developments 
The centuries-old process of explaining early Islāmic events by means of topoi and 
schemata culminated in the voluminous Arabic historical tradition.  However, early 
Islāmic historiography is not special in this regard.  For instance, the Battle of Manzikert 
fought between the Byzantines and Seljuq Turks in 1071 C.E. underwent a similar process 
of accretion.59  From the twelfth to the fifteenth century, the battle narrative became 
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transformed, taking on added features which included topoi (i.e., stock elements) and 
schematic pseudo-causes (e.g., anecdotes, documents).  Ridda narratives also show 
evidence of accretion through time.  For example, the execution narrative related about 
Musaylima’s disciple, Ibn Nawwāḥa, experienced a similar growth from the eighth to the 
eleventh century C.E.60  Identical eighth-century reports narrate Muḥammad’s encounter 
with two unnamed messengers dispatched by Musaylima.  A century later, another report 
relating the survival of Musaylima’s movement recounts the persecution of his followers 
and the execution of their leader, Ibn Nawwāḥa.  Furthermore, this early ninth-century 
report also combines the information provided in the eighth-century report by naming Ibn 
Nawwāḥa as one of the two originally unnamed messengers.  At the end of the ninth 
century, the original version circulates together with a further, enlarged combined 
version, detailing Ibn Nawwāḥa’s decapitation in the market square.  In the tenth and 
early eleventh century, a total of six reports circulate, some of which preserve the 
original, while others name Ibn Uthāl as the second messenger.61 
Accretion is not dependent on an original historical kernel; it can also arise from 
mnemohistorical polemic.  Otherwise stated, a narrative motif can spawn another motif.  
A striking example from ridda literature is the meeting of Musaylima and his female 
‘rebel’ counterpart, Sajāḥ.62  At the height of the so-called ‘apostasy wars,’ al-‘Ijlī (d. 641 
C.E.) composed an invective poem graphically portraying Musaylima and Sajāḥ’s 
purported debauchery.63  Adaptations of these popular verses continued to circulate well 
into the ninth century.  However, Sayf, the principal ridda source for al-Ṭabarī, does not 
narrate this lurid tale.  In a fifteenth-century Tunisian handbook for attracting the fairer 
sex, there appears another explicit version of how Musaylima used perfume to seduce 
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Sajāḥ.  Although separated by eight centuries, one fiction generated another, continuously 
adding to the incessantly growing corpus.   
Accretion is not so much a deviation as a way of following the natural course of 
historical narration.  Its aggregate effect, however, is core displacement.  For instance, 
once an original atomic report generates a secondary report, it can independently generate 
further accretions, thereby making the original dispensable.  Multiplied many times over, 
the original atomic report increasingly becomes relegated to the periphery.  The center, as 
a result, slowly becomes populated with later generations of reports.  The graph below 
depicts this diachronic process of core displacement (SEE GRAPH 1.1).  As illustrated, 
once an original cluster of seventh-century atomic reports produces secondary narratives 
within the emergent discursive field of practicing historians, the original cluster slowly 
begins to move off-center.  However, the original cluster still casts a shadow of its former 
self onto the central narrative.  By the ninth century, however, both the ‘shrinking’ 
narrative core and its growing shadow have taken a back seat to newly-minted tertiary 
narratives.64  Most dramatically, by the tenth century, the shrunken original core falls 
outside the purview of Islāmic discursive history; its overgrown shadow is now its only 
presence.  This shadow represents an empty thematic vessel filled not with original 
atomic content, but rather with diluted topoi and schemata.  Therefore, as a consequence 
of core displacement, historians reconstructing ‘what actually happened’ in early Islām 
must look beyond the center, that is, they must look to the margins of the Islāmic 










The contextualization and historicization of Muḥammad and his movement are central 
issues for historians seeking to reconstruct the past.  Modern historical research focuses 
on central events and reports about early Islām.  For example, studies of Muḥammad’s 
religious biography dwell on a series of eight motifs: (i) the Calling to Islām, (ii) the 
Exodus (hijra) from Makka to al-Madīna, (iii) the Battle of Badr, (iv) the Battle of Uḥud, 
(v) the Battle of the Trench, (vi) the Armistice of al-Ḥudaybiya, (vii) the Accusation 
against ‘Ā’isha, and (viii) the Conquest of Makka.65  The earliest extant reports (e.g., the 
corpus of ‘Urwa b. al-Zubayr (d. 712 C.E.)) on Muḥammad’s career are constrained by 
these same limitations.  As critical nodes, these topoi form a matrix of commensurable 
mnemohistorical facts; the outcome is a structurally homogenous narrative cycle, or in 
other words, a hagiography.   
This production of a smooth narrative is not limited to Muḥammad’s career.  Take 
for instance the early Islāmic conquests (futūḥ).  These central events and reports are 
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similarly stylized.  The ideal conquest campaign is for this reason reducible to a six-node 
narrative cycle: (i) the Appointment of the Campaign Leader, (ii) the Naming of a 
Companion of the Prophet as the Supreme Leader, (iii) the Issuance of the Caliph’s 
Orders, (iv) the Victory Achieved through the Execution of the Caliph’s Orders, (v) the 
Dispatch of the Caliph’s Share of Spoils, and (vi) the Messenger’s Interaction with the 
Caliph in al-Madīna.66  In light of these considerations, historians approaching early 
Islām need a method for detection.  The question is, how can historians breach the almost 
impenetrable spatiotemporal and conceptual barrier formed by this formidable body of 
late source material?   
 
Method 
Publishing in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Italian art historian Giovanni 
Morelli devised a method for discerning authentic paintings from forgeries.67  In 
establishing the authenticity of a portrait painting, he determined that the key is not to 
focus on central features of the face (e.g., eyes).  Invariably, forgers will pay special 
attention to these features.  Moreover, the portrayal of these central features tends to be 
greatly influenced by the painter’s school.  Therefore, in order to establish whether a 
portrait is a forgery, the critic must assess marginal features that do not usually draw any 
suspicion (e.g., hands, ears).  Look for instance at the vast range of ear portrayals by 
various Italian artists (SEE ILLUSTRATION 1.1).68  By focusing on these types of marginal 
clues, Morelli’s method uncovered new heterogeneous evidence.  Combined with 
normative homogenous evidence, the Morellian method ultimately led to startling 
conclusions about the attribution of paintings held in galleries across Europe.  Through 
the investigation of marginalities, he established a principle for sifting through both 
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pictorial and textual sources.  Accordingly, historians must read against the grain.  They 
must look at marginal – and not central – events and reports in the early Islāmic historical 
corpus.  The study of textual marginalities emerges as the cornerstone of early Islāmic 
history. 
 
        
 
  Fra Filippo.     Filippino.     Signorelli.     Bramantino.     Mantegna.    Giovanni Bellini. 
 
Illustration 1.1: Ear Portrayals 
 
Textual Marginalities 
Although there is a predilection for the homogenization of narratives, this process is 
never complete.  Consequently, uneven elements (i.e., marginal reports and marginal 
events) persist within the generally leveled master narrative.  Marginal reports contain 
tangential information found within larger narratives on central events, and do not fit 
naturally within the grand narrative informing these events.  For example, shortly after 
Muḥammad commenced his public preaching, the Makkans lambasted him by saying, 
“We have heard that a man in al-Yamāma called al-Raḥmān teaches you.  We will never 
believe in him.”69  This ‘man from al-Yamāma’ is traditionally equated with Musaylima, 
the central Arabian ‘rebel’ leader.  Although Ibn Isḥāq attempts to smooth out this jagged 
report by embedding it within a Qur’ānic discourse (Q. 13:30), this report nonetheless 
juts out.  Another marginal report is found in Ibn Hishām’s notes on Muḥammad’s 
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religious biography.  He relates that Thumāma b. Uthāl al-Ḥanafī once openly defied the 
authority of the Makkan leader, Abū Sufyān.  In spite of his transgression, one Makkan 
remarked, “Let him alone, for you have need of al-Yamāma for your food.”70  Thumāma 
accordingly departed from the city unharmed.  Combining these two marginal reports, a 
larger question begins to emerge: What does Makka have to do with al-Yamāma?   
Marginal events – the second type of textual marginality – are those that are not 
central to the mnemohistorical origins and development of the Islāmic community.  For 
instance, whereas the sīra and futūḥ genres flourished through countless retellings, the 
ridda corpus – apart from a handful of works – was altogether forgotten and deleted from 
the collective memory of the Islāmic community.  Moreover, the early compilers of ridda 
works (e.g., Sayf, al-Wāqidī) were in fact blacklisted by their contemporaries as well as 
by succeeding generations of scholars.71  Yet modern topographical research has 
corroborated Sayf’s ridda reports (e.g., his account of Khālid b. al-Walīd’s military 
expedition against the ‘apostates’ at al-Buzākha).72  In addition, although polemics and 
poetry often allude to figures such as ‘Musaylima the Arch-Liar,’ these are no more than 
literary topoi stripped of their actual historical referents.  Consider the opening lines of 
al-Ma‘arrī’s (973-1058 C.E.) poetic invective launched against contemporary sectarians in 
which he equates dual topoi, Satan and Musaylima:  
Will you not fear God, O party of (one like) Musaylima,  
For you have gone astray in obedience to your lusts. 
Do not follow in the steps of Satan;  
How many of you are followers of footsteps!73 
 
Furthermore, preoccupied with stabilizing the chronology of the maghāzī (i.e., 
Muḥammad’s campaigns and raids), classical chroniclers tended to neglect the ridda.74  
In consequence, the ridda corpus is less prone to schematization than the sīra/maghāzī 
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and futūḥ.  Compared to the smooth narrative cycles of Muḥammad’s hagiography and 
the early conquests, the ridda narratives go against the grain.  For example, Sayf’s ridda 
treatise is replete with idiosyncrasies in that the surviving narratives originate from tribal 
informants who are largely unaccounted for in later biographical (ṭabaqāt) literature.75  
Nor are these choppy ridda narratives stylized either in form or language.  Some reports 
even evidence a confusion of language when they revert to the ‘narrative present.’76  This 
evidence points to the fact that what had once been historically central to early Islām 
became displaced to the historiographical periphery.  It is here that historians must look 
to discover early Islāmic history.  The ridda are the ‘ears’ of the Arabic historical corpus.   
 
Ridda 
Historians order information for the purpose of narrating history.  They arrange available 
information into a number of thematic categories.  Although these themes are governed 
by interests and concerns relevant to the historian’s own day, they also reflect the 
autochthonous rubrics that once animated earlier historians.77  In other words, these 
themes reflect what historians consider to be important and worthy of preservation.   
 
Themes 
Themes constitute the “…questions which preoccupied the early Islāmic transmitters of 
history.”78  Primary themes reflect an early layer of historians’ thematic categories.  
Accretion over time results in the derivation of secondary themes; subsequently, tertiary 
themes ensue.  The material core of the early Islāmic tradition is contained exclusively in 
primary themes.  Although primary themes are not exempt from change over time, 
historians must mine these first-order themes in order to extract historical facts about 
early Islām.  Among these, three contiguous primary themes dominate early Islāmic 
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historiography: sīra – ridda – futūḥ.  Bridging the gap between the two crystallized 
themes of sīra and futūḥ, it is clear that ridda forms the nexus of this triad.  Since ridda 
represents a genuine theme from which historians can reconstruct the oldest layers, the 
identification of three original ridda subsets is particularly significant.  These generic 
themes are: tribal groups – tribal leader’s deeds – great tribal battles.  Reflecting 
dominant themes prevalent in the ‘Battle-Days of the Arabs’ (ayyām al-‘arab) genre, 
these themes are of pre-Islāmic provenance.79  Interestingly enough, the confluence of 
these themes generates the Islāmic sub-theme of maghāzī and the complex of sub-
thematic rubrics: conquest of provinces – storming of cities – great conquest battles.  
Ultimately, it is from these pre-Islāmic themes that the primary Islāmic themes of sīra, 
ridda, and futūḥ emerge.  In turn, this triad of primary themes generates the secondary 
and tertiary themes of early Islāmic historiography (SEE CHART 1.1). 
Since secondary and tertiary themes are reconfigured and take on narrative 
accretions, these themes rarely preserve historical information.  Secondary themes consist 
of dependent and independent types.  Dependent secondary themes (i.e., court and central 
government; law and administration) stem from the convergence of the dual primary 
themes, ridda and futūḥ.  On the other hand, independent secondary themes are 
introduced by medieval historians into the Islāmic historical craft.  These include 
annalistic style, causal links, and hijrī dating (i.e., chronology based on Muḥammad’s 
exodus from Makka to al-Madīna in 622 C.E.).  Lastly, tertiary themes stem from 
secondary themes.  For example, annalistic style gives rise to the arrangement of 
narratives according to caliphal reigns.  The tertiary theme of caliphal entitlement is also 





As the earliest stratum of the Islāmic historical tradition, ridda is the entry point into the 
past.  Waged in Arabia from roughly 632-634 C.E., the so-called ‘apostasy wars’ are 
chronologically positioned between two crucial sets of events in the annals of early 
Islāmic history, namely, the life of Muḥammad and the early Islāmic conquests.  During 
the interim, several historiographical tendencies can be identified with partisan religio-
political factions.  Early counter-communities’ interests in securing legitimacy meant a 
strong investment in the historical enterprise.80  In particular, the issues of the succession 
(khilāfa) to Muḥammad, the Islāmic conquests, and the first civil war (fitna) gradually 
assumed a doctrinal character that molded historical fact to fit within particular modes of 
mnemohistorical understanding.   
The official history of the ridda reads as follows: By the time the Messenger of 
God (rasūl allāh) passed away in western Arabia (al-Ḥijāz), the whole of the Arabian 
Peninsula had been converted to Islām.  Just before that event, furthermore, in ‘the Year 
of Delegations,’ Arab chiefs made a beeline for al-Madīna to capitulate and enter into 
Islām.  However, upon Muḥammad’s death, a number of these chiefs apostatized.  
Among their number was the ‘arch-apostate’ Musaylima, the ‘false prophet’ of the Banū 
Ḥanīfa in central Arabia (Najd).  Immediately following the ‘apostasy,’ Muḥammad’s de 
facto successor, Abū Bakr, quelled the ‘rebellions’ and brought the ‘apostates’ into the 
fold once more.  In quick succession, the unified Islāmic-Arab forces then dealt a 
debilitating blow to the Byzantine Empire, while simultaneously tolling the death knell 
for the Sāsānian Empire.  The Islāmic conquests were accordingly deeds of God 
accomplished through the Arabs.81   
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Based on the surviving material, modern historians have reassessed crucial 
narrative elements dictating this official ridda account.  For instance, they have called 
into question the degree of Muḥammad’s hegemony and the extent to which the Arabs 
actually converted to Islām.82  The trumped-up delegation narratives functioned to 
buttress Muḥammad’s claims to sovereignty over those of the king of al-Yamāma, 
Hawdha b. ‘Alī (d. ca. 630 C.E.).83  In fact, the tribal deputations that did arrive in al-
Madīna were little more than disenfranchised minority groups trying to gain the upper 
hand against their rivals back home.84  What is more, historians have systematically 
discerned four zones of Muḥammad’s influence in Arabia.85  According to this model, 
Muḥammad’s degree of control decreased from center to periphery.  The tribes in 
immediate proximity to Makka and al-Madīna were both politically and religiously 
Islāmicized.  However, those in the fourth zone (e.g., the Banū Ḥanīfa in al-Yamāma) 
were independent of him.  Therefore, it is clear that ‘apostasy’ (ridda) is a religiously 
charged label applied by Madīnan historians to the independent Banū Ḥanīfa who never 
collectively embraced Islām.86  As a matter of fact, a series of concentric zones of 
influence also radiated from al-Yamāma (SEE MAP 2.1).  So in effect, towards the end of 
Muḥammad’s life, there were two competing spheres of influence, ‘two Arabias’: central 
Arabia and western Arabia.87    
The primary theme of ridda originated from the insurmountable difficultly faced 
by Islāmic historians, lacking, as they did, any recourse to the original causal links.  
Committing the fallacy of presentism, these later historians worked under the assumption 
that Muḥammad was indeed the hegemon of Arabia.  It follows that their narrative 
needed to account for the large number of inexplicable campaigns that were waged in 
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Arabia following his death.  Consequently, the theme of ridda emerged because of its 
unifying explanatory power.88  That is, it was necessary for there to have been ‘apostasy 
wars’ in order to quell the ‘rebellion’ against Islām and the challenge it posed to the heirs 
to Muḥammad’s universal authority.  Seeing that Abū Bakr adopted the same belligerent 
measures against all the ‘rebels,’ these historians focused on narrating a single grand 
‘apostasy’ war fought after Muḥammad’s death.  Because the heterogeneous causes and 
motivations behind these counter-movements had become lost to view, the ridda became 
homogenized as a result.89  
Once introduced, ridda developed accretions within the secondary theme of law 
and administration.  Plagued by the problem of civil wars, medieval jurists had the 
question of defining an ‘apostate’ at the forefront of their minds.  They categorized 
apostates into two classes: (i) those who deny the Muslim creed (shahāda), namely 
witnessing the unity of God and Muḥammad’s apostleship, and (ii) those who refuse the 
payment of tithes.90  This twofold classification reflects the religious motivation of the 
jurists.  As a result of this religious tendency, tribes that had never converted to Islām at 
all became subsumed under one of these categories.  In fact, the motivation behind this 
ahistorical classification was to establish the legality of the so-called ‘apostasy wars’ 
waged by Abū Bakr.  In turn, this retroactive justification for Abū Bakr’s acts of war 
established an authoritative legal precedent for waging a just war against insurgents.  To 
meet their own legal needs, jurists such as al-Shāfi‘ī (767-820 C.E.) thus reshaped Islām’s 
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Chart 1.1: Themes of Early Islāmic Historiography
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These mnemohistorical and mnemolegal sources make evident the fact that the 
theme of ridda in no way bypassed the process of tendential doctrinization.  However, as 
a result of core displacement, the schematization of ridda reports was considerably 
mitigated.  Moreover, the amount of ridda material suppressed is less astonishing than 
the sheer amount preserved.91  Although these marginal reports are by no means neutral, 
nonetheless, ridda as a marginal event poses fewer difficulties for historical 
reconstruction.  It is here, accordingly, that historians must look in order to begin to 
discover early Islām.  Once again, the ridda are the ‘ears’ of the Islāmic historical corpus.  




Historians divide chronology into time periods amenable to analysis.  Two types of 
periodization, namely, intuitive and analytic, demarcate the chronological boundaries of a 
historical phenomenon under consideration.92  However, both of these types suffer from 
the same difficulty of ascertaining a dividing criterion.  In other words, what determines 
when one period ends and another begins?  A number of conceptual problems arise from 
separating one period from another.  As a result, historians must rethink how they divide 
history.   
 
Intuitive Periodization 
Historical actors use intuitive periodization to make sense of their own communal 
history.  Conscious of their founder’s role in history, these native historians primarily 
concern themselves with self-identification.  They split history into pre- and post-
communal stages.  The dividing line is the moment at which their community is founded.  
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For example, intuitive periodization segments Islāmic history into two periods: Ignorance 
(jāhiliyya) and Islām.  Originally more of a moral judgment than a chronological 
determination, this intuitive periodization contrasts polytheism and monotheism, that is, 
unbelief juxtaposed with belief.  Consequently, problems of framing and structure stem 
from this type of periodization.93   
Couched in moral terms, the Ignorance–Islām divide determines how history is to 
be narrated.  Historical agents of change take a backseat to moral causal factors.  To 
elaborate, history moves forward not because of natural and human action, but rather 
because of an internal moral logic.  Above all, history marches towards salvation.  
Structuring history around deliverance, intuitive periodization is prone to the fallacy of 
teleology.  Just as an acorn becomes an oak tree, native historians see in the beginning of 
time the seed of salvation.  In fact, native Islāmic historians (e.g., Ibn Isḥāq) see primeval 
monotheism in the mnemohistorical Abraham who was a ‘pure monotheist’ (ḥanīf).94  
Open to all the vagaries of time, this pristine monotheism became corrupt when idolatry 
and apostasy reared their ugly heads.  Muḥammad then restored monotheism, and by 
setting the course of history right, he became its focal point.  His ‘community’ (umma) is 
therefore the community of salvation.  Because the acorn prefigures the tree, native 
periodization distorts the historical development of early Islām.  Take for instance the 
portrayal of religion in the so-called ‘age of ignorance.’  Later native historians cast west 
and central Arabian religion as debased idolatry, a moral low point characterized by sex 
and violence.  However, the Qur’ān portrays religion in western and central Arabia as a 
nondenominational monotheism.95  This contemporary document reveals a missing link 




When historical actors intuitively divide periods, historians must take this division into 
account with a grain of salt.  To divide history, modern historians use analytic 
periodization.  This can be either data derived (i.e., inductive) or theory based (i.e., 
deductive).  Inductive periodization is determined by sifting through relevant historical 
facts.  At times, its results can be counterintuitive.96  For example, historical actors may 
not be aware of significant long-term changes affecting their times.  Consider the slow 
but steady growth of Arab migration and settlement on the imperial borders before the 
Islāmic conquests.97  Although this major demographic shift played a significant role in 
the conquests, it is more often than not passed over in silence.  In addition, living in the 
present, a historical actor’s gaze fixes on that particular moment, losing sight of all 
others.  In the case of early Islām, the lightning-fast foreign conquests captured the 
attention of contemporaries, whereas domestic unrest went largely unnoticed.  On the 
other hand, deductive periodization is based on a dominant theoretical criterion.  For 
instance, political historians divide Islāmic history according to dynasties, most notably, 
the Umayyad and ‘Abbāsid.  However, ordering history on the basis of one factor of 
change neglects other factors such as religion and economics.98   
 
False Periodization 
When historians fail to divide chronology along lines conforming to the historical 
phenomenon investigated, ‘false periodization’ results.99  Historians of early Islām face 
this serious and insidious problem.  Relabeled pre-Islām and Islām, modern historians 
embraced the Ignorance–Islām division as their deductive model.  They expanded the 
geographic limits of pre-Islāmic Arabia to include South Arabia.  In addition, by taking 
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into account the Nabateans, they extended pre-Islāmic chronology to cover ancient 
Arabia.100  However, by adopting this dichotomous intuitive model, they inadvertently 
inherited its biases and fallacies.  Specifically, the temporal split between pre-Islām and 
Islām creates a false dichotomy.  This generates an either-or fallacy.  Everything – 
historical or thematic – must come either before or after Muḥammad.  There is nothing in 
between.  Any continuity between these allegedly incommensurable periods is reduced 
and homogenized.  For example, in the portrayal of Arabian religion, this either-or 
periodization obfuscates the all-important development of a nondenominational 
monotheism in Arabia.  Therefore, the pre-Islām–Islām periodization is fallacious.  In 
fact, this official periodization masks a third intermediate category: proto-Islām.  As a 
temporal category straddling the pre-Islāmic and Islāmic periods, proto-Islām offers a 
fresh perspective on the development of early Islām.  The result is a new tripartite 
periodization: pre-Islām – proto-Islām – classical Islām.  
 
Proto-Islāmic History 
Proto-Islām accounts for seemingly inexplicable events in western and central Arabia.  
Consider the historical and mnemohistorical presence of Musaylima in the Islāmic 
historical tradition.101  Muḥammad’s hagiography clearly indicates that Musaylima the 
man and ‘Musaylima the Arch-Liar’ are present both before and after Muḥammad.  
Pertaining to the period prior to Muḥammad’s birth, another source attributes the 
eponymous title ‘Raḥmān’ to Musaylima.102  From this it appears that knowledge of 
Musaylima’s preaching circulated among the Makkans.  On one occasion, Muḥammad 
recited the opening phrase: ‘In the Name of the Merciful and Compassionate God’ 
(bismillāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm).  The Makkans mocked him because they interpreted this 
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to mean, ‘In the Name of the Merciful God, al-Raḥmān.’103  At another time, the 
perplexed Makkans sent a delegation to al-Madīna to inquire about Muḥammad’s 
preaching.  They related that “He [Muḥammad] has claimed that he is the Messenger of 
al-Raḥmān.  Indeed, the only al-Raḥmān we know is the one of al-Yamāma.”104  Another 
report preserved in Muḥammad’s religious biography relates that after losing his tribe’s 
protection, he appealed directly to the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads for assistance.  They rejected 
his appeal outright.  After his exodus (hijra) to al-Madīna, he reviled Musaylima by 
calling him ‘the liar.’105  Other sources preserve fragments of a lively correspondence 
between the two leaders and also narrate their meeting in al-Madīna.  Lastly, reports 
attest that only after Muḥammad’s death did Musaylima meet his end in the so-called 
‘apostasy wars.’  As a matter of fact, Musaylima’s legacy lived on well into the early 
modern era.106  These reports unequivocally situate Musaylima and his movement before 
and after Muḥammad.    
However, all historians of early Islām share a common assumption.  Following 
native Islāmic historians, modern historians equate the historical ridda wars with the 
ridda theme.  As a result, ridda research is limited exclusively to the period after the 
death of Muḥammad, that is from 632 to 634 C.E.  Their research never goes beyond what 
the Islāmic historical tradition designates as ‘apostasy’ (ridda).  Yet the phenomenon of 
ridda chronologically extends well beyond the scope of both the ridda theme and the 
historical ridda wars.  In fact, the ridda phenomenon commences well before Muḥammad 
and continues well after him.  This continuity that spanned the pre-Islāmic and Islāmic 
periods was previously concealed under the dominant periodization.  Similar to the 
phenomenon of an Arabian nondenominational monotheism, the ridda phenomenon falls 
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neatly within the proto-Islāmic period.  From this it is clear that historians must escape 
the baited trap of native Islāmic historical and thematic categories of ‘apostasy.’  They 
must look to proto-Islāmic history in order to reconstruct early Islām.   
 
Subject 
Periodization and its subject matter are interlinked.  Originally, the placement of the 
fourth and final ridda subtheme of Musaylima was problematic.  It could only be 
regarded as either pre-Islāmic or Islāmic.  Accordingly, historians overshadowed the 
Musaylima subtheme under the Islāmic thematic umbrella.  However, moving beyond 
‘apostasy,’ historians must now place Musaylima under the proto-Islāmic category.  
Therefore, the historical and thematic figure of Musaylima emerges as the subject of 
proto-Islāmic history (SEE CHART 1.1).  Yet official historians (e.g., Ibn Isḥāq, Ibn 
Ḥubaysh) have through the ages typecast Musaylima in the villainous role of heretic.  
Furthermore, when these historians recast him in a pseudo-prophetic role, they do so only 
for comedic effect.  On the other hand, Sayf, the Kūfan counterhistorian, casts him in a 
positive light as a hero, saint, and martyr.  Sifting through this heresiographical and 
hagiographical debris, the problem of writing a history of Musaylima comes to the fore.      
 
Heresiography 
History is written by the victors, and so too are works on heresy.107  Demonizing the 
enemy, heresiographies are not historical texts.  Rather, they are functional and 
performative in nature.  They function to define the ‘sameness’ that binds together 
orthodox communal identity against the ‘otherness’ of heterodoxy.  As performative 
texts, they forge this identity by reenacting their founder’s mnemohistorical drama 
against an artificial foil.  Contrasted with the protagonist, the Musaylima foil serves to 
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emphasize Muḥammad’s prophetic credentials.  Beauty and truth go hand in hand.  
Whereas Musaylima is described as pale and thin, Muḥammad shines as the epitome of 
beauty.108  Roots and truth also stand side by side.  While Muḥammad’s universal family 
tree is the centerpiece of genealogical works, Musaylima’s languishes in the corner.109  
Cast as the imposter-prophet, Musaylima provides comic relief.  Mimicking Muḥammad, 
his miracles go hilariously haywire.  When Musaylima strokes the head of a newborn, the 
child goes bald.110  If Muḥammad blesses a freshly dug well, sweet water sprouts 
forth.111  But when Musaylima blesses a well, it dries up.112  Even Musaylima’s 
revelations are made into Qur’ānic parodies.  The most famous of these verses reads: “O 
immaculate frog, neither do you refuse drink, nor do you muddy the water.”113  Once 
decontextualized, these lines were no doubt cited to extol Muḥammad’s virtues at 
Musaylima’s expense.     
Typecast as the impostor, Musaylima is libeled by official heresiographers.  In 
fact, the name Musaylima is in itself a diminutive of Maslama, a variant form of his given 
name, Aslam.114  As a ridda diminutive, it corresponds to a group of such belittling 
names which include Ṭulayḥa (Ṭalḥa), Ukaydir (Akdar), and most notably, Abū Hurayra 
(a one-time governor recalled from al-Yamāma).115  Musaylima’s title is also revealing.  
Unceremoniously dubbed ‘the Arch-Liar’ (al-kadhdhāb), this epithet ostensibly contrasts 
with Muḥammad’s designation, al-Amīn (‘the Trustworthy’).116  Although hagiographers 
relate an anecdote to support the pseudo-etymology of Muḥammad’s title, it is 
nevertheless evident that al-Amīn was his given name (ism), not his title.117  The actual 
contrapositive to al-Kadhdhāb (‘the Mendacious’) is al-Ṣiddīq (‘the Veracious’).  This is 
the title of none other than Abū Bakr, de facto successor to Muḥammad and victor of the 
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so-called ‘apostasy wars.’  Hagiographers also deploy a literary scheme to mask this trail 
by using pseudo-etymologies to narrate various contradictory occasions on which Abū 
Bakr was supposedly given this title.118  Despite these efforts, the essential historical 
tension between ‘the Mendacious’ and ‘the Veracious,’ that is, between Musaylima and 
Abū Bakr remains.   
Although heresiography resorts to these kinds of caricature, ridicule, and name-
calling, these polemics nevertheless reveal a real power struggle between early counter-
communities and their competing histories.119  Official heresiography attempts to 
subsume them all under the single rubric of ‘apostasy.’  As the transmitter of many ridda 
reports, Abū Hurayra relates this prophetic tradition: “The hour will not come until thirty 
antichrists come forth, each of them claiming to be a prophet.”120  Given the 
eschatological character implicit in salvation history, Islāmic historians hurriedly 
attempted to account for these thirty false prophets.  They lumped together into this 
numerical topos divergent religious and secular ‘rebel’ leaders who were now recast as 
false prophets.  Non-religious movements such as Umm Ziml’s also fell prey to this 
rubric of ‘apostasy.’  In effect, Islāmic historians of heresy created a false milieu: the 
ridda.   
 
Hagiography 
As opposed to the abundance of writing on heresy, hagiographical fragments on 
Musaylima are limited.  Hagiography is characterized by the same functional and 
performative qualities as heresiography.  In contrast, hagiography seeks to sacralize 
rather than demonize its subject.  As a subtle form of political apologetic, it tends to rely 
heavily on subtext.  In other words, explicit themes remain unexpressed on the surface 
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level.  By focusing on specific events or doctrines promulgated by the founding hero-
saint, hagiography reveals the community’s deep-seated identity.  For example, the 
manner of a hero-saint’s death is especially significant.121  In the case of Kūfan counter-
history, Sayf twice narrates Musaylima’s last words: “Fight for your noble descent!”122  
Elsewhere, it is reported that Musaylima and his followers fought and fell like lions in 
‘the Oasis of Death’ (ḥadīqat al-mawt).123  Here, Musaylima is immortalized as a 
martyr.124  Consequently, he embodies the heroism (muruwwa) which is the highest 
virtue of tribal ethos.  Especially noteworthy is Sayf’s account of Musaylima’s death.  As 
Khālid inspects the corpses, Sayf’s narrative identifies the body of Musaylima’s right-
hand man, but fails to identify the corpse of the ‘deathless’ hero-saint.125  Therefore, al-
Ṭabarī – who preserves his own reworking of Sayf – needs to resort to another authority 
to make a positive identification of Musaylima’s small and pale remains.126  A further 
indicator of Musaylima’s elevated status is his age.  He is reported to have died at the ripe 
age of a hundred and fifty.127  As a hagiographical embellishment, this emphasizes the 
hero’s near immortality.   
Hagiographical fragments on Musaylima also highlight his teachings.128  In fact, 
his proto-Islām has an uncanny resemblance to that of Muḥammad’s.  In stark contrast to 
the pre-Islāmic age of ignorance, these hagiographical materials clearly indicate that 
Musaylima’s proto-Islām regulated sex (i.e., unless for procreation) and violence (e.g., 
female infanticide).  Characterized as a monotheist and ascetic, Musaylima enjoins 
prayers, fasting, and abstention from sins of the flesh.  He calls for recognition of the one 
God, al-Raḥmān.  In addition, his doctrines recognize a Day of Reckoning and a 
Kingdom of Heaven.  Other verses are also preserved.  Notable are the talismanic lines in 
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defense and praise of Sayf’s ancestral tribe.  Musaylima once said that “Banū Tamīm is a 
tribe of purity, an independent tribe with nothing reprehensible about them and [who pay] 
no tribute [to anyone]; let us be allies of protection with them in goodness as long as we 
live, let us protect them from every person, then when we die their fate will be to the 
Merciful One (al-Raḥmān).”129   
 
Historiography 
As mentioned above, official Islāmic historians attempted to place Musaylima after 
Muḥammad, intentionally placing the cause after the effect.  In order to accommodate 
this official interpretation of history, these historians fashioned a false milieu of 
‘apostasy.’  Musaylima, among others, became an imposter, i.e., an imitator mimicking 
Muḥammad.  Nevertheless, once this false milieu is cast aside, the question of 
contextualizing Musaylima and Muḥammad remains.  Some historians, on the other hand, 
have argued that since both preachers employed the same religious institutions (e.g., the 
caller to prayer: mu’adhdhin), these institutions must have emerged from a shared 
prototype.  They maintain that ‘analogous effects must originate from analogous 
causes.’130  The cumulative effect of such shared prototypes is a shared milieu.  They also 
contend that Musaylima and Muḥammad were independent products of their 
environment.  One preacher was not dependent upon the other, nor were their respective 
movements.  However, a milieu can only delimit the coordinate plane in which a 
discourse is generated; it cannot generate the discourse itself.  Put differently, there is a 
serious problem of agency in the development of early Islām.  Only historical actors 
could have set proto-Islām into motion.  It could not have given rise to itself.  The 
unmistakable resemblance of the teachings and institutions of the two preachers points to 
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either a primacy of one over the other or a codependency.  Given Muḥammad’s late 
arrival on the scene, Musaylima’s primacy necessarily follows.  Therefore, Musaylima – 
from this point forward Aslam – is the subject of proto-Islāmic history.  Narrating the life 
and times of Aslam proves to be another problem altogether. 
 
Narrative Reconstruction 
Function of a Narrative 
History is the past described, it is not the past itself.  Otherwise stated, history is 
historiography.131  Historical writing is the representation of past events in a nonfictional 
narrative format.  Since history is told through the perspective of time, its narrative 
development is linear; it begins at the beginning and ends at the end.  The narrative form 
of history performs several functions.132  First, it serves a heuristic purpose by aiding 
historians in processing and comprehending the past.  Next, it gives order to the 
description of past events.  Lastly, it serves a restorative function.  Historians use the 
structure inherent in narrative to repair and restore damaged histories.  The cumulative 
effect of narrative is history.  When historical facts are plugged into a narrative template, 
otherwise unseen and unaccounted for historical facts are forced to the fore.  These new 
facts are then ordered and synthesized with the old to forge a new narrative.  The result is 
the recovery of the past.  For this reason, the fractured historical record of proto-Islām 
ideally lends itself to narrative reconstruction.  Framing and filling are two stages of this 
reconstruction.133   
 
Framing 
Disparate and often putatively contradictory facts about the past are ordered by narrative 
parameters.  A three-tier principle governs the narration of proto-Islāmic history: (i) 
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frameworks, (ii) levels, and (iii) factors.  Proto-Islām’s linear framework progresses in 
three developmental phases: early, middle, and late proto-Islām.  This framework reflects 
the major turning points in history.  For example, early proto-Islām begins by tracing the 
emergence of the Banū Ḥanīfa as the protector of central Arabia.  After sketching the rise 
of Aslam, early proto-Islām ends with the Banū Ḥanīfa’s hegemony over Arabian 
commerce.  Middle proto-Islām, on the other hand, begins with the mobilization of 
Muḥammad’s reform movement in western Arabia and ends with his triumph there.  Late 
proto-Islām then follows the confrontation of these two leaders and these two Arabias.  
Lastly, the new order established by Abū Bakr constitutes the post-development of 
classical Islām.   
Two levels of interaction are at work in proto-Islāmic Arabia (i.e., local and 
regional).  The narrative of proto-Islām follows developments at both levels, and the 
ways in which one of these affects the other.  The main local levels include al-Yamāma 
in central Arabia (Najd) and Makka in western Arabia (al-Ḥijāz).  These two local levels 
interact to form a trans-Arabian sphere of action.  There are also three operative ethno-
historical factors in proto-Islām, i.e., contexts, agents, and shifts.  Contexts are the 
societal, environmental, ideological, and human surroundings in which historical agents 
act.  Existing at the local and regional levels, contexts are the setting and backdrop of 
their times.  Embedded within these contexts are the agents who play their role in history.  
The two principal proto-Islāmic agents are Aslam and Muḥammad (from this point 
forward Amīn) whose actions bring about changes that ultimately reconfigure contextual 
conditions at play.  These historical agents’ actions cause ripples in society at the local 
and regional levels, in turn, shifting the course of human history.  For instance, the 
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creation of a regional economic hegemony by the Yamāmī leader Hawdha had far-
reaching consequences.  Most notably, it gave rise to a local opposition movement 
resisting this centripetal force.  Subsequently, this local effect itself became a cause 
which gave rise to the Makkan preacher Amīn.  Eventually, Amīn and his opposition 
movement put an end to Hawdha’s regional order, supplanting it with their own.   
 
Filling 
Once the frame sets the narrative parameters, this area is then populated with available 
descriptive facts and sequences of events.  The result is a punctured narrative shot full of 
holes.  These interpretive “gaps” range in size from small to large.  Filling is therefore the 
next stage of narrative reconstruction.  Interpretive fillers comprise: (i) logical fillers, (ii) 
replacements, and (iii) bridges.  Logical fillers are inferences used to repair micro 
fissures.  For example, when the temporal sequence of events is uncertain, historians 
extrapolate relative chronologies based upon available data.  For instance, the number of 
events transpiring between the battles at al-Buzākha and ‘the Oasis of Death’ indicate an 
interval that spanned at least two months.  Given that Khālid arrived at al-Buzākha (in 
central Najd) at the end of October 632 C.E., it follows that the Banū Ḥanīfa were 
defeated at al-Yamāma (in eastern Najd) around January 633 C.E.134  Once computed, this 
relative chronology is used as a logical filler to provide time perspective in the narrative.   
Replacements fill in midsize gaps left when literary devices have been excised 
from the narrative.  For example, pseudo-causes originally served as historical place 
holders.  Once removed, they are replaced with descriptive content.  Take for instance 
Aslam’s inverted miracles.  After the inversion is corrected, the miracles remain.  
Although Aslam is made the direct causal agent of the swelling of sweet water in the 
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wells, the fertility of the land, and the good health of the children, these nevertheless 
point to the prosperity of al-Yamāma.  This is corroborated by its agricultural 
productivity.  The area produced an abundance of dates, barely, and wheat.135  In fact, al-
Yamāma exported its surplus grain as far as Makka (known as ‘the valley without 
cultivation’) whose barren land made its inhabitants dependent upon grain arriving from 
al-Yamāma for survival.136  In short, Aslam’s miracles indicate that al-Yamāma was 
teeming with life.  Furthermore, the prosperity of the place was tied to his social and legal 
reforms.   
Bridges are the third and final fillers that hold together two historical phenomena 
when no causal link is directly given in the sources.  Consider, for example, a central 
historical problem concerning Amīn’s military career.  Soon after his exodus from Makka 
to al-Madīna, Amīn launched a series of military campaigns throughout the Arabian 
Peninsula.  The objective of his first failed campaign was to secure Dūmat al-Jandal, a 
remote north Arabian trading outpost.  A prolonged phenomenon, totaling no fewer than 
eighty campaigns with no apparent pattern, followed in the wake of this battle.  The 
sources are silent on the military strategy informing Amīn’s opening gambit here, as well 
as his successive campaigns.  It follows that this phenomenon is ‘poorly understood’ by 
historians.137  However, there exists another phenomenon that can shed light on this 
matter.  Amīn’s rival, Hawdha, monopolized an extensive trans-Arabian trade network 
which bypassed both Makka and al-Madīna in western Arabia.138  Originating in Dūmat 
al-Jandal, this network spiraled throughout the peninsula, ultimately funneling its goods 
into Hawdha’s capital, al-Yamāma (SEE MAP 2.2).  Amīn’s campaigns sought to reroute 
the flow of goods from central to western Arabia.  As a result, a one-to-one 
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correspondence emerges between Amīn’s military objectives and Hawdha’s trade 
network.  Therefore, this filler bridges a large gap in the narrative.   
Since gaps in a severely damaged historical narrative can rarely, if ever, be 
reconstructed without resorting to new interpretive materials, it is no surprise that these 
new materials closely resemble the old.  For example, in reconstructing the foundations 
of a brick building, a mason skillfully chisels the older damaged bricks and replaces them 
with new, stronger ones of the same shape and size.  Strikingly similar in technique, 
fillers resemble literary devices.  Nonetheless, as explanatory strategies, interpretive 
fillers are indispensible tools in the historian’s kit.  Since interpretation and description 




To systematically fill the gaps in the historical record, historians use the comparative 
method.  This method compares discrete facts that constitute concrete phenomena in 
order to extrapolate shared patterns.  Comparison is only feasible if two sets of 
phenomena already share a number of characteristics (SEE TABLE 1.4).  Take for example 
the following three sets: 
 
SET 1 SET 2 SET 3 
A C B 
B D C 
C E D 
D F E 
E G F 
 




Each set consists of five elements.  A comparison of Sets 1 and 2 yields three shared 









Table 1.5: Comparative Type 
 
three common elements and adds two further variables (X, Y) in order to account for 
those features not shared by the above two sets (A, B and F, G).  This generic 
comparative type is comprehensive as it anticipates further comparable phenomena, 
including Set 3 (SEE TABLE 1.4).   
 
Classes 
There are two classes of comparative types: historical and interdisciplinary.139  The 
distinction revolves around whether the data used to extrapolate a comparative type is 
strictly based upon historical facts, or upon a cross-section of different fields such as 
sociology and anthropology.  Irrespective of this distinction, the three-stage construction 
of both types is the same.  Whereas the first analytic stage determines sets of atomic 
facts, the second stage compares them.  In the third stage, their shared features are then 
synthesized into a comparative type.  Although the construction of comparative types is 
similar, their compatibility differs.  Since the historical class is narrow in construction, its 
application is generally limited to the field of history.  Conversely, the interdisciplinary 
class is broad in construction and therefore cross-compatible.  Accordingly, historians 




The comparative method is a powerful tool for restoring historical narratives.  This 
method is key for reconstructing ethno-historical factors such as agents, contexts, and 
shifts.  For example, a comprehensive account of proto-Islām entails reconstructing the 
power roles that historical agents assumed in Arabia.  However, the surviving facts are 
few and far between.  Historians nonetheless use the comparative method to identify 
three ideal types of legitimate authority: (i) traditional authority, (ii) charismatic 
authority, and (iii) rational-legal authority.140  Based upon custom, traditional authority 
is exemplified by the tribal chief.  Charismatic authority, on the other hand, takes either a 
political or demagogic form.  Political charisma is grounded in the person and heroic 
deeds of the conqueror.  Demagogic charisma, in contrast, is epitomized by public orators 
such as the poet and preacher.  Lastly, rational-legal authority is vouchsafed through the 
codification and enforcement of law.  All these types of legitimacy are not mutually 
exclusive, since historically they exist as “variants,” ‘transitional’ forms, and 
syntheses.141  In addition, multiple types of authority can be present simultaneously, one 
reinforcing the other; and, at times, these form a diachronic continuum of legitimation.  
By comparing these patterned types to extant historical facts, historians can 
systematically reconstruct the structure of power in Arabia.  In fact, surviving 
information indicates not only shifts in legitimation styles, but also the emergence of 
another discourse that combines the charismatic and traditional types, namely, religious 
legitimacy.   
The application of the comparative method also extends to reconstructing 
historical contexts.  For instance, there exist two dominant forms of social and 
environmental adaptation in Arabia (i.e., nomadism and sedentary society).  Some 
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historians have long considered these juxtaposed sectors to reflect a social bifurcation, 
therefore assuming a consequent friction between them.  As a result, they have used the 
nomadic-sedentary divide to account for a wide variety of historical phenomena 
extending from the rise of al-Madīna to the Arab conquest of the Middle East.142  
Comparative studies in human geography, however, demonstrate that this division does 
not constitute a static boundary between the two sectors of society.  In fact, both of these 
social forms are among a range of interdependent organizational types that make up the 
continuum of Arab society.  The insights garnered and gained from the comparative 
method make possible the reconstruction of the relationship between nomadism and 
sedentary life in late antique Arabia.   
Lastly, comparative research contributes considerably to the reconstruction of 
historical shifts in Arabia.  Take for example the dual processes of detribalization and 
retribalization.  Reflecting the fluidity of social modes of adaptation, these twin 
processual types account for how decentralized tribes become transformed into 
centralized states, and vice versa.  These processes therefore allow for the reconstruction 
of the sociological factors behind the transformation of the Banū Ḥanīfa into a major 
sedentary power centered in al-Yamāma during the early proto-Islāmic period.  In sum, 
the judicious application of the comparative method as a critical filling technique results 
in the rich narrative reconstruction of proto-Islāmic history.  
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The Persian-Sāsānian Empire had extended its sphere of influence into central Arabia (al-
Yamāma) as early as the third century C.E.  With the decline of its Lakhmid client state in 
the south-western ‘Irāqī city of al-Ḥīra, al-Yamāma came under the sway of the Kinda.1  
This tribe consolidated its power over central and northern Arabia, thereby forging a 
formidable confederacy.  However, its rule in al-Yamāma was short-lived.  Intertribal 
conflicts and wars of succession bled them dry.  When the Kinda fled central Arabia 
around 530 C.E., a political vacuum emerged in its wake.2  To suit the exigencies of the 
moment, its constituent nomads reverted to forming their own temporary alliances.  As a 
result, decentralization – coupled with the breakdown of frontier defenses – created the 
crisis of town and village life during this period.   
 
Decentralization 
Besides settlements and oases, central Arabia consisted largely of pasture districts 
demarcating particular nomadic spheres of action and influence.  These comprised water-
sources, domesticated animals, settlements, and regional markets.  Although located in a 
specific pasturage and projecting itself as a single entity, a nomadic group was 
nonetheless divided along lines of “kinship, geographical location, or interests.”3  In a 
region characterized by the scarcity of resources, raiding and tribute to a large degree 
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informed central Arabian socio-political and economic structures.  Raiding was a 
reciprocal means by which resources were distributed and redistributed in the region.  
Reduced to tributary status by the nomads, the sedentary populace was unable to rise 
above the local level.  Accordingly, this precluded the formation of alliances to secure 
their territorial, agricultural, and commercial interests against nomadic despoliations.  
Therefore, villages, towns, and settlements fell within the purview of the nomadic group 
within whose pasturage they happened to be situated.  Since nomads either migrated 
according to the changing seasons, demographic and ecological necessity, or 
displacement by other tribes, pasturages frequently changed hands.  As a result, this led 
to the high frequency of the formation and dissolution of nomadic alliances.4  For the 
sedentary populations, this meant shouldering the economic burden of multiple tributes 
which became all the more difficult to bear.  Left unchecked, competing nomadic groups 
wreaked havoc on the settlements, destabilizing al-Yamāma.  These unstable social, 
economic, and political conditions provided the catalyst for the rise of a number of local 
and regional enterprises emerging to fill the power vacuum.  Among these was the Banū 
Ḥanīfa tribe.   
 
Tribe 
Nomads order societal relations according to (i) family, (ii) clan, (iii) tribe, and (iv) 
confederacy.  The basic unit of a tribe is the family.  This independent group labors 
together to provide daily necessities for its members.  For the purpose of protection and 
herd management, a group of families forms a clan.  As a political reaction to outside 
pressures and threats, clans coalesce into a tribe headed by an elected chief who serves as 
first councilor.  In turn, a tribe is a constituent element within a macro political order, 
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namely, a confederacy.5  As larger expressions and extensions of aligned tribes, 
confederacies provide regional socio-economic and political stability.  However, they are 
not conglomerations solely of tribes; rather, overseen by a chief, they form an alliance 
among the nomads and the sedentary populations.  The actual or derivative relations 
among members of a clan, tribe, and confederacy are forged through the mechanism of 
kinship which necessitates common interests, not blood relations.6  On the clan as well as 
the tribal and confederate levels, genealogy facilitates the formation and dissolution of 
these groups.  Nomads, however, do not exclusively participate in tribal forms of 
organization; both rural and urban sedentary populations are involved as well.   
 
Retribalization 
Coexisting as an alternative structure to centralizing enterprises (e.g., Kinda), tribal 
society serves the same essential functions of organizing and governing populations.  
Known as retribalization, centralized enterprises transform into decentralized tribes when 
they cease to secure the safety and welfare of its subjects.7  A centralizing enterprise 
dissolves when (i) the bureaucratic apparatus breaks down, (ii) commercial networks 
destabilize, and (iii) the enterprise can no longer supply food stuffs.  Under these 
conditions, local populations look elsewhere.   
In the second quarter of the sixth century, al-Yamāma had witnessed the 
breakdown of the Kinda’s institutions and authority.  Dependent upon the security of the 
countryside, the urban food supply had been compromised.  The number of predatory 
pastoral nomads pillaging sedentary agricultural populations increased dramatically 
during this period.  Their numbers included internally displaced sedentary populations 
(i.e., “ex-farmers”) who adapted to nomadic pastoralism and raiding as a means of 
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survival.8  The centralized Kinda enterprise had in effect failed to protect and provision 
its subjects.   
In the aftermath of the Kinda’s flight south to Ḥaḍramawt, the Banū Ḥanīfa 
started to overtake al-Yamāma’s numerous fortresses and villages.  Many of the Kinda’s 
former subjects sided with the Ḥanafī chief, Qatāda b. Maslama (r. until ca. 600 C.E.).9  In 
exchange for protection, he received tribute from al-Yamāma’s sedentary population.  
Central Arabian cities, their agricultural hinterlands, and trade routes soon came under 
the protection of the Banū Ḥanīfa.  Spearheaded by them, the new nomadic-sedentary 
alliance was successful because of the social positioning of Qatāda’s semi-sedentary clan.  
The fact that his clan was not purely nomadic allowed him to negotiate with the sedentary 
population.10  As chief and first councilor, he forged this alliance by balancing the vested 
interests of both his nomadic and sedentary followers.  By making them clients of the kin 
group, the sedentary population was assimilated into the tribe.  During his chieftainship, 
the Banū Ḥanīfa went from raiding to protecting its newly acquired Yamāmī towns.11   
 
Detribalization 
When the townspeople submitted to Qatāda’s chieftaincy, he confirmed their land 
tenures.12  Over time, the direct and sustained contact of the nomads with sedentary 
populations set into motion the process of detribalization.13  This transformation from a 
decentralized tribe into a centralized state is accompanied by sedentarization, that is, the 
settlement of the nomads.  As more Banū Ḥanīfa began to settle and till the soil, 
affiliation with place substituted kinship.  In other words, the nomads increasingly 
identified with their town and territory.14  The set of demands placed upon Qatāda to 
govern an agricultural and urbanized society with its complex economy and relations, 
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moreover, required that he adopt ‘sedentary models’ of governance.15  Status was now 
accorded in the manner of a centralizing state, that is, through a tax register.  
Consequently, the Banū Ḥanīfa was fundamentally transformed in terms of social 
organization.  No longer an exclusively nomadic tribe, it became a joint sedentary-
nomadic confederacy.   
As a result of the peace secured by the Banū Ḥanīfa, a symbiosis emerged 
between the nomadic and sedentary populations.16  Nomads bartered for dates, wheat, 
equipment, utensils, and weapons; in exchange, they traded clarified butter, domesticated 
animals, and other animal products.  This commercial activity between these two sectors 
was not limited to the marketplace.  In fact, merchants from the city would venture into 
the nomadic zone to transact business.  Additionally, the nomads – through the 
institutions of companionship and honor – provided for the safe passage of goods and 
persons through their respective territories.  This extended the reach of al-Yamāma far 
beyond the isolated Najd plateau (located in central Arabia).  Furthermore, owing to the 
interaction between these two sectors, cultural traits (e.g., language, values, mores, 
traditions) were transmitted, and actual and fictional kinship relations developed.17  Peace 
and prosperity turned into profit, fueling unprecedented economic, demographic, and 
urban growth in the area.   
 
Imbalance 
The ancient oasis-town of Jaww in al-Yamāma flourished into a sizeable city.  This and 
other similar oasis-cities (e.g., Ḥajr) developed when a cluster of villages unified.  These 
oasis-cities gradually drew other surrounding villages into their urban production and 
consumption economy.  They also attracted the inhabitants of nearby villages which 
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ultimately led to an ‘urban demographic implosion’ and depopulation of the agricultural 
hinterland.18  This implosion eventually turned into a rural demographic explosion that 
created a multiplicity of new villages.  This enlarged rural countryside provisioned the 
city, while nomadic pastoralists subsisted on its fringes.  Complex economic, social, and 
political relations resulted from this urbanization and ruralization.  Ultimately, this 
stratification bred strife.     
 
Stratification 
Commerce, mining, and agriculture formed the main economic basis for these urban 
centers and their hinterlands.  These cities’ complex division of labor included nobles, 
peasants, merchants, artisans, and camel drivers.  Consequently, this division of labor 
eventually overshadowed kinship.  For this reason, social relations became increasingly 
based upon economic stratification.19  At first, these self-sufficient cities engaged in 
commerce through surplus production.  Commerce became even more significant over 
time.  For example, the area’s main market in al-Falaj boasted four hundred shops and a 
bustling slave trade.20  Once the marketplace connected the nomads to the city, their 
business became essential to the local and regional economy. 
al-Yamāma prided itself on the high quality of its succulent meats, white wheat, 
curative water, and wide variety of dates.21  In addition to cultivating date palms, staples 
(e.g., barley), and small fruit bearing trees (e.g., pomegranates), it also produced cash 
crops (e.g., sugar).  Total agricultural yield increased at an exponential rate in its forty-
three valleys.  For instance, it produced more dates than all of western Arabia 
combined.22  This intensive agriculture required large sums of investment and operating 
capital for the construction and maintenance of irrigation canals.  In particular, its 
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growing agricultural sector depended heavily upon access to reclaimable land and 
intensive manual labor.  Agriculturally-linked industries (e.g., milling, tool manufacture, 
distribution) were affected by the investment upturn.23  Therefore, sizeable increases in 
investment led to the rise of a whole agricultural sector that further drew the rural 
population into the urban economy.   
There was no shortage of labor in al-Yamāma.  In fact, peasants, transients, and 
slaves were abundant, cheap, and expendable.  Slaves, for example, comprised one third 
of its total population, with upwards of four thousand slaves working a single 
plantation.24  Agricultural and industrial laborers, though they formed the majority, were 
only begrudgingly accepted in society.  Only those of ‘pure’ tribal descent of the upper 
stratum held leadership positions.  Yet, as a malleable device, tribal descent forged 
together an inclusive urban, rural, and nomadic elite.  The urban notables included the old 
landed aristocracy whose landholdings Qatāda had guaranteed.  To these were added new 
Ḥanafī landholding elite families similar to that of Qatāda.  The rural gentry consisted of 
village heads and farm owners, while the nomadic nobility was composed of lesser 
nomadic chiefs, notably, Thumāma b. Uthāl (d. 632 C.E.).  The rural and nomadic gentry 
held great power.  Rural heads had the ability to refuse grain, while nomadic chiefs had 
the capacity to block trade.  Therefore, all three gentrified classes formed an uneasy 
alliance.25  Although civic identification ostensibly unified these elites and their 
constituencies, power plays at court reverberated throughout al-Yamāma along kinship 






In a land of plenty, the underlying problem was not production, but distribution.26  
Agricultural surplus and industrial products (e.g., textiles, leather goods) were exported 
far and wide.  Yamāmī grain not only supplied western Arabia (e.g., Makka and al-
Madīna), but also made its way into markets in southern ‘Irāq.  Agricultural profits, gold 
and silver bullion, and commercial tax revenues poured into elite coffers all the while.  
Reinvesting in agricultural expansion and land reclamation, these absentee landlords and 
merchants sought to meet foreign market demands.  These ventures, however, 
compromised domestic needs, placing an unbearable stress upon the land and its people.  
Unable to cope, indebted farmers became tenants, a virtually free labor source.27  The gap 
between the haves and have-nots widened.  This disparity resulted in the corrosion of the 
patron-client system, moreover, disrupting nomad-sedentary relations.28   
Qatāda’s transformation of the Banū Ḥanīfa into a sedentary polity marginalized 
those nomads who had brought him to power.  By means of taxation, he and his 
immediate successor regulated both their nomadic and sedentary subjects.29  The interests 
of the nomads were antithetical to the consolidation of Ḥanafī power.  No longer needed 
for their military services, some nomads were reduced to cottagers, while the poorer ones 
were relocated with their flocks to pasturages on the other side of the escarpment dividing 
al-Yamāma.30  Tossed to the side away from al-Yamāma’s agricultural heartland, these 
disenfranchised nomads were alienated.  Meanwhile, their desert brethren skirted 
southern al-Yamāma on the borders of the Empty Quarter.  Since both the urban labor 
class and rural populace maintained active kinship relations with the nomads, these three 
lower strata of society posed a formidable challenge to Qatāda’s authority.  For example, 
as agriculture pushed its limits on the desert fringes, it encroached upon the land of the 
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semi-nomadic Tamīm.31  As a result, heightened Ḥanafī-Tamīmī tensions slowly edged 
the nomads toward open revolt.   
What is more, the majority of al-Yamāma’s sedentary populace continued to live 
in poverty and squalor.  For this reason, some Ḥanafī laborers made their way back to 
western Arabia, the original homeland of the Banū Ḥanīfa.32  A moral uncertainty set in 
throughout al-Yamāma’s lower social strata.  Justice gave way to greed, governance to 
tyranny.  These forces ripped at the very seams of the traditional social fabric.  
Consequently, al-Yamāma was on the brink of splitting three ways.  The plight of the 
poor and disillusioned, however, did not go unnoticed.  Their crisis gave rise to a 




The agricultural peasantry bore the brunt of the shift from a subsistence to an emergent 
commercial economy.  The vested interests of the nobles (i.e., urban merchants, 
landowners, and gentrified chiefs) were diametrically opposed to those of the commoners 
(i.e., manual laborers, peasants, and nomads).  Food rations grew thin.  Diminishing rural 
resources put these peasants at odds with their nomadic neighbors.  Increasingly resorting 
to predation, these nomads disrupted the transit routes, thereby compromising the 
security of Persian trade.  No longer could the nobles turn a blind eye to the mounting 
crisis.  In response to this existential threat, the nature and role of authority in al-Yamāma 






Order and stability constituted the core interests of the peasantry who needed this security 
to conduct their daily social and economic activities.  Now vulnerable to external attack, 
they faced the difficult task of survival in a time when deadly nomadic raids razed their 
crops, ravished their women, and devastated their villages.  They desperately groped in 
the dark for an immediate solution to their predicament.  At one time, the peasantry at 
least had an option.  Although caught between a rock and a hard place, they could either 
submit to the nomads or the city dwellers for protection.  However, times had changed.  
The peasants were left to their own devices.  They had to rely on themselves, fend for 
themselves, and defend their own land.  In the midst of this chaos, an agrarian poet 
vented his grievances against the deteriorating state of his kinsmen.  In al-Yamāma’s 
central market square, his voice cut through the din of the crowd.  He implored them:  
Defend your cultivated land, 
Shelter the one seeking favor, 
And oppose the oppressor.33 
 
His verses polarized the populace, while galvanizing the peasants into action.  Swearing 
by the honor of their women, he openly declared the virtues of his fellow plowmen: 
By the women who scatter seed at planting, 
By the women reaping at harvest, 
By the women who winnow wheat, 
By the women who grind flour, 
By the women who break bread, 
By the women who break bread into crumbs, 
By the women who gobble mouthfuls of grease and fat, 
You [men] have been favored over the nomads, 
Nor shall the city folk take precedence over you.34 
 
Capturing the hearts and minds of his people, Aslam, the people’s poet, channeled ‘the 
strength of local interests’ into a grassroots movement.35 
The son of his village, Aslam b. Ḥabīb (d. 633 C.E.) was much more closely 
attuned to the challenges facing the peasants.36  His hometown was located in the al-
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‘Āriḍ district of central al-Yamāma where his family owned some farmland in al-Haddār 
and Ubāḍ.37  Situated near stable sources of water, al-‘Āriḍ was well-known for its 
irrigated valleys and agricultural produce, particularly its wheat.  Within this district lived 
the sedentary Banū Ḥanīfa.38  al-‘Āriḍ’s most important geographical feature was the 
Ṭuwayq escarpment, which acted as a natural defense against the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads on 
the other side.  At the heart of al-‘Āriḍ stood its commercial capital, Ḥajr where trade 
from Persia, ‘Irāq, al-Yaman, al-Baḥrayn, and al-Ḥijāz converged.39  As a social and 
political act in the market square, Aslam’s rustic poetry critiqued both his society and its 
rulers.40  His civil disobedience did not go unnoticed.  Promulgated through public 
oration and private conversation, his message spread far and wide, travelling along the 
pan-Arabian trade network.  As a result, he attracted a growing community of followers.  
Noteworthy were his highborn companions, the learned diplomat, al-Rajjāl b. ‘Unfuwa 
(d. 633 C.E.), and Muḥakkim b. al-Ṭufayl (d. 633 C.E.), the ‘old warhorse of al-Yamāma’ 
(muḥakkim al-yamāma).41  Moreover, Aslam’s preaching came to the attention of none 
other than Hawdha b. ‘Alī, the future successor to al-Yamāma’s first man.     
 
Coalition 
Hawdha hailed from the Suḥaym b. Murra clan of Banū Ḥanīfa.42  His powerful 
mercantile family controlled the caravan trade, while simultaneously monopolizing 
political control in Jaww.  Prior to his bid for power, he had failed to secure a Persian 
caravan train.43  Beset by Tamīm nomads, the caravan’s precious cargo was lost.  This 
transgression sparked an intertribal war between the Banū Ḥanīfa and Tamīm.  
Threatened by his rivals, Hawdha turned to the Persians who dealt the Tamīm a decisive 
blow.  Eclipsed by Hawdha (r. ca. 600-630 C.E.), Qatāda’s coalition fell apart.  The 
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capital of al-Yamāma then moved south from Ḥajr to Jaww.  In return for helping him 
subject the Tamīm to his will, Hawdha secured trade routes vital to Persian interests.  In 
exchange for performing and executing this duty, the Persian monarch deputized him as a 
vassal prince, bestowing the title ‘King of al-Yamāma’ upon him.44  He was in turn 
known as ‘bearer of the crown’ (dhū al-tāj).45  Thereafter, he set out to consolidate his 
power.   
Hawdha’s retinue included al-Rajjāl, Muḥakkim, Mujjā‘a b. Murāra (the land 
magnate), and Thumāma b. Uthāl (the chief of the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads).46  An astute 
politician, Hawdha understood the fragility of his authority in the face of the forces 
ripping at the seams of al-Yamāma’s social fabric.  Having curbed nomadic power on the 
periphery, he now moved to limit their range of action on the home front.  During 
Qatāda’s tenure, policies were instituted to forcibly settle the nomads in eastern al-
Yamāma in order to neutralize their mobility.  A settled population is governable and 
taxable.  However, Qatāda’s plan was only partially successful.  Restive nomads poured 
into western al-Yamāma, swelling Thumāma’s ranks.  Ruling to the west of the Ṭuwayq 
escarpment, while Hawdha ruled the east, Thumāma was known as one of ‘the two heads 
of al-Yamāma.’47  In order to maintain balance of power, Hawdha looked to the rural 
population to check the rising nomadic chief.  His experience with the Tamīm also 
demonstrated the limits of unorganized steppe warfare in light of the advanced state of 
Persian arms (e.g., infantry, armored cavalry, and siegecraft).  Accordingly, he began to 
deliberately shift away from the original core comprising the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads to a 
sedentarized military organization.48  Moreover, in rebuilding al-Yamāma’s economy, 
Hawdha recognized the central role of the agricultural sector.  For this reason, he turned 
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to Aslam, the de facto agrarian leader with whom he shared a common enemy, the 
envious nomads.  Joining forces with Aslam, their new coalition reformed society in 
order to strike an equitable balance centered on an inclusive city.  Aslam’s verses 
effectively fashioned a new civic identity: 
I swear by this city; 
And do not leave from this city 
Until you have property and progeny, 
And [you] grow numerous and are bound to it [viz. the city]; 
So imagine and reckon 
Until the end of time, 
In spite of those who envy.49 
 
In time, the broadening scope of Aslam’s concerns expanded his role from rural poet to 
sage-at-large.    
 
Sage 
Building on his role as rural poet, Aslam became a righter of wrongs.  In al-Yamāma, for 
example, the urban elite monopolized water rights that were crucial to the irrigation 
canals.  Naturally, the rural peasants required access to these aquifers.50  This brought 
matters to a head.  In order to prevent a resource war, he sued for peace: 
O immaculate frog, 
Neither do you refuse drink, 
Nor do you muddy the water.51 
 
In another similar incident, he fairly redistributed energy resources, calling once again for 
moderation: 
Indeed, we have given you coals; 
Thus take for yourself and do not hesitate. 
But be cautious [not] to be greedy and not to exceed [the bounds].52 
 
Acting as an intermediary between the urban and rural populations and the rich and the 





Aslam expressed his notion of civic justice with two central concepts, compassion (al-
raḥma) and the house (al-dār).53  With overtones of kinship, compassion represented his 
unifying code of conduct personified by the city’s merciful deity, al-Raḥmān.  As divine 
protector, al-Raḥmān was the source of al-Yamāma’s prosperity.  He was ‘the deity’ 
(allāh) of the farmer, the cottager, the miner, and the merchant alike: 
Remember the grace of the deity (allāh) and thank him, 
As he turned for you the sun into a shining lamp, 
And sent heavy rain; 
He brought forth for you the ram and the ewe, 
And granted you silver and glass, 
Gold and silk clothes. 
And it is from his grace that he brought out from the earth pomegranates,  
Grapes, sweet basil, 
Wheat, and bitter plants.54   
 
The Arabic root word for compassion (√rḥm) also signifies kinship through matrilineal 
descent (raḥim).55  Aslam was cognizant of the complex kinship relations permeating al-
Yamāma’s political clientele system.  In this patrilineal society, male descent polarized 
feuding factions.  Therefore, Aslam used the mechanism of kinship to broker political 
relations.  He cut across these party lines by appealing to a common matrilineal ancestor.  
In fact, the city’s founding myth recalled the memory of this shared matriarch, al-
Yamāma bt. Murra, who had been crucified on the town gate.56  Originally known as 
Jaww, Hawdha’s new capital was renamed al-Yamāma, a name which eventually 
broadened to encompass the whole area.  In addition, raḥim also connotes the physical 
sense of womb.  al-Raḥmān’s vibrant city, al-Yamāma is the womb from which its 
citizens issue forth.  This is why the founding of al-Yamāma is akin to the birth of a 
child: 
The deity (allāh) has been gracious to the mother-to-be; 
He has brought forth from her a living being that can move; 
From her very midst.57 
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Aslam’s second concept refers to an encircled dwelling (al-dār).  Overlapping 
with Hawdha’s ‘royal reserve,’ al-Raḥmān’s city was an enclosed sacred communal 
space.58  Just as the household was the fundamental unit structuring his village 
community, he conceived of al-Yamāma as a conglomeration of unified households.  
Matrilineal kinship and propinquity ordered this inclusive community, bound by common 
property, intermarriage, and justice.  ‘Compassion,’ ‘kinship,’ and the ‘womb’ are thus 
interlocked in his conception of an inclusive city based upon the household.59   
 
Lawgiver 
Backed by Hawdha, Aslam issued a series of prescriptive laws collectively known as the 
Commandment (al-Furqān).60  This set of versified moral codes was directed at 
institutional, social, moral, and legal reform.  The town crier (mu’adhdhin) who 
proclaimed these laws in the public square became a permanent feature of Yamāmī life.  
Aslam’s general legal principles reinforced traditional ethics and values (e.g., enjoining 
the good and forbidding the evil, almsgiving, equity, common defense).  In the area of 
criminal law, a specific statute outlawed female infanticide.  Pertaining to family law, he 
recommended monogamy and prescribed sexual abstinence after the birth of the first 
child.  In terms of commerce, he encouraged foreign merchants to settle in al-Yamāma, 
while at the same time making it a point to censure their questionable business practices: 
Indeed, we have granted you wealth; 
Thus pray to your lord (rabb) and emigrate. 
And, indeed, your wrongdoing is immoral.61   
 
As a result of Aslam’s inclusive policy, al-Yamāma’s population increasingly included 
Persian mercantile families.62  To ease the burden on the urban and rural poor, a 
moratorium was placed on the export of grain.63  In the same vein, sumptuary laws 
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limited expenditure for luxury goods.  Aslam forbade the consumption of fine wines and 
called for periodic abstention from food.  Looking to Aslam as a role model, modesty and 
piety now became civic ideals for the effete nobles:  
When I saw their faces they were comely, 
And their complexions were clear,  
And their hands were soft;  
I said to them, ‘You shall not come to women, 
Nor drink wine; 
But you are the company of the pious, 
Fasting a day 
And tasking a day.’64 
 
A significant portion of the moral code centered on ritual prayer.  As the frequency of 
interactions across kinship and class lines escalated, Aslam instituted ritual practices and 
urban ceremonies designed to normalize, unify, and legitimize the civic order.  In effect, 
these rituals bolstered the city’s shared moral outlook.  Their performance became part of 
al-Yamāma’s ‘drama of citizenship.’65  He entreated the citizens: 
Pray to your lord (rabb) and do not hesitate 
During the nights and regularly.66 
 
In time, he came to realize the special link between the numinous and the mundane: 
The deity (allāh) listened to whomever he listened to, 
And made him yearn for good when he yearned, 
And his cause is still arranged in everything that delights him. 
Your lord (rabb) saw you and gave you life and preserved you from loneliness, 
And saved you and gave you life on the day of his religion (yawm dīnih); 
For us some prayers of the company of the pious, 
Neither miserable nor licentious, 
Staying up at night and fasting by day; 
Indeed your lord (rabb) is great, 
The lord (rabb) of the clouds and the rain.67 
  
Aslam’s civic, legal, and moral precepts culminated in a unified religion.  The divine and 
human were bound by reciprocal ties of prosperity and prayer.  As a microcosm, the 





From Poet to Prophet 
Aslam’s reforms were a staggering success.  He managed to correct the class imbalance 
in al-Yamāma.  Domestic peace ushered in wealth and prosperity.  As the embodiment of 
piety, the city and its inhabitants were favored by al-Raḥmān.  Rumors soon circulated 
about Aslam’s charismatic power (al-amr).69  In the eyes of the common people whom 
the reformer-poet had freed from the bonds of earthly suffering, he was seen as nothing 
short of a miracle worker.  As the direct link between the city and its patron deity, the 
nature of his authority consequently transformed.  An agrarian poet turned moralist and 
sage, Aslam – in the popular imagination – was now vested with charismatic and 
kerygmatic powers.  Gossip turned gospel.  Soon his image would be cut from the same 
cloth as that of the prophets.    
 
Miracle Worker 
Conceived as ‘the lord of the clouds and the rain,’ al-Raḥmān was initially a ‘god of 
economy’ for peasants dependent upon the harvest.70  Although now bound to the 
inclusive city, al-Raḥmān retained these attributes, and Aslam, his agent, became the 
rainmaker.  Good harvests demonstrated the power and efficacy of the patron deity.  
Summoning down the harvest moon was among the miracles worked through Aslam.71  
In addition, the populace flocked to him to win his blessing.  Known for his congenial 
manner and believed to possess thaumaturgic powers, peasants and nobles alike implored 
him to work miracles on their behalf.72  Farmers reliant on irrigation sought him out to 
consecrate their newly dug wells, while the wealthy courted him to bless them with 
children.  Even nomads came to him in order to ensure long and prosperous lives for their 
newborn.  He was also called upon to pray on behalf of the sick and suffering.  As a 
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result of these intensified interactions and his exposure to multiple conceptions of the 
divine, Aslam’s own understanding of al-Raḥmān grew more complex.  Although al-
Raḥmān was the city’s patron deity, he was not coterminous with al-Yamāma.  al-
Raḥmān was there from the city’s beginning, but it was not his beginning, nor would its 
end be his. 
 
Prophet 
Recast in an urban environment, the figure of al-Raḥmān accrued additional universal 
characteristics.  With the further decline of al-Ḥīra, al-Yamāma received a steady stream 
of ‘Irāqī Christian scholars seeking patronage.  The sum of their transmitted knowledge 
reinforced and refined the ideological shift concerning the nature of al-Raḥmān.  
Originating in Christian circles active in al-Yamāma since the fifth century C.E., al-
Raḥmān was associated with a host of monotheistic concepts.73  Once reintroduced, these 
concepts universalized al-Raḥmān as the transcendental creator and immanent savior.  
‘The lord of the clouds and the rain’ thus transformed into ‘the lord of the heavens’: 
So praise be to the deity (allāh)!  Verily life came to where you live; 
Ascend to the king of heaven.74 
 
The language of the gospels (e.g., ‘kingdom of heaven’ (mulk al-samā’)) was 
reasserted.75  In tune with audience expectations, Aslam’s role as reformer was re-
scripted to that of religious virtuoso, an inner-worldly ascetic striving to match reality to 
his ideals.76  As a holy man, he donned prophetic garb: 
I am a herald (rasūl) with whom the creator is pleased, 
The powerful, the generous, and the provider to you.77 
 
Warning the wicked away from the road to perdition, Aslam’s Commandment (al-
Furqān) became a measure of salvation (furqān).78  Deviance from god’s commandments 
constituted sin that was to be reckoned on the day of judgment.79  Inspired by the 
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archangel Gabriel, al-Furqān attained the status of divine revelation.80  As ‘the herald of 
the deity’ (rasūl allāh), Aslam ultimately became the vehicle of salvation.  His town 
crier, Ḥujayr b. ‘Umayr, publicly proclaimed the Ḥanafī creed (shahāda):  
I witness that there is no deity but al-Raḥmān,  
I witness that ‘Abd al-Raḥmān [viz. Aslam] is the herald of the deity.81 
 
Endowed with charismatic and kerygmatic gifts, Aslam possessed the credentials of a 
true biblical prophet who acted ‘In the name of the merciful deity, al-Raḥmān.’82  Before 
long, he gathered around him a group of disciples who formed the nucleus of a fast 
growing communal network spreading throughout Arabia.   
 
The Muslim Movement 
Aslam’s inclusive city generated a new movement with its accompanying institutions.83  
As word of his prophecy disseminated throughout the peninsula, devotees of al-Raḥmān 
congregated at al-Yamāma.  As a result, the movement took on a life of its own.  
Additional layers of membership accumulated around Aslam’s original circle of close 
disciples, e.g., al-Rajjāl, Muḥakkim, and ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Nawwāḥa.  Consequently, they 
became apostles by extension.84  These companions turned their attention to ensuring the 
continuity of the movement.  In order to ‘secure the permanence’ of Aslam’s mission, 
they moved to routinize his prophetic authority (al-nubuwwa) by means of religion and 
the ritualization of power.85  They formalized his authority in a distinctively Yamāmī 
religious institution, i.e., the imāmate (al-imāma).86  His disciples’ interests coincided 
with the legitimation strategy of his ally, Hawdha, who was the functionary leader of al-





Aslam’s devotees called themselves the Raḥmāniyya, i.e., followers of al-Raḥmān, the 
Commiserator.88  Accordingly, Aslam’s honorific title became ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, the 
servant of al-Raḥmān.89  Throughout Arabia, his renewed monotheism coalesced with the 
efforts of Christian missionaries, monks, and preachers.  For example, Quss b. Sā‘ida – 
the itinerant Nestorian associated with the Christian community at Najrān – forcefully 
preached monotheism and resurrection at ‘Ukāẓ.90  This famous market was located near 
Makka along an increasingly Yamāmī-dominated trade network.  In addition, self-
generated monotheistic groups (e.g., that of Umayya b. Abī al-Ṣalt at al-Ṭā’if) later 
sprang up in cities across Arabia.91           
As the Imām of al-Yamāma, Aslam founded a non-denominational monotheistic 
religion.  This defining feature set it a world apart from ‘competing’ confessions.92  Over 
the course of time, the nature al-Raḥmān shifted as well.  Although beginning as a 
popular rural god of nature, the urban al-Raḥmān became a domestic deity, and above all, 
the elite’s god of salvation.93  As a matter of course, when this religion of salvation 
spread to the illiterate masses, al-Raḥmān was conflated with ‘Abd al-Raḥmān.94  Once 
equated with al-Raḥmān, Aslam was naturally looked upon as a personal savior.95  This 
reception induced a fundamental shift in the movement.  Aslam’s followers increasingly 
identified themselves as Muslims, literally those who ‘Aslamed.’96  Islām was their 
religion.  Facing al-Raḥmān’s shrine (ka‘ba) in Makka, the Muslims prayed three times a 
day and observed their holy month of Ramaḍān.97  Ritual ablution with water was 
permissible, while cleansing with sand was under all circumstances prohibited.  Dietary 
laws restricted consuming the flesh of fowl, and substances inducing altered states of 
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consciousness were tabooed.  Covering family, civil, criminal, and moral law, Islām was 
a comprehensive religion.   
 
Legitimation 
The question of legitimacy in al-Yamāma came to a critical juncture during Hawdha’s 
reign.  Early in his career, he had already repelled the forces of the ‘king’ of al-Ḥīra, 
‘Amr b. Hind (554-570 C.E.).98  After that, he had to contend with al-Ḥārith b. Wa‘la, a 
pretender to the throne.  He resorted to propaganda by enlisting the services of Maymūn 
al-A‘shā (ca. 570-625 C.E.).  This youthful blind poet lambasted the counterclaimant in 
support of Hawdha’s own claims as sovereign.99  al-Yamāma’s internal politics was also 
characterized by the struggle for a share in power and control of its distribution.  Its 
continued existence depended upon the acquiescence of power by the urban, rural, and 
nomadic subjects to their political ruler, Hawdha.  In turn, Hawdha’s appropriation of 
power necessitated its legitimation through internal justification.100  Installed as an 
indirect ruler, he was dependent upon the resources of the landed and commercial elite.  
His ambition, however, was to establish direct rule.  Drawing upon both the religious (al-
imāma) and functionary authority crafted at his court, his alliance with Aslam guaranteed 
a unique dual form of legitimacy.  With this in hand, Hawdha established and unified a 
patrimonial monarchy in al-Yamāma.  Once he had put his house in order, he fixed his 




Peace at home and war abroad created conditions favorable for al-Yamāma’s 
expansion.101  At the turn of the sixth century, the Arabian political scene was in turmoil.  
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One by one, Arab tribes wrested themselves from Lakhmid control.  With the murder of 
‘Amr b. Hind, the Usayyid clan of Tamīm had already begun to throw off the yoke of al-
Ḥīra.  However, the bloody reprisal cost them dearly.  Soon thereafter followed the 
pillaging of the royal caravan en route to ‘Ukāẓ, which sparked the protracted Fijār War 
that destabilized western Arabia.  The year 602 C.E. marked a turning point.  The last 
Lakhmid king, al-Nu‘mān III b. al-Mundhir IV (r. 580-602 C.E.), was deposed and put to 
death by the Sāsānid emperor, Khusraw II (r. 591-628 C.E.).  In the meantime, total war 
broke out between the Byzantine and Persian Empires.  Redirecting their resources, the 
Sāsānians minimized their garrison forces defending the Arabian frontier.  Consequently, 
the Bakr b. Wā’il tribal confederation defeated the Persians and their nomadic allies.  
This celebrated Battle of Dhū Qār (605 C.E.) signaled the beginning of the end for foreign 
rule.  This left a power vacuum in Arabia.  Enter al-Yamāma.   
 
Diplomacy 
The ensuing intertribal wars bled the nomads white.  Although a member of the Bakrī 
confederacy, the Banū Ḥanīfa had committed no men at Dhū Qār.  At the end of the day, 
al-Yamāma was unmatched in wealth, power, and resources.  Fielding an army of ten 
thousand, Hawdha became the de facto ruler of central and northern Arabia.102  Tribal 
chiefs directly dispatched delegations to al-Yamāma.  Some paid homage, others tribute.  
In return, Hawdha recognized their rights to communal pastures and watering grounds.  
To seal the deal, tribes contracted diplomatic marriages.  Worthy of note is Aslam’s 
marriage into one of Makka’s leading clans, ‘Abd Shams.  After Aslam had imposed the 
moratorium on grain exports, famine and disease hit Makka hard.103  In response, a 
Qurayshī deputation was dispatched to al-Yamāma to secure wheat vital to the survival of 
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Makka, the site of al-Raḥmān’s shrine.  After reaching a settlement that authorized 
limited shipments, the Qurayshī elite offered Aslam the hand of Ramla bt. al-Ḥārith.104  
An enduring alliance was born.  Under the protection of Thumāma b. Uthāl, Yamāmī 
grain once again flowed into Makka.105  Furthermore, commerce and peace led to 
conversion.  Drawn to the prospect of instituting similar reforms in their tribes, villages, 
and cities back home, a number of Arab delegates embraced Islām and became Muslims.   
 
Sphere of Influence 
al-Yamāma’s sphere of influence extended over three zones: direct, indirect, and 
independent (SEE MAP 2.1).  Hawdha directly controlled those tribes in the immediate area 
of al-Yamāma.  These included four Bakrī tribes, five Tamīm clans, the Numayr, and the 
Ka‘b and some Kilāb of ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a.106  He exacted taxes from them and the 
agricultural population.107  Village heads levied taxes in kind on irrigated and non-
irrigated lands, while commercial taxes were primarily market dues (maks) collected by 
agents.  Nomadic chiefs, on the other hand, gathered taxes in the form of sheep and 
camels from their kinsmen.  In the second zone, Hawdha held indirect sway over tribes in 
al-Yamāma’s vicinity, especially on the vast Najd plateau.  To the north was the Usayyid 
clan of the ‘Amr (of Tamīm b. Murr).  To the southwest were two branches of the ‘Āmir 
b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a of Hawāzin: the Sa‘d b. Bakr (who dwelt between al-Yamāma and al-Ḥijāz) 
and the ‘Uqayl.108  Not taxed in kind, these tribes paid with their services.  In other 
words, they secured Yamāmī trade passing through their pasture districts.  Lastly, among 
the independent tax-exempt tribes numbered the hostile Banū Sa‘d clan of Tamīm and its 
eastern enemies, the ‘Abd al-Qays.  To the north dwelt the Banū Fazāra of Dhubyān b. 
Ghaṭafān and the remainder of the Bakr b. Wā’il.109  Finally, to the west were the Thaqīf 
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of Hawāzin.  Although politically independent, these and other outlying territories were 
within al-Yamāma’s economic orbit.  For example, neighboring on Najrān, the lucrative 
Yaman-Ctesiphon trade route ran right through al-Yamāma’s al-Falaj district.110  





Map 2.1: Sphere of Influence 
 
Monopoly 
Fifty markets were scattered across Arabia.111  Of these, thirteen had risen to prominence.  
At one time tied into a Persian-dominated trade network, these markets ‘spiraled’ 
throughout the peninsula.112  Previously working through their Lakhmid intermediaries, 
imperial officials had exacted commercial taxes (maks), while the Tamīm confederacy 
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secured the circuit.  However, the outbreak of war between Byzantium and Ctesiphon had 
destabilized the quadrant.  As a result, trade experienced a marked decline.113  With the 
loss of its Lakhmid sponsors, the rapidly disintegrating Tamīm confederacy was no 
match for the rising power of the Banū Ḥanīfa.  Hard pressed on every side, the Persians 
now contented themselves with exercising nominal suzerainty in all but eastern Arabia.  
By 611 C.E., Yamāmī clients and agents flying the flag of Hawdha monopolized and 
transformed the old market cycle.  Spiraling throughout the peninsula, the trade vortex 
ultimately funneled its goods into Hawdha’s commercial capital, Ḥajr in al-Yamāma (SEE 
MAP 2.2).114   
 
Vortex 
The ancient site of Dūmat al-Jandal fed the market cycle.115  Located in northern Arabia, 
Dūma was the shipping hub between the greater Near East and Arabia.  Its well-fortified 
citadel was defended by the surrounding Banū Kalb.  As the main depot for the storage of 
merchandise, its market hosted wholesale traders dealing in sizeable quantities of artisan 
goods, luxury items, and slaves.  al-Mushaqqar in eastern Arabia was the next transit 
point along the network.  Specializing in perfumes, this luxury market was policed by the 
‘Abd al-Qays and a clan of Tamīm.  However, its location made it vulnerable to periodic 
attacks, especially after the waning of Persian power.  Incessant hostilities further spoiled 
relations between the ‘Abd al-Qays and the Banū Sa‘d of Tamīm.  From al-Mushaqqar, 
the trade sequence moved southeast to the third and fourth markets.  On the gulf, these 
markets at Ṣuḥār and Dabā benefited from the Indian Ocean trade.  The commercial cycle 
then swung downward around the great southern desert.  Once at al-Shiḥr, merchants 
purchased textiles and fragrances.  Further south was the port city of ‘Adan, and to its 
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north lay Ṣan‘ā’.  Both were held by Yamanī-born Persian families, known as the Abnā’.  
These markets boasted an excellent selection of merchandise (e.g., spices, dyes).  




Map 2.2: Trade Vortex 
 
between al-Ṭā’if and Nakhla in al-Ḥijāz, the ‘Ukāẓ market featured famed performances 
by poets and preachers who increasingly employed a Najdī-based poetic idiom.116  The 
‘Orator of the Arabs,’ Quss b. Sā‘ida of Iyād, spread his message here.  In addition to an 
active slave trade, this market was known for its famous leather goods.117  More 
significantly, it was a site of negotiation where alliances were born.  Moving westward, 
the circuit stopped at Majanna and Dhū al-Majāz.  Thereafter, the cycle worked its way 
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upward to Khaybar.  Accelerating downward into Najd, the market vortex culminated in 
Ḥajr, the eye of the storm.  As its hegemons, Hawdha and Aslam were masters of all they 
surveyed.118  However, the centralization of Arabia was ‘uneven’ and incomplete.  
Therefore, the struggle for a share in power persisted in the essential tension between the 
center and its periphery.  In sum, this tension resulted in the paradox of early proto-
Islāmic history.  Aslam’s reforms created prosperity in al-Yamāma while sowing the 
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Reform Preacher  
Dissonance 
Makka lay on the outskirts of western Arabia.  From its humble beginnings as a village of 
palm huts, it emerged as a trade entrepôt.1  Outside the orbit of the imperial powers and 
their proxies, the Banū Quraysh specialized in the lucrative trafficking of goods and 
predatory lending.  Shrewd business practices, along with their organized network, made 
Makka a financial center.  As it developed into a city, settlements formed around its 
original core which was centered on al-Raḥmān’s shrine (ka‘ba).  The influx of wealth 
and its unequal distribution further bifurcated the city.  The inner Quraysh (i.e., the ‘Abd 
Shams and Makhzūm clans) were the winners, while the outer Quraysh were the losers.2  
Although Makka’s remote location provided protection, its barren valley exposed it to 
periodic famine and disease.  Dependent upon grain shipments, the Banū Quraysh were at 
the mercy of their suppliers.  Therefore, Makka was not impervious to fluctuations 
abroad.  With the fall of the Kinda, the intervening four decades of instability in al-
Yamāma had rippled throughout al-Ḥijāz.  With political instability, al-Yamāma’s 
agricultural output plummeted.  Outlying areas in western Arabia suffered most.  Year in 
and year out, famine and plague were daily realities.  Syrian supplies provided temporary 
relief.  However, with the escalating Persian-Byzantine war, these grain supplies were 
requisitioned northward.3  This threatened the south with further waves of famine and 
suffering.  In Makka, there was a return to religion. 
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Impurity 
Disaster befell Makka.  Whereas piety meant observance, the violation of taboos 
constituted a transgression against the cult god, in other words, a sin.4  Ancient ritual 
taboos were reintroduced among the well-to-do Quraysh whose leaders served as temple 
priests.  To maintain their ritual purity, these elite Quraysh abstained from certain foods, 
limited their marriage circle, and reinstituted pilgrimage rites.  These ostensibly pious 
acts served to distinguish social classes within Makka and moreover, created a zealous 
table-community (ḥums) that facilitated political alliances between neighboring and 
related tribes (īlāf).5  Linked to these taboos was the shark (quraysh), the Banū Quraysh’s 
eponymous tribal totem and traditional symbol of kinship and brotherhood.  Housing the 
gods of their allies, the Makkan shrine was indicative of their expanding network.  Their 
cult center, in turn, facilitated trade and relations beyond the intra-tribal level.  Commerce 
and cult were interlocked.  As the source of Makka’s wealth and local power, the shrine 
was ultimately the city’s origin.   
But then disaster struck again.  The return of famine and plague signaled a failure 
to appease the cult god.  Rampant among these hardest hit Quraysh – the young, the 
weak, and the poor – desperately sought an end to their suffering.  Sin and piety gave 
way to an ethical understanding of the divine, a monotheism.6  Soon some members of 
the Banū Quraysh refused to partake in the pagan cult.  Among these was Zayd b. ‘Amr, 
a sage who proscribed female infanticide, renounced the idols, and publicly preached the 
worship of the one god: 
To the heavenly king – there is no deity beyond him 
And no lord can draw near him. 
Beware, O men, of what follows death!7 
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Notions of impurity gave way to a sense of societal imbalance.  The god of commerce 
gave rise to a god of justice as guarantor of the fair ‘circulation’ of goods among the 
strong and the weak, the rich and the poor.8  Before long, a reform preacher came to warn 
of other-worldly judgment and retribution.   
 
Liminal Zone 
Born in a famine year that took his father’s life, Amīn b. ‘Abd Allāh (d. 632 C.E.) was 
orphaned at an early age.9  Put in the care of Ḥalīma bt. Abī Dhu’ayb, Amīn spent his 
youth in the liminal zone within al-Yamāma’s indirect sphere of influence.  Dependent 
upon the sedentary cult, Ḥalīma’s clan of Sa‘d b. Bakr frequented Makka to the west.10  
Driven by their need for provisions to sustain life, they also made their way east to al-
Yamāma.  The son of the steppe, Amīn was exposed early on to the egalitarian ethos of 
desert society centered on co-liability, codependency, and martial prowess.11  Following 
his days as a shepherd, he was taken in by his relatives who were engaged in commerce.  
In Makka, he experienced an acute culture shock.  The rich towered above the poor, 
traditional bonds of kinship were cast aside, and profit carried the day.  At the bottom of 
the barrel, his worldview was turned upside down.   
While attending the trade fair at ‘Ukāẓ, Amīn was drawn to the sermon of an 
eccentric preacher perched atop a she-camel:       
O people, he who lives dies  
And he who dies passes away. 
Whatever is coming is coming, 
Dark night and the heaven of the zodiac, 
And stars that shine,  
Seas that accumulate, 
And sons and daughters,  
Fathers and mothers, 
The one gone, 
The one coming, 
That in the heaven there is a passage 
And that there is on earth a message.12 
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Quss b. Sā‘ida’s words resonated with him, an orphaned outcast and firsthand witness to 
the fragility of life and the transience of this world.  Turning away from the social chaos 
of his day, Amīn the religious virtuoso took upon himself the life of a world-rejecting 
ascetic.13  Resigning himself to a cave in Mount Ḥirā’ on the outskirts of Makka, he lived 
a life of solitude and contemplation.  Constant exposure to poor passersby prevented him 
from escaping the mundane world and its ills.14  For this reason, he returned to the city to 
eke out a meager living, while occasionally retreating to the relative solace of Mount 
Ḥirā’.   
 
Warner 
Although the fortunes of the petty merchant changed when he married into wealth, his 
experiences in Makka and abroad ‘reawakened’ a keen sense of justice and balance.15  
On one occasion, Amīn heard the oracle: 
O you, enfolded in your mantle, 
Arise and warn! 
Glorify your lord, 
Purify your inner self, 
And cast off all fear.16 
 
The religious virtuoso had become an inner-worldly ascetic, ‘an instrument of god.’17  He 
took up the vocation of a local reform preacher warning that judgment was close at hand.  
He implored his fellow Makkans: 
As for the orphan, oppress not, 
As for the beggar, refuse not, 
As for thy lord’s favor, proclaim.18 
 
He publicly castigated the wealthy naysayers:   
Woe to every slanderer, scoffer, 
Who gathers wealth and counts it, 
Thinking wealth will make him immortal.19 
 
Lamenting their fate, he declaimed in a single incisive stroke: 
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Nay! He will surely be thrown into the grain grinder (al-ḥuṭama).20 
 
Far from being a harbinger of doom, he came bearing the message of salvation.  To 
correct Makka’s imbalance, he called for the proper distribution of goods.  In addition to 
a communal ‘political salvation,’ he also preached individual salvation through personal 
piety by means of fasting, vigils, and prayer (accompanied by ritual ablutions).21  He 
envisioned a coming world order in which the righteous “…shall recline on jeweled 
couches face to face, and there shall wait on them youths with bowls, pitchers, and a cup 
of purest wine (that will neither pain their heads nor take away their reason); with fruits 
of their own choice and flesh of fowl that they relish.”22 
 
Call for Social Justice 
As Makka expanded into a full-fledged city, the class divide widened.  The rich and 
powerful ‘Abd Shams and Makhzūm clans dominated the inner city and its shrine, while 
the remaining eight poor clans were scattered in makeshift huts strewn across the 
crowded, squalid outer city.23  Seven middling and lower classes emerged in Makka: 
caravan merchants, middlemen, debtors, clients, wage earners, mercenaries, and slaves.  
The wealthy mercantile class used patronage as a mechanism to tighten its grip on the 
rebounding population.  In this system, a patron took under his wing a weak client.  
Dependent upon the patron for protection, the client-patron relation was a bond of 
subservience.  In time, thirteen client groups were tied to the two most powerful Qurayshī 
clans.   
 
Weight 
Amīn drew his followers and companions largely from the disenfranchised and the 
middling class.24  Among his early followers were a merchant, a youngster, and a slave.  
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The petty merchant Abū Bakr b. Abī Quḥāfa (known as ‘Atīq, ‘freedman’) was his 
confidant.  The youngster whom Amīn took in during a famine was ‘Alī (d. 661 C.E.), the 
son of Abū Ṭālib, head of the Banū Hāshim clan.  The slave purchased at ‘Ukāẓ by 
Ḥakīm b. Ḥizām was Zayd b. Ḥāritha al-Kalbī (d. 629 C.E.) who belonged to Amīn’s 
devoted wife and business partner, Khadīja bt. Khuwaylid (d. 619 C.E.).  Among those 
who later sided with Amīn was the middleman ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 644 C.E.), the 
nephew of the outspoken sage Zayd b. ‘Amr.  Amīn’s movement also attracted alienated 
Makkan elites.  Notable was his son-in-law, ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān (d. 656 C.E.), a 
prosperous younger member of the powerful ‘Abd Shams clan that was vying with the 
Makhzūm for supremacy.   
Ultimately, Makka’s societal structure became unstable under the weight of 
human-slavery, wage-slavery, and debt-slavery.  In addition, the clientele system put an 
enormous burden upon the elite masters.  When periodic famine struck, the dependent 
population looked to their patrons.  This placed the Makkan leaders and priests in a 
precarious and potentially volatile situation.  Makka was one failed food shipment away 
from civil strife.25  In order to shore up their position, the Banū Quraysh opened 
diplomatic channels with the region’s leading supplier of cereals, al-Yamāma.  The ‘Abd 
Shams clan secured steady but limited grain shipments through a marriage alliance 
between Aslam and Ramla bt. al-Ḥārith.  This ensured the inner Quraysh’s hold over the 
city center and its politics.  This elite commodity, however, was accessible only to the 
dominant clans.  The poor outer Quraysh remained exposed to famine.26  The elites, 
nonetheless, enjoyed virtual immunity, as they resided around the shrine’s sacred space 
(ḥaram) where violence was sacrilege. 
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Measure 
Rich Makkans were given to conspicuous consumption.  Public displays of generosity 
and largess purposefully redistributed wealth to the lower strata, thereby creating 
obligations and bonds of loyalty.  However, these escalating contests of prestige took a 
destructive turn.27  In imitation of the proverbial Ḥātim al-Ṭā’ī, hundreds of camels 
would needlessly be slaughtered.  Amīn condemned these unethical displays of wealth 
which tore apart the civic bonds uniting Makka: 
I swear by this city, 
You a citizen of this city, 
And by the [ties binding] parent and child. 
Surely we have created man to toil. 
Does he think that none has power over him? 
‘I have squandered vast riches!’ he boasts. 
Does he think that no one sees him? 
Have we not given him two eyes, 
And a tongue, and two lips, 
And shown him the two paths? 
But he would not take the high road.28  
 
Echoing the sentiment that the city is a functional whole, he cautioned his Makkan 
audience about ingratitude: 
Indeed, man transgresses all bounds, 
Thinking himself self-sufficient. 
Surely to your lord all things return.29 
 
He mused aloud: 
Do they never reflect on the camels, and how they were created? 
The heaven, how it was raised on high? 
The mountains, how they were set down? 
The earth, how it was made flat?30 
 
More and more, his sermons focused upon the gratitude owed to the creator god.  The 
successful Makkan merchants, he felt, should show thanks “[f]or Quraysh’s political and 




Therefore let them worship the lord of this house 
Who fed them in the days of famine and shielded them from all peril.32  
 
Moreover, he preached that when ordering the world, the just creator:  
Raised the heaven on high and set the balance of all things, 
That you might not transgress the balance. 
Give just weight and full measure.33 
 
Amīn’s words met with strong resistance among the Makkan aristocracy.  As a 
countermeasure, they attempted to lure him to their side by offering him a place in their 
ranks.  These aristocrats temporarily succeeded in bending him to their will.34  However, 
‘Uthmān b. Maẓ‘ūn al-Jumaḥī (d. 624/5 C.E.) stepped in.  He greatly strengthened Amīn’s 
hand against the Makkan elite.   
Scattered across al-Ḥijāz were steadily growing communities of Aslam’s 
followers.  Noteworthy among these were the actual Qurayshī Muslims active in Makka 
before Amīn’s public preaching.35  Their leader was Ibn Maẓ‘ūn.36  In line with Aslam’s 
laws, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn forbade intoxication, practiced monogamy, and observed abstinence 
after his wife bore him a son.  Centered on the worship of al-Raḥmān, al-Yamāma’s 
religion attracted some affluent members of Makka’s aristocracy.  Among Ibn Maẓ‘ūn’s 
followers were Abū ‘Ubayda b. al-Jarrāḥ, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Awf, Abū Salama b. ‘Abd 
al-Asad, and ‘Ubayda b. al-Ḥārith b. al-Muṭṭalib.37  Through the intermediacy of Abū 
Bakr, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn and Amīn soon made common cause and formed an uneasy coalition.38  
Amīn then publicly disclosed the name of the ‘heavenly king’:  al-Raḥmān.39  His 
announcement caused a great stir among the Makkans both high and low.  He touched a 






Although partially lifted, the continued Yamāmī ban on grain exports wreaked havoc on 
Makka.  Prices rose to exorbitant levels.  As the exclusive supplier of grain to the 
Qurayshī elite, Aslam was seen as the real culprit behind this heinous crime against the 
poor.  He was known to the Makkans as ‘Raḥmān of al-Yamāma.’40  By naming al-
Raḥmān as the ‘heavenly king,’ Amīn had made an egregious error.  The crowds 
dissipated.  Whenever they encountered Amīn in public, they derided him, freely 
declaring their “…unbelief at the mention of al-Raḥmān.”41  Perplexed, he observed: 
“When it is said to them, ‘Prostrate yourselves (in adoration) before al-Raḥmān,’ they 
say, ‘What is al-Raḥmān?  Shall we prostrate ourselves before that which you command 
us?’”42  “Raḥmān,” they remarked, “is merely a shaman (kāhin) in al-Yamāma.”43  
Holding his ground, Amīn persisted, maintaining that al-Raḥmān “…is my lord and there 
is no deity but he; in him do I trust and to him do I turn.”44  The Makkans taunted Amīn 
and his companions, calling them treacherous ‘Aslamers,’ that is Muslims.45  Amīn’s 
companions countered by insisting that they were Mu’mins, literally, followers of Amīn.   
Amīn’s movement was too politically sensitive to escape the notice of those in 
power.  Uncertain over how to proceed, the Banū Quraysh immediately dispatched ‘Uqba 
b. Abī Mu‘ayṭ and al-Naḍr b. al-Ḥārith to Yathrib (al-Madīna) in order to consult the 
Ḥanafī diaspora community residing there.  Antagonistic towards Amīn, both couriers 
related: “We have come to you for a momentous matter, because a young, poor, vulgar, 
and orphaned youth has been repeating a splendid thing.  He has claimed that he is the 
herald of al-Raḥmān.  Indeed, the only al-Raḥmān we know is the one of al-Yamāma.”46  
Amīn was playing with fire.  His sermons had the potential to jeopardize the delicate 
relations between Makka and al-Yamāma.  In other words, he posed an existential threat 
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to the Makkan elite.  With the crowds thinning out and pressure mounting, he took the 
most prudent course: “Pray to ‘the deity’ (allāh) or pray to al-Raḥmān; whichever [name] 
you call upon, to him belong the most beautiful names.”47  Amīn and his fledgling 




The Makkan elite were caught in a bind.  By bringing harm to Amīn and his Muslim 
followers, they risked a potential confrontation with al-Yamāma.  On the other hand, by 
sitting on their hands, they risked the infiltration of an egalitarian ideology inimical to 
their vested interests.  Walking a tightrope, they resolved to remain neutral.  However, 
when rank and file members of the elite deserted to Amīn’s camp, the Makkan merchants 
resorted to stronger measures.  Upon the death of al-Walīd b. al-Mughīra around 615 C.E., 
power changed hands.  At the head of the indomitable Makhzūm clan now stood Abū al-
Ḥakam (ca. 570-624 C.E.), the son of a Ḥanẓalī Tamīmī woman.  Without recourse to 
physical violence, he resorted to ‘structural violence.’48   
 
Damage 
Abū al-Ḥakam imposed a trade blockade on Amīn and his kinsmen, the Banū Hāshim 
and Banū al-Muṭṭalib.49  Almost immediately, Abū ‘Utba and his dependents defected 
from the Banū Hāshim.  Amīn pleaded with Abū ‘Utba to reconsider, promising him 
infinitely greater rewards in the afterlife.  Abū ‘Utba replied that “‘Amīn promises me 
things which I do not see.  He alleges that they will happen after my death; what has he 
put in my hands after that?’  Then he blew on his hands (yanfukhu fī yadayhi) and said, 
‘May you perish.  I can see nothing in you [viz. his hands] of the things which Amīn 
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says.’”50  Shortly thereafter, the Makkan elite formalized their relationship with Abū 
‘Utba who wed the sister of Abū Sufyān (d. ca. 650/1 C.E.).  Her brother was head of the 
‘Abd Shams clan that was in league with the Makhzūm.  Amīn reviled both Abū ‘Utba – 
Abū Lahab (‘Father of Flame’) – and his Sufyānī bride in a scathing attack:  
May the hands of Abū Lahab perish!  May he himself perish! 
Nothing shall his wealth and gains avail him. 
He shall be burnt in a flaming fire, 
And his wife, laden with firewood, 
Shall have a rope of fiber round her neck!51 
 
This diatribe was to no avail; the ban continued uninterrupted.  It effectively released 
debtors from repaying their loans to Amīn and his companions.  Abū Bakr’s already 
modest capital dwindled further from forty to five thousand dirhams.52  The boycott 
restricted trade and marriage with Amīn’s kinsmen.  However, the commercial ban was 
bypassed on a regular basis by close kin and allies who devised clever means of 
delivering foodstuffs and clothing.  On one occasion, Abū al-Bakhtarī al-Asad even 
hampered an attempt by Abū al-Ḥakam – Abū Jahl (‘Father of Ignorance’) – to stop a 
flour delivery to Amīn’s wife.53   
 
Refuge 
Although relatively unsuccessful, the boycott nonetheless further damaged Amīn’s 
credibility as leader of the joint Mu’min-Muslim movement.54  His activities had already 
placed the Qurayshī Muslims in the line of fire.  In response, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn reasserted his 
own authority and shepherded his flock to safety.55  Around 615 C.E., eighty-three 
Qurayshī Muslim men fled with their women and children to their brethren and 
coreligionists in al-Yamāma.56  In al-‘Irḍ district of western al-Yamāma resided a long 
established Qurayshī community of miners.57  Situated near the Qarqarī district, these 
Quraysh were neighbors of Thumāma b. Uthāl, chief of the nomadic Banū Ḥanīfa.  
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Among the refugees were ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān and his wife Ruqayya, and Amīn’s cousin 
Ja‘far, the son of Abū Ṭālib.  Amīn and the remaining Mu’mins, however, stayed behind.  
The Makkan merchant elite panicked when word of the flight reached them.  They 
frantically dispatched ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ b. Wā’il al-Sahmī and ‘Abd Allāh b. Abī Rabī‘a to 
retrieve the fugitives.58  In any case, this effort was in vain.  Hawdha b. ‘Alī had already 
granted protection to the Qurayshī Muslims at the request of Ja‘far b. Abī Ṭālib.  
Summoned to Hawdha’s court, Ja‘far addressed ‘the king of the horizons’ (malik al-
afāq):   
O king,59 we were an uncivilized people (ahl al-jāhiliyya), worshipping 
idols, eating carrion, committing abominations, breaking natural ties, 
treating guests badly, and our strong devoured our weak.  Thus we 
were until god sent us a herald whose lineage, truth, trustworthiness, 
and clemency we know.  He summoned us to acknowledge god’s unity 
and to worship him and to renounce the stones and images which we 
and our fathers formerly worshipped.  He commanded us to speak the 
truth, be faithful to our engagements, mindful of the ties of kinship and 
kindly hospitality, and to refrain from crimes and bloodshed.  He 
forbade us to commit abominations and to speak lies, and to devour the 
property of orphans, to vilify chaste women.  He commanded us to 
worship god alone and not to associate anything with him, and he gave 
us orders about prayer, almsgiving, and fasting (enumerating the 
commands of Islām)…Therefore our people attacked us…So when 
they got the better of us, treated us unjustly and circumscribed our 
lives, and came between us and our religion, we came to your country, 
having chosen you above all others.  Here we have been happy in your 
protection, and we hope that we shall not be treated unjustly while we 
are with you, O king.60 
 
When he heard this heartfelt appeal, Hawdha denied the Makkan extradition request and 
granted the refugees asylum.  Empty-handed, ‘Amr and his companion hastened to 
Makka.  The Qurayshī Muslims remained in al-Yamāma for six years.  Among those who 
repatriated early on was Ibn Maẓ‘ūn who sought to return to his affluent Qurayshī 
Muslim followers still residing in Makka.61  Sheltered by their wealth, these followers of 
his had had no need to flee Makka.  When he arrived in Makka from Hawdha’s court, he 
witnessed firsthand the deteriorating situation of his coreligionists, the Mu’mins.  
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Disgusted, he immediately cast off the protection of the dominant Makhzūm clan by 
stating defiantly that “…I am under the protection of one who is stronger and more 
powerful than you….”62  Soon thereafter, he and Amīn buried the hatchet; the two 
leaders resolved to coordinate their efforts and presented a united front.63 
Although Abū al-Ḥakam and Abū ‘Utba doggedly pushed on with the boycott, it 
came under heavy fire from the rest of the Banū Quraysh.  In a sermon based on a dream 
vision, Amīn divined the outcome of his struggle against these two wealthy elites (the 
‘Father of Folly’ and the ‘Father of Flame’): “I saw on my arms two bracelets of gold 
which I disliked so I blew on them (fa-nafakhtuhumā) and they flew away.”64  This soon 
came to pass.  A group of leaders sympathetic to Amīn’s clan banded together to 
challenge the Makhzūm-‘Abd Shams monopoly of power in Makka.  The ban was lifted, 
but even so, events took a turn for the worse.  In 619 C.E., Abū Ṭālib, the leader of the 
Banū Hāshim and Amīn’s protector, passed away.  He was succeeded by his brother who 
was none other than Abū ‘Utba, brother-in-law of Abū Sufyān and a sworn enemy of 
Amīn.65  Shortly after assuming power, Abū ‘Utba renounced Amīn.  Left defenseless, 
Amīn scrambled.   
 
Exodus 
For nearly three years after the death of Abū Ṭālib, Amīn desperately searched for 
another patron and protector.66  Suffering from arrested development, Amīn’s movement 
came to a complete standstill and lost its appeal.  No longer an imminent threat, he was 
left to rot.  Having exhausted all options in Makka, he looked elsewhere to broaden his 
reach.  He launched a revitalization campaign directed at nearby sedentary and nomadic 
populations.   
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Scramble 
Going from place to place, Amīn made his rounds.  al-Ṭā’if was his first stop.  In the past, 
this self-sustaining town had proven fertile ground for fomenting dissent against their 
Makkan neighbors.  However, following the Fijār War (ca. 580 C.E.), the Banū Quraysh 
under the leadership of Ḥarb b. Umayya (of ‘Abd Shams) had subjugated the Banū 
Thaqīf (the sedentary branch of the Hawāzin) to serve Makkan commercial interests.67  
In fact, rich Makkan families summered in al-Ṭā’if.  Two competing factions dominated 
al-Ṭā’if and its politics: the weak Aḥlāf and the stronger Banū Mālik.  The Aḥlāf had 
allied with the Qurayshī Makhzūm clan to strengthen their hand against their rivals.  
Upon his arrival, Amīn pitched his bold plan to the Aḥlāf.  He proposed to shake off the 
shackles that bound them to the Banū Quraysh.  Meeting a cold reception and outright 
resistance, Amīn had grievously erred in tipping his hand.  The Aḥlāf unceremoniously 
ran him out of town.  Publicly humiliated, he returned to Makka a disgraced man.  
Bruised but not beaten, he kept his eye out for potential hosts.   
During the annual market at ‘Ukāẓ, Amīn delivered his public sermons and made 
for the tents of the Arabs.  He approached the nomadic branch of the Hawāzin, the Banū 
‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a.  One of their number candidly replied to his offer: “I suppose you want 
us to protect you from the Arabs with our breasts and then if god gives you victory 
someone else will reap the benefit!  Thank you, No!”68  Other tribes such as the Banū 
Kinda of Ḥaḍramawt and the Banū Kalb politely declined.  Amīn crossed the line when 
he stepped into the tent of Thumāma, chief of the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads.  Condemned by 
Hawdha and Aslam to waste away on the outskirts of al-Yamāma, these nomads waited 
in the wings for the opportune moment to strike against them.  Making a serious 
miscalculation, Amīn stood in their midst and preached their oppressor’s sedentary 
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ideology.  They treated him badly for his audacity.  He was fortunate to come back in one 
piece.  From this experience, he gained a practical insight into imperial politics: al-
Yamāma had a fifth column.  The sum of these unsavory encounters soured his attitude 
towards the Banū Ḥanīfa, Banū Thaqīf, and Banū Quraysh, all three of whom he bitterly 
cursed.69   
On one occasion, a delegation travelled from Yathrib to Makka in order to explore 
the prospect of an alliance.  Back home in Yathrib, the clan of al-Aws was fighting a 
bloody feud against their Banū Qayla kinsmen, al-Khazraj.70  A food shortage had 
sparked this conflict.  Although an oasis, the acreage of tillable land in Yathrib was 
limited.  As a result, it depended on grain imports, largely from al-Yamāma.71  However, 
peace and stability there had resulted in a demographic boom.  To sustain its growing 
population, al-Yamāma had increasingly begun to import, rather than export grain 
supplements from surrounding areas.  This extraction of resources intensified during bad 
harvests in al-Yamāma.72  Lucrative profits guaranteed the flow of grain into al-
Yamāma’s trade vortex, bypassing local markets.  Moreover, the Yathribīs faced 
starvation with Aslam’s ongoing embargo on cereal sales.  Left in the lurch, Yathrib’s 
nomadic clans turned against the sedentary population.  In response, the farmers fled with 
their families to the village citadels that were primarily designed to defend against 
predatory raids.  As a countermeasure, the sedentary population allied with one nomadic 
clan for protection against another.  This social cleavage in Yathrib spawned two major 
political alignments, al-Aws and al-Khazraj, each resorting to land grabbing in a 
desperate act of survival.  This conflict reached a stalemate after the Battle of Bu‘āth in 
617 C.E.73  Bled white by incessant violence, neither side had the upper hand.  al-Aws 
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sought to turn the tide by forming an alliance with Quraysh’s elite.  When the 
disenfranchised Amīn offered al-Aws his counsel, he was met with a sharp rebuff.  From 
this whole affair, Amīn became aware that all was not well in Yathrib.  At a market in al-
‘Aqaba (located between Makka and Minā), he came upon a party of al-Khazraj.  These 
war-sick deserters enthusiastically embraced his offer: “We have left our people, for no 
tribe is so divided by hatred and rancor as they.  Perhaps god will unite them through 
you.  So let us go to them and invite them to this religion of yours; and if god unites them 
in it, then no man will be mightier than you.”74  al-Khazraj hoped Amīn could do for 
Yathrib what Aslam had done for al-Yamāma.  
 
Subterfuge 
Amīn mulled it over, considering all the available options.  Yathrib meant a clean slate, a 
fresh start.  On the other hand, he contemplated joining those Qurayshī Muslim and 
Mu’min refugees who continued to prosper in al-Yamāma: “I have dreamt that, indeed, I 
am migrating from Makka to the land where there are date-palms; [this vision] comes and 
goes and it is Yamāma….”75  But he thought better of it.  In al-Yamāma, the Mu’min 
movement risked losing its independence and cohesion.  He was also reluctant to hand 
over the reins of power to Ibn Maẓ‘ūn.  Rather than al-Yamāma, Amīn divined the 
ordained destination:  “…it was the city of Yathrib, and in my dream I saw that I was 
swinging a sword….”76  Thereafter, he commenced negotiations with the Yathribīs.  He 
held two major rounds of talks with them at al-‘Aqaba.  After a party of al-Khazraj 
became Mu’mins, they went back to Yathrib, promising to return the following year.  In 
the first round of talks in 621 C.E., a joint party of al-Khazraj and al-Aws swore their 
allegiance to Amīn.77  They then headed back to Yathrib accompanied by Amīn’s agent 
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and scout, Muṣ‘ab b. ‘Umayr.  Left out of the talks, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn saw this as a deliberate 
attempt to circumvent his authority.  He had to beat Amīn at his own game.  He straight 
away vacated his family home in Makka and hastened to Yathrib.78  Aslam’s religion had 
already taken root in Yathrib prior to the Battle of Bu‘āth.79  His task greatly simplified, 
Ibn Maẓ‘ūn succeeded in converting a substantial portion of southern Yathrib.  The 
Yathribī Muslims boasted about their chief, al-Barā’ b. Ma‘rūr: 
To us belongs the man who was the first to pray 
Facing al-Raḥmān’s shrine (ka‘ba) between the sacred sites.80   
 
In the fertile village of Qubā’ located in Upper (southern) Yathrib, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn built 
himself an independent power base.  These Yathribī Muslims provided his only leverage 
against Amīn.        
At the next annual fair, Muṣ‘ab returned with seventy-five Yathribīs.81  This 
second round of negotiations established Amīn’s nominal primacy in Yathrib.  In a call to 
arms, these Yathribīs pledged to defend him with their lives.  The leaders of Banū 
Quraysh learned of his plan to take refuge in Yathrib.  They therefore approached him 
and the Yathribīs.  Stalling for time, Abū al-Ḥakam proposed to postpone their 
departure.82  According to his terms, they were free to go after a specified interval of time 
had elapsed.  The Yathribīs refused to be diverted from their purpose.  These battle-
hardened men threatened to unleash war by striking down the fairgoers.  At any rate, 
Amīn dissuaded them.  He then acquiesced to Abū al-Ḥakam’s demands.  A handful of 
Yathribī representatives remained behind to guarantee that the Banū Quraysh honored 
their half of the agreement.83  Amīn, however, suspected treachery.  The Banū Quraysh 
redoubled their efforts against his followers.  Some fled, while others committed 
apostasy.84  After foiling an attempt on his life, Amīn stealthily escaped to Yathrib. 
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Resistance 
The Mu’min Movement 
Surrounded by hills to the north and south, lava flows to the east and west, Yathrib was 
situated on a plain (jawf) crisscrossed by rain-fed river beds (wādī-s) and wells.85  
Sprawling across this fertile plain were numerous defended villages, each outfitted with 
its own citadel.  Over a hundred citadels dotted the landscape.  The name ‘Yathrib’ 
originally designated only the northwest quarter, but eventually, it was applied to the 
whole settlement.  Largely concentrated in the south, oasis agriculture in Yathrib centered 
on date palms with limited cereal cultivation.  Feuding clans – not tribes – dominated 
Yathrib.  Although non-belligerency treaties allowed farming to continue, intermittent 
violence disrupted planting and irrigation.86  Before the Battle of Bu‘āth in 617 C.E., the 
clan of al-Khazraj had forged an alliance with the sedentary Banū Naḍīr and Banū 
Qaynuqā‘.  Their foes were the al-Aws clan and the Banū Qurayẓa, a formidable 
sedentary force.87  During the battle, al-Aws then formed a temporary coalition with the 
Banū Naḍīr and Banū Qurayẓa.  After Bu‘āth, the Banū Naḍīr realigned with al-Khazraj 
whose leader was ‘Abd Allāh b. Ubayy (d. 631 C.E.), chief of the Ḥublā b. Ghanm b. 
‘Awf b. al-Khazraj clan.  He commanded the unassailable fortress of Muzāḥim, 
strategically located in the heart of Yathrib.88  Cold and calculating, he had prudently 
abstained from the destructive Battle of Bu‘āth that took the life of his Khazrajī rival, 
‘Amr b. al-Nu‘mān.  The last man standing, Ibn Ubayy, the chief of al-Khazraj, emerged 







Around 622 C.E., Ibn Ubayy contracted a diplomatic marriage between his daughter and 
the son of Abū ‘Āmir al-Rāhib, head of the ‘Amr b. ‘Awf branch of al-Aws.89  A joint 
Khazrajī-Awsī confederacy was in the works.  Ibn Ubayy’s rise to power, however, did 
not sit well with all of the oasis dwellers.  These dissenters had bypassed his authority 
when they opened separate talks with Amīn at al-‘Aqaba.  In September 622 C.E., Amīn 
dared to set foot on Ibn Ubayy’s turf uninvited.90  Following the second meeting at al-
‘Aqaba, he gave the word to his followers to emigrate.  Small waves of Qurayshī Muslim 
and Mu’min emigrants (al-muhājirūn) steadily poured into Upper (southern) Yathrib.  
They lodged with local Banū Qayla hosts (al-anṣār) in Qubā’.  Like ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān 
and ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, most emigrated, while a handful stayed back in Makka.  In 
addition, Qurayshī Muslims and Mu’mins still residing in al-Yamāma made their way to 
Yathrib.91  Prior to their arrival, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn was actively proselytizing in Yathrib.  By 
the time Amīn alighted in Qubā’ accompanied by Abū Bakr, he found that a considerable 
number of its inhabitants were Muslims who had ‘Aslamed.’92  Accordingly, Amīn was 
infuriated with Ibn Maẓ‘ūn.  He nonetheless bit his tongue and refrained from any ill-
advised action at this point.  His first order of business was Ibn Ubayy.93  Hoping to be 
received with open arms, he paid him a visit.  But rather than a warm welcome, Ibn 
Ubayy sent him packing.  The tone was set.  As a result, Amīn settled in Lower 
(northern) Yathrib among another Khazrajī clan, the Mālik b. al-Najjār.  In the meantime, 
Abū Bakr appropriately took up residence further south in al-Sunḥ, midway between 
Amīn and Ibn Maẓ‘ūn.94  While Amīn built his mosque in Lower Yathrib, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn 
completed his Qubā’ mosque in Upper (southern) Yathrib.95  In an effort to mitigate the 
damage caused by Ibn Maẓ‘ūn, Amīn delivered a vitriolic sermon.  He denigrated Aslam 
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by calling him a little man (musaylima) and a liar.96  In a bold move geared towards 
legitimating his own position against that of Aslam, Amīn the preacher staked a 
counterclaim to exclusive prophetic authority (al-nubuwwa).97  It was to little avail.  He 
had already made a futile effort to redirect the prayer (qibla) away from al-Raḥmān’s 
shrine (ka‘ba) to Syria in the north.98  Yathribī Muslims such as al-Barā’ (d. 622 C.E.) 
continued to pray towards Makka until their dying day.99  The Yathribī and Qurayshī 
Muslims held on dearly to both their new-found religion and its bearer, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn.  
Vying for power with Ibn Ubayy, Amīn had no choice but to once again join forces with 
Ibn Maẓ‘ūn in order to forge a combined Mu’min-Muslim confederacy.  Amīn directed 
his town crier (mu’adhdhin), Bilāl b. Rabāḥ, to promulgate the joint Mu’min-Muslim 
creed (shahāda) that equivocated on the identity of the herald of the deity: 
I witness that there is no deity but the deity (allāh),  
I witness that the ‘praised one’ (muḥammad) is the herald of the deity.100 
 
This satisfied both the Mu’mins and the Muslims in Yathrib.   
 
Constitution 
Amīn’s aim was to weaken the tribal structure underlying Ibn Ubayy’s emergent 
confederacy.  His ultimate goal, however, was to replace Ibn Ubayy’s tribe with his own 
neo-tribe.101  Moreover, the emigrants to Yathrib came not as squatters, but as rebel 
raiders intent on exacting their revenge on the Banū Quraysh in Makka.  These emigrants 
(al-muhājirūn) and their hosts (al-anṣār) were in effect neo-clans.102  Membership in the 
Anṣār neo-clan supplanted any previous tribal affiliation with the Banū Qayla.  By 
merging his neo-tribe with Yathrib’s sedentary population, Amīn planned to create a full-
fledged confederacy bound by ‘imagined’ kinship relations and a blood oath.  The 
confederate treaty (ṣaḥīfa) read: 
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This is a document from the ‘praised one’ (muḥammad) the prophet (al-
nabī) between the Mu’mins and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib, and 
those who join them as clients, attach themselves to them and fight the 
holy war with them.  They form one tribe (umma)103 to the exclusion of 
others.  The emigrants from Quraysh keep to their tribal organization 
and leadership, cooperating with each other regarding blood money and 
ransoming their captives according to what is customary and equitable 
among the Mu’mins…A Mu’min will not kill a Mu’min in retaliation 
for a non-believer (kāfir) and will not aid a non-believer against a 
Mu’min…The Mu’mins are allies (mawālī) one to another, to the 
exclusion of other people…Whatever you differ about should be 
brought before the deity (allāh) and the ‘praised one’ (muḥammad) 
[viz. Amīn]…The plain (jawf) of Yathrib is a violence-free zone 
(ḥaram) for the people of this treaty (ṣaḥīfa)…No protection will be 
granted to Quraysh nor to whomever supports them…They [viz. the 
confederates] undertake to aid each other against whosoever attacks 
Yathrib.104 
 
This confederate oath was between two major parties: the Mu’mins and the Muslims.105  
On the one hand, these included the Qurayshī and Yathribī Mu’mins, and on the other, 
the Qurayshī and Yathribī Muslims.  Yathrib was split between confederates and non-
confederates (i.e., non-believers: kāfir-s).  Those who had become Mu’mins and Muslims 
were brothers bound to one another.106  At the same time, they were severed from their 
biological kin.  The oath, therefore, annulled their preexisting kinship obligations, such as 
seeking revenge for their blood relatives.107  In fact, the oath clearly indicated that “[a] 
Mu’min will not kill a Mu’min in retaliation for a non-believer (kāfir) and will not aid a 
non-believer against a Mu’min.”108  Amīn’s treaty also contained another clause relating 
to Ibn Ubayy’s own Khazrajī branch.  It stipulated that “[t]he Banū ‘Awf keep to their 
tribal organization and leadership, continuing to cooperate with each other in accordance 
with their former mutual aid agreements regarding blood money, and every sub-group 
ransoms its captives according to what is customary and equitable among the 
Mu’mins.”109  Similar parallel clauses pertained to other Khazrajī and Awsī members of 
Ibn Ubayy’s budding confederacy.  On the face of it, the treaty preserved Ibn Ubayy’s 
power that was founded upon mutual protection and retaliation.  In reality, however, 
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Amīn’s confederacy eroded these foundations, thereby nipping Ibn Ubayy’s power in the 
bud.110  For good measure, Amīn strengthened the hand of ‘Ubāda b. al-Ṣāmit of the 
Khazrajī Sālim clan against their mutual rival, Ibn Ubayy.  In place of Ibn Ubayy, Amīn 
installed himself as chief, arbiter, and tribal prophet (al-nabī al-ummī) of the 
confederacy.111  He designated the fertile lava plain (jawf) as a space free from violence 
(ḥaram).  Most importantly, the treaty marked Amīn’s target: the Banū Quraysh in 
Makka. 
 
From Prophet to Rebel Leader 
Shortly after their migration (hijra), a terrible bout of fever and famine struck Yathrib.112  
Following a period of convalescence, Amīn’s neo-tribe mobilized.  Seven months after 
they touched down in Yathrib, Amīn ordered the first raid (sariyya) against Qurayshī 
caravans.113  In the months to follow, he dispatched further raiding parties, one after 
another.  On certain occasions, he himself commanded the assault.  The primary objective 
of the raids (al-maghāzī) was to temporarily divert secondary trade away from Makka.  
More importantly, the immediate goal was to provision themselves at their enemy’s 
expense.  The Banū Quraysh managed to elude some of these predatory attacks by 
traveling off the beaten track.  Consequently, several raids ended without engaging the 
enemy.  In time, the conflict steadily escalated from low-stakes guerilla warfare to 
combat at close quarters.  Nearly two years after the exodus, Amīn engaged the Banū 
Quraysh head-on.   
 
Rebel War 
In March of 624 C.E., Amīn’s scouts reported that a valuable Qurayshī caravan loaded 
with bullion was en route to Badr, a trading town southwest of Yathrib.114  Taking a back 
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road, he hastened there with some three hundred of his fellow neo-tribesmen.  He also 
sent two camel riders on a reconnaissance mission.  Reluctant to jeopardize his precious 
cargo, the caravan leader Abū Sufyān entered the town first as a precautionary measure.  
Informants directed him to a well where two unidentified camel riders had stopped; here 
he found fresh camel dung.  An expert tracker, Abū Sufyān broke apart the dung to find 
Yathribī date stones inside.  Alarmed, he rerouted his caravan in short order and scurried 
to Makka.  Meanwhile, a courier sped ahead to alert the Makkans of what had transpired.  
In Makka, Abū al-Ḥakam rallied the masses and marshaled a force of nine hundred and 
fifty bound for Badr.  On the way there, Abū al-Ḥakam refused to turn back when he 
received news of the caravan’s safe arrival in Makka.  Instead, he charged headlong into 
danger.  Shut in by mountains and sand dunes on all sides, the plain of Badr was a death 
trap.  All the while, Amīn lay in wait for the anticipated caravan.  Soon, word reached 
him that a formidable Makkan force was less than a week away.  He prepared to resist the 
coming onslaught.  He set up camp in the northernmost district, strategically located near 
two escape routes: one to Syria, the other to Yathrib.  Outnumbered three to one, he 
evened the odds by compromising every water source south of his position.  After a long 
march, the Qurayshī host was greeted by sand-filled wells.  The fatigued and thirsty 
Makkans were no match for Amīn.  Their only other option was to fall back into the 
parched desert.  Abū al-Ḥakam stood his ground.  Suddenly, out of the blue, the heavens 
opened.115  Rather than a deliverance, the downpour proved damning.  The Qurayshīs 
sunk in deep mire, unable to regain their footing.   
Loyal to Aslam (known as ‘Abd al-Raḥmān), Ibn Maẓ‘ūn led the Muslims and 
charged the enemy crying out, “O People of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān!”116  The Mu’mins 
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followed suit.  Headed by Abū Bakr (known as ‘Abd Allāh), they advanced into the 
battlefield shouting, “O People of ‘Abd Allāh!”117  Above the din of battle roared the 
shared Mu’min-Muslim slogan, “O victorious, slay!”118  The bodies piled up.  Among the 
seventy Qurayshī corpses lay Abū al-Ḥakam and Ḥanẓala, the son of Abū Sufyān.119  
With the death Abū al-Ḥakam, the fortunes of the Makhzūm clan waned.  At the head of 
the ascendant ‘Abd Shams clan, Abū Sufyān became Makka’s leading man.  In the thick 
of the battle, the Qurayshīs killed about fourteen confederates and fatally wounded Ibn 
Maẓ‘ūn.  Although the Battle of Badr failed to achieve its primary objective, Amīn 
generated an enormous sum ransoming the Qurayshī prisoners of war.  Makkan elite 
families paid upwards of forty ounces of silver per captive.  In one instance, Nawfal b. al-
Ḥārith was ransomed in exchange for a large quantity of spears.120  In this way, Amīn 
secured funds and weapons for his rebellion.   
Riding on the heels of Badr, Amīn tightened his hold on Yathrib.  In the following 
months, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn slowly died from his wounds.121  At his funeral, Amīn made a public 
show of grief for his fallen comrade and coreligionist.122  Yet he censured Ibn Maẓ‘ūn’s 
wife, Khawla bt. Ḥakīm al-Sulamiyya, when she testified that her deceased husband was 
in paradise.  Moreover, Amīn refused to marry this poor widow whom he distrusted.123  
After assuming leadership over the Qurayshī and Yathribī Muslims, Amīn built another 
mosque in Qubā’ to rival that of Ibn Maẓ‘ūn.124  Despite his efforts, isolated pockets of 
Muslim resistance held out in Upper (southern) Yathrib against Amīn’s grab for power.  
Their leader-in-exile was the head of al-Aws clan, Abū ‘Āmir.  This ascetic once charged 
Amīn with corrupting the religion.125  In quick response, Amīn turned against Abū 
‘Āmir’s former partner, Ibn Ubayy.  In an effort to reduce Ibn Ubayy’s influence in 
108 
Yathrib, Amīn attacked his sedentary power base, the Banū Qaynuqā‘.  In addition to 
being political allies of al-Khazraj, the Banū Qaynuqā‘ were also Amīn’s commercial 
rivals.  Shortly after settling in Yathrib, Amīn had established a duty-free market 
modeled on that of ‘Ukāẓ.126  Originally set up near the Buṭḥān Bridge, his market 
rivaled that of the Banū Qaynuqā‘.  In protest, a member of this mercantile class, Ka‘b b. 
al-Ashraf, cut the strings of the newly erected market tent.  Since its location in the Banū 
Qaynuqā‘ quarter caused friction, Amīn’s market was moved to the district of the Banū 
Sā‘ida.  In April 624 C.E., Amīn laid siege to the Banū Qaynuqā‘ strongholds.127  Ibn 
Ubayy effectively intervened on their behalf.  Some converted, while the rest were exiled 
north to Wādī al-Qurā.   
 
War of Retaliation 
The defeat at Badr damaged Makka’s reputation.  Soft-spoken merchants carrying little 
sticks, the Banū Quraysh relied heavily on their collective prestige to hold together their 
far-flung business ventures.  The crack that appeared after Badr widened.  To regain their 
lost honor and prestige, they needed to make an example of Amīn.  At great expense, 
they made a show of force by mounting a military expedition numbering three thousand 
fighters.128  In November 624 C.E., the Qurayshīs marched to Yathrib under the command 
of Abū Sufyān, Khālid b. al-Walīd al-Mughīra al-Makhzūmī (d. 642 C.E.), and ‘Ikrima, 
the son of the slain Abū al-Ḥakam.129  Although outnumbered four to one, Amīn 
exercised the option of picking the battle site, thereby maximizing his tactical home-field 
advantage.  Unable to shed blood in the sacred plain of Yathrib, Amīn set up his base of 
operations north of the oasis at Mount Uḥud.  With only a couple of horses at their 
disposal, his men had little hope for survival in an open-field battle.130  Therefore, he 
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carefully chose this site in order to level the playing field by limiting his enemy’s two 
advantages, their numerical strength and maneuverability.   
Naturally carved into the rock face of the northern Uḥud curve was a niche large 
enough for Amīn’s last stand.131  It was over 360 feet in length and approximately 130 
feet in breadth.  Accessible only through a corridor about 82 feet wide, the pass was 
narrow enough to hold.132  Since it was too constricted for the passage of a cavalry 
formation, it served to nullify the maneuverability of the Banū Quraysh’s two hundred 
strong cavalry.  Furthermore, it compelled the Qurayshīs to enter Amīn’s lair in small 
groups vulnerable to attack.  Ideal for an aerial assault with a volley of arrows, the 
elevated terrain flanking either side of the passageway functioned as the control valve.  
Fifty archers guarded either side of the northern corridor, and were instructed to allow 
only a handful of enemy at a time to pass through unencumbered.  Thereafter, they were 
to stop up the corridor.  On the ground, his forces were ordered to fight the enemy hand-
to-hand in close quarters.  Once the first wave was defeated, the archers were instructed 
to allow another troop of enemy inside.  While one group of his men fought, the others 
rested in two adjacent chambers north of the niche.  This tag-team effort greatly reduced 
the enemy’s numerical strength.  In this manner, he not only directed the enemy’s flow, 
but also regulated its numbers.  Since the archers formed the linchpin of his overall 
strategy, he issued them strict orders to hold their position at all costs.  There was no 
room for error.  His strategy succeeded in the initial leg of the conflict.  The Qurayshī 
death toll rose to twenty-three.  With victory in sight, most of the archers prematurely 
abandoned their stations in order to despoil the unguarded enemy camp.  With the safety 
valve gone, the floodgates burst open.  The enemy exploded onto the scene.  Amīn and 
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his troops were pinned against the wall.  Fear and panic quickly set in.  His frightened 
men made a frenzied push through the Qurayshī lines into the open field.  Here they were 
mercilessly cut down by Khālid’s cavalry.  Cornered, wounded, and deserted, his fingers 
frantically scrabbled against the solid rock wall.  Gripping a handhold, he climbed to 
higher ground and took refuge in a well-hidden cave.  At the end of the day, his forces 
were literally decimated.  Seventy of the seven hundred were trodden underfoot.  Among 
the dead was Muṣ‘ab b. ‘Umayr, his first envoy to Yathrib.133  For the Makkans, the 
scent of victory was in the air.  But at the last minute, Abū Sufyān’s jealous political 
rival, Ṣafwān b. Umayya, stopped him from achieving total victory over the oasis.134  The 
Qurayshī host withdrew.  His blood revenge exacted and his tribe’s reputation restored, 
Abū Sufyān lamented the loss of Ḥanẓala, his son who had fallen at Badr: 
Uḥud for Badr,  
A day for a day; 
Ḥanẓala Ḥanẓala, 
War is but a game of chance.135 
 
After suffering this humiliating, soul-crushing defeat, it took Amīn a moment to get his 
bearings.  In a desperate attempt to save face, he turned vengefully against his enemies at 
home.  
The earlier incident with Ibn al-Ashraf grew to be a bone of contention between 
Amīn and the Banū Naḍīr who were former allies of the exiled Banū Qaynuqā‘.  One day, 
Muḥammad b. Maslama al-Ashhalī overheard Amīn saying, ‘Will no one rid me of this 
troublesome man,’ or words to that effect.  With four others, including Ibn al-Ashraf’s 
foster-brother, al-Ashhalī carried out the deed.136  While the Banū Naḍīr mourned the 
loss of Ibn al-Ashraf, Amīn recounted the events after Badr.137  Abū Sufyān had 
negotiated with the Banū Naḍīr for the safe passage of two hundred cavalrymen who then 
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proceeded to set ablaze the date palms in northern Yathrib.  Amīn used this as a pretext 
for war against Ibn Ubayy’s allies.  In August 625 C.E., Amīn besieged the Banū Naḍīr 
for two weeks.138  After Ibn Ubayy failed to make good his promise for reinforcements, 
the Banū Naḍīr surrendered and were exiled to Khaybar.  Amīn won the hearts of the 
emigrants (al-muhājirūn) when he distributed the seized property among them.  Ibn 
Ubayy was a convenient scapegoat for the failure at Uḥud.  Lumped together with his 
former ally, Abū ‘Āmir, Ibn Ubayy was branded the figurehead of the traitors and 
dissenters (al-munāfiqūn) for his obstructive activities on behalf of the Banū Qaynuqā‘ 
and the Banū Naḍīr, as well as for his alleged desertion at Uḥud.139  Although Amīn 
initially planned to incorporate the sedentary population of Yathrib into his 
confederation, his efforts were met with heavy resistance.  Those not with him were 
against him.  The tribal prophet therefore picked off his sedentary enemies one by one, all 
the while consolidating his own power.  As rebel leader, he never lost sight of the fact 
that Yathrib was only a means to an end.  The conquest of Makka was always first and 




In order to lay his hands on Makka, Amīn widened the local conflict in search of allies.  
He sent out raiding parties into deadly and contested territory.  The Makkans could not 
afford to sit idly by while Amīn conducted systematic raids on their ‘inbound’ 
shipments.   His actions met a reaction.  The threatened Makkans summoned allies to 
their side, one tribe after another.  As a result, Amīn embroiled western and northern 
Arabia in conflict.  He himself, however, lacked the prerequisites for power.  His position 
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in Yathrib was weak.  As a staging ground, the oasis city was deficient in critical 
resources necessary to wage all out war on Makka.  To remedy the situation, the tribal 
rophet unleashed his forces. 





In 625 C.E., Amīn courted danger.  The aging chief of the Banū ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a, Abū al-
Barā’ approached him bearing gifts.  Dwelling in the liminal zone, the Banū ‘Āmir were 
on the brink of assimilation.  During his lifetime, Abū al-Barā’ witnessed firsthand al-
Yamāma’s growing sphere of influence.  Consequently, the Banū ‘Āmir faced the loss of 
their independence.  Although vowed to the Qurayshī elite’s ritual cult (ḥums), it struck a 
deal with Yathrib against their mutual Yamāmī foe.  Abū al-Barā’ proposed: “O Amīn, 
indeed I consider this authority (amr) of yours an excellent authority.  My people are 
behind me, and if you send a group of your companions with me, I hope that they will 
answer your battle cry (da‘wa) and follow your authority.  If they follow you, how 
excellent your authority will be!”141  Enticed, but not convinced, Amīn responded: “I fear 
the people (ahl) of Najd will attack my companions.”142  Abū al-Barā’ assuaged his fears: 
“Do not fear for them.  I will be protection for them, and not one of the people of Najd 
will obstruct them.”143  Even though he still harbored some doubts, Amīn gathered a 
reconnaissance raiding party comprising forty men; among them 
mawlā) and fellow Taymī tribesman, ‘Āmir b. Fuhayra.144 
Amīn quickly dispatched the raiding party to Bi’r Ma‘ūna, on the oblong Najd 
plateau.145  This watering place straddled the pasture districts of two tribes: the Banū 
‘Āmir and the Banū Sulaym.  Bi’r Ma‘ūna was by no means a neutral zone.  Left to 
choose between a weak chief on the one hand, and the might of al-Yamāma on the other, 
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the nomads of Najd fell upon Amīn’s men without hesitation.  Sixteen men were 
confirmed dead, including Ibn Fuhayra and Mundhir b. ‘Amr.  Deeply regretting the 
needless loss of life, Amīn knew better than to trust the Banū ‘Āmir who had once failed 
to protect the royal caravan from al-Ḥīra to ‘Ukāẓ.  This notorious incident had sparked 
the sacrilegious Fijār War that Amīn had witnessed in his youth.146  He cursed the Banū 
‘Āmir for the failed raid.  Ḥassān b. Thābit (d. ca. 659 C.E.) composed an elegy for Ibn 
‘Amr who was sla
God decr opriate. 
i
 
urrounded and vulnerable to an 
ssault, Amīn retreated without directly engaging them.   
in at Bi’r Ma‘ūna: 
eed upon Ibn ‘Amr the truth that was most appr
They said to him, ‘Choose between two authorities (amrayn ).’ 
So he chose the view that was most loyal.147 
Ibn ‘Amr died a martyr upholding the authority of his comrade Amīn against that of 
Aslam.  Nonetheless, Amīn continued to maintain amicable relations with ‘Āmir b. al-
Ṭufayl of the Banū ‘Āmir, the culprit responsible for inciting the Banū Sulaym at Bi’r 
Ma‘ūna.  Amīn and Ibn Ṭufayl remained on friendly terms since they shared a common 
enemy, the Ghaṭafān, and its sub-branch, the Fazāra in northern Najd.148  Amīn had 
entered into al-Yamāma’s third sphere of influence.  On another expedition to Najd in 
626 C.E., he led over four hundred men against two Ghaṭafān sub-groups, the Anmār and 
Tha‘laba.  When his expedition (ghazwa) came face to face with the enemy at Dhāt al-




After the fruitless expedition at Dhāt al-Riqā‘, Amīn mounted a major expedition to 
Dūmat al-Jandal.150  Four hundred thirty-five miles north of Yathrib, this far-off site 
housed the largest emporium in Arabia and was the ultimate source of the Yamāmī- 
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dominated trade vortex.  The objective of the campaign (ghazwa) was to reroute Dūma’s 
lucrative trade route southwest into Yathrib.151  With a party of one thousand men, Amīn 
set out in the dead of summer.  Without a supply train, they acquired provisions en route.  
However, the water proved impotable, the terrain torturous, and grazing virtually 
nonexistent.  Furthermore, sand and lava tracts hampered the expedition’s progress.  In 
short, Amīn never reached Dūma proper.  Over a day’s journey south of Dūma, the 
raiding party came upon a handful of lightly armed herders from the Banū Kalb.  At the 
sight of supper, Amīn’s hunger-stricken men rushed and seized the herd, while the 
shepherds fled.  Amīn then sent out parties to search for water and grazing.  They 
returned without success.  Only Amīn’s henchman al-Ashhalī captured a single 
prisoner.152  Doomed to failure, the ambitious expedition backtracked to Yathrib.        
The following year, enemy forces converged on Amīn’s position.153  From the 
south marched the Banū Quraysh, Banū Thaqīf, and Banū Sulaym.  From the north 
descended the Ghaṭafān, Fazāra, and the Banū Naḍīr exiles with their allies from 
Khaybar.  Yathrib was to face a daunting enemy numbering ten thousand infantry and six 
hundred horsemen.  Amīn prepared for the coming storm.  He had trenches dug around 
critical quarters of Yathrib to defend against the cavalry.  As a result, Abū Sufyān’s 
coalition was forced to switch its strategy from a swift strike to a slow siege.  However it 
was a drought year.  Besides, there was not a single straw of hay in northern Yathrib left 
for grazing.154  Ill-equipped and ill-provisioned, the coalition broke apart.  After Amīn 
forced him to settle for a humiliating draw, Abū Sufyān suffered a fall from grace.  For 
this reason, his political opponents at home gained the upper hand.  Ṣafwān b. Umayya, 
‘Ikrima b. Abī al-Ḥakam, and Suhayl b. ‘Amr increasingly dominated Makkan 
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politics.155  When the coalition broke camp, Amīn turned against the Banū Qurayẓa who 
were the allies of al-Aws headed by Abū ‘Āmir, the Muslim leader-in-exile.  The 
allegation leveled against them was conspiring with the enemy.  After a short siege of 
their farm strongholds, the Banū Qurayẓa accepted an unconditional surrender.  Sa‘d b. 
Mu‘ādh
quisites for power.  In all respects, Yathrib now stood on an equal footing with 
akka. 
 
, an Awsī loyal to Amīn, delivered the condemning verdict.156   
By eliminating the sedentary allies of Ibn Ubayy and Abū ‘Āmir, Amīn solidified 
his political hold over Yathrib.  Thereafter, he attempted another raid on Dūmat al-Jandal.  
Led by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Awf in the winter of 627/8 C.E., this seven hundred man 
campaign also failed to reach the settlement of Dūma.157  South of the trade depot, ‘Abd 
al-Raḥmān converted al-Aṣbagh, a petty local chief of the Banū Kalb.  Otherwise, the 
expedition was a wasteful drain on Yathrib’s diminishing resources.  To this end, Amīn 
fixed his eyes on agricultural centers in the northern Ḥijāz.  In 628 C.E., he waged a food 
war on ‘the valley of villages,’ Wādī al-Qurā’.158  Three nomadic groups defended this 
string of valleys in exchange for part of the farmers’ harvest: the ‘Udhra (a branch of the 
Quḍā‘a whose membership included the powerful Banū Kalb), and the Fazāra and 
Tha‘laba b. Sa‘d b. Dhubyān (both sub-groups of Ghaṭafān).  Amīn had engaged the 
Fazāra on two prior occasions near Wādī al-Qurā’.  This expedition, however, scored a 
decisive victory, and the sedentary populations capitulated.  Amīn exacted one-third of 





Emboldened by his recent success, Amīn preached the invasion (fatḥ) of Makka.  From 
his dream vision, he divined a speedy victory: “You will enter the sacred space secure 
and fearless.”159  In March 628 C.E., he ostensibly set out to perform the lesser pilgrimage 
(‘umra).  The Qurayshī cavalry intercepted him on the outskirts of Makka, near the 
village of al-Ḥudaybiya.  When representatives met, Abū Sufyān was conspicuous by his 
absence, Ibn Ubayy by his presence.  In a strong position to bargain, Amīn negotiated 
favorable terms with Suhayl b. ‘Amr, a prominent member of the Qurayshī elite.  The 
resulting ten-year armistice called for: (i) the immediate withdrawal of Amīn’s forces, (ii) 
the right of return for Amīn in the following year, (iii) the cessation of hostilities, (iv) the 
repatriation of unauthorized Qurayshīs taking refuge in Yathrib, and (v) the permissibility 
for either party to form alliances with other third parties.160  Although Amīn benefited 
from this chance occurrence, he never had any intention of engaging the enemy, nor of 
taking Makka by storm with a token force of fourteen hundred.  Rather, he operated on a 
false pretense.  His real objective was an undisclosed meeting.   
 
Attrition 
A frontal assault on Makka was quickly ruled out as a viable option.  Amīn needed 
another way to slip the noose around Makka’s neck.  Poor water and dead soil doomed 
Makka to the fate of ‘a barren valley.’161  Therefore, he sought to exploit the Achilles’ 
heel of Makka: food imports.  He was aware that Quraysh’s elite consumed the 
‘aristocratic starch,’ wheat.162  On the eastern Najd plateau, al-Yamāma produced 
enormous quantities of cereals.  In addition to barley, it cultivated its famous white 
wheat.163  al-Yamāma was the Makkan elite’s exclusive supplier.  Amīn recalled his 
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earlier run-in with the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads who formed al-Yamāma’s fifth column.  
Grain shipments passed directly through their district.164  Once he realized that al-
Yamāma was the key to winning a war of attrition against Makka, he dispatched a 
message to the gatekeeper of al-Yamāma.165  Thumāma b. Uthāl was the nomadic chief 
of Banū Ḥanīfa and the envious rival of Hawdha and Aslam.  In March 628 C.E., before 
Thumāma made his grain delivery, Amīn marched to the outskirts of Makka to 
rendezvous with him.166   
Although a nominal member of Hawdha’s coalition, Thumāma the nomad was 
obviously the odd man out.  Once courageous defenders of al-Yamāma’s frontiers, 
Thumāma’s poor nomads now shouldered heavy sheep and camel taxes, while the 
sedentary populace prospered in peace.  Thumāma was growing restless and increasingly 
weary of Hawdha’s rule.  What is more, Aslam was a thorn in the nomads’ side.  His 
agrarian-based religion deliberately excluded these nomads who were dependent on the 
sedentary cult.167  In particular, the nomads objected to the ablution rites.  Aslam 
mandated the use of water – not sand – for ritual cleansing, thus barring the nomads out 
in the desert steppe from partaking in the religious rites.  Alienated from god, king, and 
country, Thumāma wanted to liberate the nomads from their heavy burden.  More 
importantly, he anticipated that the succession struggle over the aging king’s throne was 
just over the horizon.  Thumāma made common cause with Amīn, the tribal prophet.  In 
return for blocking Makka’s grain supply, Amīn offered to assist Thumāma in his bid for 
power when the time came.168  In addition, Amīn extended his table-community by 
sanctifying the use of sand for ritual ablutions.  He instructed, “O you who believe!  
When you rise to pray, wash your faces and your hands as far as the elbow, and wipe 
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your heads and your feet to the ankle.  If you are unclean, cleanse yourselves…[if] you 
can find no water, take some clean sand and rub your faces and your hands with it.  The 
deity does not wish to burden you; he seeks only to purify you and to perfect his favor to 
you, so that you may give thanks.”169  To seal the deal, Thumāma performed the 
ablutions and proclaimed the Mu’min creed.170  He confessed to Amīn saying, “…I 
swear, formerly there was no one on earth I hated more than you.  Now I love you best of 
all men.  And, I swear, there was no faith more hateful to me than yours.  Now your faith 
has become the one I love best.  Moreover, there used to be no land more hated by me 
than your land; now your land has become the one I love best….”171 
Following their meeting, Thumāma entered Makka as an avowed Mu’min.  To the 
Makkans he said, “I follow the best religion, the religion of Amīn.”172  Thereafter, he 
threatened, “And by god not one kernel of wheat (ḥinṭa) from al-Yamāma will come to 
you until the herald [viz. Amīn] permits it.”173  Thumāma then performed the lesser 
pilgrimage, reciting the ritual formula (talbiya): ‘At your service, O the deity, at your 
service (labbayka allāhumma labbayka).’174  By reciting this, he had committed a 
sacrilegious act.  The Makkans who fell upon Thumāma were bent on decapitating him.  
However, some Qurayshī bystanders shouted: “Let him go, you need al-Yamāma for your 
food.”175  Thereupon, he was instantly released.  The Banū Ḥanīfa nomads proudly hailed 
their chief’s defiant stand:   
It was our man who said publicly in Makka 
In the sacred months labbayka despite Abū Sufyān.176 
 
Thumāma honored his half of the agreement by blockading the flow of food from al-




Amīn intensified his war of attrition.  He had ten years before the truce of al-Ḥudaybiya 
expired.  He needed to purposely inflict a famine in order to bring Makka to its knees.  
Along the Sarāt range, al-Ṭā’if provisioned Makka with fruits (dates and raisins), 
vegetables, and wine, but no cereals.  As for al-Yaman, its demand for cereals outstripped 
its supply; it therefore exported aromatics, not food.  Whereas Taymā’ (located between 
Wādī al-Qurā and Dūmat al-Jandal) cultivated no wheat, Khaybar in the north grew and 
exported dates and barley.177  The truce secured Yathrib from an attack from the rear.  
Although Amīn turned his attention north, all the while he was maneuvering against the 
south.  Careful not to violate the armistice, he waged war on Khaybar, the only other 
major regional arms dealer besides al-Yamāma.178  His secondary objectives were to 
secure the northern frontier and to stockpile food and weapons.  His primary objective, 
however, was to seize and secure a critical node in al-Yamāma’s trade network; after all, 
Khaybar was the last stop right before Ḥajr in al-Yamāma.  Furthermore, Khaybar’s 
northern location made it a prime staging ground against Dūmat al-Jandal and the Najd 
plateau.  The siege of Khaybar dragged on for one and a half months; it fell when Amīn 
reached a peace agreement with the surrounding tribes of Ghaṭafān and Asad.179  In the 
aftermath, he captured rations and weapons, including a siege engine that was stored for 
sale.  In addition, the population agreed to fork over half of their annual crop.  The attack 
on Khaybar struck fear into the hearts of nearby townspeople and villagers.  The town of 
Fadak sued for peace in exchange for half of its land and half of its annual date and cereal 
harvest.  Both were to be paid directly to Amīn.180  Thereafter, Amīn raided Najd.  In the 
winter of 628/9 C.E., Abū Bakr led a raid against the Hawāzin, the tribal confederation to 
which the Banū ‘Āmir belonged.181  Then in 629 C.E., Amīn dispatched another small 
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raiding party of twenty-four against the Hawāzin at al-Siyy (in the territory of the Banū 
‘Āmir).182  This two-week expedition captured a large number of sheep and cattle, as 
well as a handful of women.  Otherwise, all of these campaigns in Najd made no 
territorial gains.   
Despite the fact that the armistice of al-Ḥudaybiya suspended open hostilities, 
both sides nonetheless engaged in proxy warfare.  Along the northern coast, Abū Jandal 
and Abū Baṣīr led a group of three hundred marauders.183  Fighting on behalf of Amīn, 
they despoiled Qurayshī caravans from Syria, the major foreign supplier of Makka’s 
foodstuffs.  Combined with Thumāma’s efforts, Abū Jandal mercilessly choked Makka to 
death.184  In response, Abū Sufyān journeyed to Yathrib to negotiate terms.  He requested 
the recall of Abū Jandal and the others.185  Amīn consented.  During the talks, Abū 
Sufyān asked Amīn a frank question:  “Do you not claim that you were sent out of 
compassion for the worlds?”  Amīn nodded.  In a stern rebuttal, Abū Sufyān argued: “But 
you have killed the fathers with the sword, and the sons with hunger.”186  From this point 
forward, Amīn took measures to alleviate Makka’s suffering.  In addition to lifting 
Thumāma’s blockade, he delivered to Makka a shipment of barley and dates captured at 
Khaybar.187  The spoils were divided among the Qurayshī elite, namely, Abū Sufyān, 
Ṣafwān b. Umayya, and Suhayl b. ‘Amr. While Ibn Umayya and Ibn ‘Amr rejected 
Amīn’s gesture of goodwill, Abū Sufyān accepted it wholeheartedly saying, “May the 
deity reward my brother, for he does good unto the kindred.”188  As a result, the elites 
became even more polarized.189  In 629 C.E., Amīn wed Ramla bt. Abī Sufyān b. Ḥarb b. 
al-Ḥārith (Umm Ḥabība) (d. ca. 664/5 C.E.) who was the thrice-married daughter of Abū 
Sufyān b. Ḥarb b. al-Ḥārith and sister of Mu‘āwiya b. Abī Sufyān.190  This marriage 
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bound together the destinies of Yathrib and Makka.  In March 630 C.E., Abū Sufyān and 
Ḥakīm b. Ḥizām graciously invited Amīn to enter Makka with his force of ten 
thousand.191  The food blockade had broken the Makkans’ will.  They literally lacked the 
strength to resist.  Amīn declared a general amnesty.192  In his quest to correct the 
imbalance in Makkan society, things had gone horribly awry.  It unleashed pestilence, 
war, famine, and death.  Amīn conquered Makka while simultaneously causing its 
precipitous decline.  His victory was a defeat, his triumph a failure.  This is the paradox 
of middle proto-Islāmic history.   
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Decline of Makka 
For nearly a decade, Amīn raided and plundered Qurayshī caravans bound to and from 
Makka.  These raids achieved his goal: the surrender of Makka.  The city, however, 
suffered the long-term consequences.  Rather than diverting commerce away from Makka 
temporarily, Amīn unintentionally caused a permanent decline in Makkan trade.  
Although he fulfilled his ambition of restoring the Makkan shrine (ka‘ba) to his Banū 
Hāshim clan, his raids had the opposite effect.  In Makka, commerce and cult went hand 
in hand.  Once secondary trade routes had circumvented al-Ḥijāz, the shrine fell off the 
map.  Merchants and pilgrims alike bypassed this remote and dangerous destination.  
There were no pilgrims left to object when Amīn destroyed the idols in the shrine.1  On 
the ground, the population was confronted with increasingly harsh realities.  The 
bankrupt, famine-struck city struggled back onto its feet in the immediate aftermath of 
the conquest.  On shaky legs, Makka was afflicted with chronic instability and poverty.  
In response, Amīn devised a contingency plan to arrest its fall. 
 
Instability 
From 623 C.E. onwards, Amīn had obstructed the free movement of Makkan trade traffic.  
Raids on inbound shipments aimed to cut it off from its suppliers.2  For example, 
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in 624 C.E., there were two major raids, one at Badr and the other at Nakhla near al-Ṭā’if.  
At Nakhla, ‘Abd Allāh b. Jaḥsh had managed to seize a Qurayshī caravan.  Amīn had 
never abandoned this policy, as the raid at al-‘Īṣ in 627 C.E. clearly demonstrates.  
Consequently, buyers and suppliers went elsewhere.  In addition, he had conducted 
outbound raids.  Amīn’s plundering of caravans leaving Makka had deprived the 
Qurayshī merchants of their investment capital.  By 624 C.E., Amīn had effectively 
blockaded the Makka-Syria route.  For this reason, the Qurayshī commercial elite 
explored an alternative route to ‘Irāq by way of the Najd plateau.3  On “the expedition to 
al-Qarada,” he commanded Zayd b. Ḥāritha and a troop of one hundred to block the 
passage of Ṣafwān b. Umayya’s caravan to ‘Irāq.  Northeast of Makka, Zayd intercepted 
the Makkans on the foothills of Mount ‘Irq (Dhāt al-‘Irq) in Wādī al-‘Aqīq.  They 
ransacked the caravan and captured a hoard of gold and silver coins, as well as a handful 
of prisoners.  Investments with a potential one hundred percent profit returned to Makka 
empty-handed.4  With no capital, profits, and reinvestment, commerce and finance in 
Makka ground to a halt.   
The high cost of war added to the city’s financial burdens.  Makka’s defeat at the 
Battle of Badr had damaged its reputation as a credible middleman.  Even though the 
Battle of Uḥud had ended with a Qurayshī victory, it was a situation of diminishing 
returns.  The financial costs mounted when the Banū Quraysh hired over two thousand 
mercenaries.5  They had committed a small fortune to winning the war.  At the end of the 
day, Abū Sufyān had returned with prestige, but no tangible war booty.  Over the course 
of a decade, the sustained conflict had drained Makka’s resources, gradually bankrupting 
the city.  De-urbanization soon set in.  The exodus (hijra) from Makka had already left 
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many family homes (such as that of the Banū Jaḥsh) without tenants.6  Those who were 
able, left the city.  Homes were either vacated or altogether abandoned with their doors 
flung wide-open.  Meanwhile, famine and disease whittled away at the remaining 
population.  Property values in Makka plummeted.  The depopulated city was in ruins.  




During his sermon, Amīn addressed those hardest hit by ‘extreme hunger’ (makhmaṣa) 
and permitted them to eat “forbidden” foods such as carrion and blood: “He who is 
forced by extreme hunger to eat of what is forbidden, not intending to commit sin, will 
find the deity forgiving and merciful.”7  He also repeated his old Makkan and earlier 
Yathribī sermons on poverty, while simultaneously implementing similar policies to feed 
the hungry.  The main ‘recipients’ of charity were kin (dhū al-qurbā) and the poor (al-
miskīn).  He implored the rich to aid their less fortunate relatives and the urban needy.  
He preached that the deity gave the rich surplus wealth (al-faḍl) so that it might trickle 
down to the impoverished.  In this way, he urged his wealthy followers to practice 
reciprocity.  The top-down redistribution of wealth was held to be morally commendable: 
“Such is the grace (al-faḍl) of the deity: He bestows it on whom he will.  His grace is 
infinite.”8  At the same time, Amīn condemned hoarding: “Never let those who hoard the 
wealth which the deity has bestowed on them out of his grace (min faḍlihi) think it good 
for them: indeed it is an evil thing for them.  The riches they have hoarded shall become 
their fetters on the day of resurrection.  It is the deity who will inherit the heavens and the 
earth.  The deity is cognizant of all your actions.”9  
132 
In addition to wealthy donors, Amīn designated three other sources of charity 
funding: (i) war booty, (ii) inheritance, and (iii) almsgiving.  War booty largely denoted 
chattel or portable property seized through raids conducted by means of camelry or 
cavalry.  He instructed, “Know that one fifth of your war booty (ghanimatum) shall 
belong to the deity, the herald (al-rasūl), the herald’s kindred, the orphans, the destitute, 
and the traveler in need: if you truly believe in the deity and what we revealed to our 
servant (‘alā ‘abdinā) on the day of victory, the day when the two armies met.  The deity 
has power over all things.”10  Inheritance was the second means of redistributing wealth.  
“If relatives, orphans, or needy men are present at the division of an inheritance, give to 
them, too, a share of it, and speak kind words to them.”11  Lastly, Amīn preached the 
purification of wealth through almsgiving: “And they were enjoined only to serve the 
deity and to worship none but him, to attend their prayers and to render the alms levy (al-
zakāt).  That, surely, is the correct religion (dīn).”12  As in early Yathrib, the destitute 
(fuqarā’) became ‘the center of the community’ in Makka.13 
Amīn relinquished any preconceived ideas of making impoverished Makka his 
headquarters.  After the conquest of Makka, Abū Sufyān moved to Yathrib, the seat of 
power.14  The elite of Banū Quraysh followed suit.  With Makka out of the loop, Yathrib 
remained Amīn’s capital.  He, however, stayed in Makka for about two weeks to preach 
and receive homage.  He then appointed ‘Attāb b. Asīd governor, making him responsible 
for disaster relief.15  While in Makka, Amīn experienced an acute shock.  He had 
faithfully executed his charge.  Yet his mission remained incomplete.  In order to correct 
the local imbalance, he had first to correct the regional imbalance.  He had realized long 
ago that al-Yamāma was the root of iniquity and conflict in western Arabia.  Peace and 
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stability in al-Yamāma came at a high price.  The Makkan standoff that had ended with 
Amīn’s expulsion (hijra) stemmed from a food crisis.  It was precipitated by Aslam’s 
embargo on cereal exports.  The catalyst was the same for the futile and self-destructive 
Ḥāṭib Wars in Yathrib that ended with the Battle of Bu‘āth.16  This civil war that pitted 
clan against clan was essentially a war over food.  al-Yamāma’s unchallenged trade 
monopoly had created a food shortage, and al-Ḥijāz continued to pay dearly.  In his effort 
to restore Makka, Amīn prepared to strike at the heart of the problem.  From the pangs of 
hunger issued forth the pangs of war. 
 
Restoration 
Makka had been virtually destroyed by Amīn’s own hand.  In order to restore the city, he 
challenged al-Yamāma’s trade monopoly.  To implement an independent economic 
policy, he needed direct control over the market of ‘Ukāẓ.  The prolonged conflict in al-
Ḥijāz had already partially destabilized al-Yamāma’s preexisting trade network.  To 
compensate, trade was diverted away from western Arabia.  For this reason, he took 
measures to make al-Ḥijāz independent and self-sufficient.  As a temporary commercial 
solution, he established a local trade circle.  This, however, was only the first step.  He 
instituted far-sighted policies deliberately meant to change the rules of the game.  In this 
way, he engaged in a competitive struggle that challenged al-Yamāma’s monopoly.   
 
Destabilization 
The annual trade fair of ‘Ukāẓ was held between ‘northern’ Nakhla and al-Ṭā’if.  
Immediately after conquering Makka, Amīn sent Khālid b. al-Walīd to destroy the old 
pilgrimage site at Nakhla.  Thereafter, Amīn marched against al-Ṭā’if.17  He mobilized 
twelve thousand men: ten from the Makkan invasion – including the Banū Sulaym – who 
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were reinforced by another two thousand Makkans and nomads from the Dhubyān b. 
Ghaṭafān and Banū Asad.  Meanwhile, under the command of Mālik b. ‘Awf, the 
Hawāzin laid an ambush for Amīn and his men at the oasis of Ḥunayn (about thirty miles 
northeast of al-Ṭā’if).  Early on in the engagement, the element of surprise worked to 
their advantage.  Caught off-guard, Amīn’s men retreated.  This would nearly have 
guaranteed the Hawāzin victory had not Khālid regained his composure and rallied 
Amīn’s forces.  They routed the Hawāzin and its sub-branch, the Thaqīf.  The unexpected 
reversal at the battle caught the Hawāzin off balance.  The men fled to al-Ṭā’if, leaving 
their families and flocks behind.  Amīn seized the women, children, and camels as war 
booty.   
Among the women captured was Shaymā’, the daughter of Amīn’s wet nurse, 
Ḥalīma.  Her tribe, Banū Sa‘d b. Bakr, belonged to the Hawāzin.  Some of these had 
fought with Amīn at Ḥunayn, others against him.18  After Amīn released his milk-sister, 
he pursued the fugitives who took refuge with their Thaqīfī kinsmen at al-Ṭā’if.  He was 
accompanied there by the ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a.  This Hawāzin subgroup deserted to his side 
after the defeat at Ḥunayn.19  al-Ṭā’if stood on a promontory surrounded by fertile 
villages.  With the capture of Makka, it was left without a market for its fruit produce.  
With the defeat of the Hawāzin, it was also left without nomadic support.  Its route to 
‘Ukāẓ blocked, it capitulated.20  Subsequently, Amīn’s numbers surged.  Dependent upon 
sedentary supplies, the surrounding nomads were compelled after the fall of Makka and 
al-Ṭā’if to join the tribal prophet.  In exchange, he affirmed their rights above all others to 
contested pasture districts and water wells.21  With the capture of the markets at ‘Ukāẓ, 
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and Khaybar to the north, al-Ḥijāz was once and for all cut off from the invisible hand of 
al-Yamāma.   
Timed around the fall harvest, al-Yamāma’s annual market cycle commenced at 
Dūmat al-Jandal in November.22  From July through September, the markets set up shop 
in al-Ḥijāz.  From August to September in the month of Dhū al-Ḥijja, the markets opened 
at Dhū al-Majāz, a day away from Makka.  Although it was not a commercial destination, 
pilgrims once flocked to the sacred grove of Nakhla.  During this month, Makka 
benefited from lucrative secondary trade and pilgrimage.  In September, the markets 
cycled north to Nuṭāt Khaybar.  Finally, in October, the trade sequence came to a close at 
Ḥajr in al-Yamāma.23  Like a water-wheel, once complete, the market cycle was bound to 
repeat.  However, Amīn’s incessant raiding and the seizure of both Khaybar and ‘Ukāẓ 
destabilized the west Arabian trade routes, thereby forcing their closure.  Rather than 
proceeding from Rābiya in the south to ‘Ukāẓ in the northwest, trade now flowed from 
Rābiya to Najrān, then directly to Ḥajr in al-Yamāma by way of al-Falaj (SEE MAP 4.1).24  
As a result, ‘Ukāẓ, Majanna, Dhū al-Majāz, and Khaybar were simply cut out of the 
market cycle.  In the month of Dhū al-Ḥijja, neither pilgrims nor residual trade now made 
their way from Dhū al-Majāz to Makka.   
 
Restructuring 
To counteract the negative effects on al-Ḥijāz’s economy, Amīn established his own 
shorter circle of market fairs (mawāsim) (SEE MAP 4.1).25  Although this local circle was 
pilgrimage-oriented, it was coupled with trade.  He tried to jumpstart Makka’s economy 
through pilgrimage tourism.  For this purpose, he had already desecrated Nakhla, 
Makka’s competitor and the foremost pilgrimage site in the area.  He hoped to draw 
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pilgrims in to Makka by word of mouth: “Exhort all people to make the pilgrimage.  
They will come to you on foot and on the backs of swift camels from every distant 
quarter.”26  The new market circle started at ‘Ukāẓ, moved to Majanna, and ended in 
Minā and ‘Arafa.  At times, Badr and Makka proper were also incorporated into this 
sequence.27  Amīn arranged an annual pilgrimage (ḥajj) in the sacred month of Dhū al-
Ḥijja.  He encouraged commerce at the pilgrimage sites by declaring that “[i]t is not 
accounted against you as a crime if you seek the bounty of your lord at the fairs of the 
pilgrimage (fī mawāsim al-ḥajj).”28  Furthermore, he set up ‘offices’ and institutions 
paralleling those at ‘Ukāẓ.  To the pilgrimage sites, he assigned a peacekeeper, a market 
controller, and an arbiter.  Unlike in old ‘Ukāẓ, he forbade prestige contests in his 
jurisdiction.29  Instead, he replaced this destructive practice with his own notions of the 
fair ‘circulation of wealth.’  These emphasized the ethical bond between the affluent and 
the destitute.  For example, during the annual pilgrimage, the wealthy sacrificed animals 
to atone for their sins, while simultaneously feeding the hungry.  He preached that “[t]he 
deity has made the shrine (ka‘ba), the sacred house, the sacred month, and the sacrificial 
offerings with their garlands, eternal values for mankind.”30   
At the same time, Amīn outlawed ‘the practice of intercalation’ in which ‘time-
reckoners’ annually switched the observance of ‘sacred and profane’ months.31  
Consequently, the Yamāmī and Makkan calendars were no longer synchronized.  The 
sacred months had forbidden violence, thereby allowing pan-Arab trade.  This was no 
longer feasible with Amīn’s calendar reform.  From this point onward, merchant caravans 
in al-Ḥijāz travelled safely only during the four sacred months, and only en route to the 
pilgrimage sites.32  The incompatibility of the Yamāmī and Ḥijāzī networks rendered 
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east-west trade a thing of the past.  Amīn’s restructuring temporarily sheltered Makka; at 
the same time, it also isolated al-Ḥijāz.  The long-term solution was the conquest and 








Amīn’s independent trade circle closed off ‘Ukāẓ to al-Yamāma.  However, control of 
this transit point for goods was meaningless without access to the source of goods.  For 
this purpose, he campaigned north.33  His objective: the emporium of Dūmat al-Jandal.  
Following the fall of al-Ṭā’if, he returned to Yathrib and made preparations for war on 
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the northern frontier.  After a second setback at Dūmat al-Jandal in 627/8 C.E., he 
rethought his strategy. 
    
Opening 
Amīn had attempted to bypass the northern depot by reopening a direct route to Syria.  
Independent access meant channeling Syrian trade through Khaybar to Yathrib.  For this 
task, in August of 629 C.E., he had dispatched Zayd b. Ḥāritha with a force of three 
thousand.  Accompanying them was Khālid b. al-Walīd.  After camping in Wādī al-Qurā, 
the expedition pressed on through dangerous territory.  The Quḍā‘a, kinsmen of the Banū 
Kalb and the keepers of Dūmat al-Jandal, attacked Zayd and his men at Mu’ta.34  Zayd 
and two de facto commanders (amīr-s) were killed: ‘Abd Allāh b. Rawāḥa and Ja‘far b. 
Abī Ṭālib (who had just returned from al-Yamāma).  Khālid ordered a general retreat.  
The death toll at Mu’ta was high.  The Yathribīs treated those who returned alive as 
deserters.  Abū Hurayra’s cousin confronted him point-blank, “Were you not a coward on 
the battle-day of Mu’ta!”35  At a loss for words, Abū Hurayra hung his head in shame.  
That winter, Amīn ordered ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ to lead a retaliatory raid at Dhāt al-Salāsil 
against three Quḍā‘a subgroups (the Balī, ‘Udhra, and Balqayn).36  He reached their 
territory with three hundred men.  Greatly outnumbered, he requested reinforcements.  
When two hundred more arrived, he made a raid against the Quḍā‘a who immediately 
scattered and blended into their surroundings.  The expedition returned with no spoils 
other than some sheep and camels.  The fact remained that the defeat at Mu’ta was a 
major setback.   
In 630 C.E., Amīn readied another campaign north, this time to Tabūk.37  The site 
was a prime staging ground against Dūmat al-Jandal.  Beset with serious financial 
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difficulties, the preparations proceeded slowly.  The nomads refused to contribute to the 
campaign fund.  Moreover, the specter of failure hung over the expedition, and the 
proposed summer launch for the campaign met with strong resistance from all quarters.  
Even Ibn Ubayy, who commanded more men than Amīn himself, resolved to remain 
behind.38  In an attempt to overcome these obstacles, Amīn ‘threatened’ to unleash holy 
war and hell-fire upon the stragglers.39  In an effort to boost recruitment and to aid those 
unable to equip themselves, he designated them eligible for charity.  He implored the rich 
to provide them with weapons, horses, and rations to fight in the campaign.  After all, the 
capture of Dūmat al-Jandal would be a boon for business.  Accordingly, the wealthy 
merchant ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān donated a sizeable sum.  Thereafter, the ‘raid of hardship’ 
set out.  Rather than risk an engagement, the ‘local chiefs’ around Tabūk capitulated.  
From there, Amīn dispatched his third expedition to Dūmat al-Jandal.  Khālid reluctantly 
set out with four hundred and twenty horsemen.  They traversed the hazardous territory 
around Dūma where the Banū Kalb dwelt.  The expedition returned after a skirmish with 
al-Akdar, the head of the largest district of Dūmat al-Jandal.  Unable to lay siege to the 
emporium, the Tabūk expedition fell far short of achieving its original objective, which 
again was Dūmat al-Jandal.40   
 
Closure 
The political fallout of the unpopular and unsuccessful Tabūk campaign preoccupied 
Amīn.  In order to quell internal dissent and encourage compliance, he made an example 
of his remaining enemies at home.  It was during this time in October 630 C.E. that Abū 
‘Āmir, the Muslim leader-in-exile, returned to Yathrib.41  He took refuge in the mosque 
of Ibn Maẓ‘ūn in Qubā’.  His arrival lifted the spirits of Muslims among the ‘Amr b. 
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‘Awf clan who had withheld their monetary support for Amīn’s poorly financed 
expedition to Tabūk.  So as to silence the opposition, Amīn declared: “And those who 
have taken a mosque in opposition and unbelief, and to divide the Mu’mins, and as a 
listening post for those who earlier fought against the deity and his herald, will swear 
‘We desire nothing but good.’  But the deity testifies they are truly liars.”42  He forbade 
the Mu’mins to pray in Ibn Maẓ‘ūn’s mosque by saying: “You shall not set foot in it.  It 
is more fitting that you should pray in a mosque founded on piety from the very first 
day.”43  He redirected the Mu’mins to his own mosque in Qubā’.  Therein, he said: 
“…[Y]ou shall find men who would keep themselves pure.  The deity loves those that 
purify themselves.”44  After he branded Abū ‘Āmir ‘the sinner,’ the Muslim ‘opposition’ 
mosque of Ibn Maẓ‘ūn was torched.45  When Amīn delivered his fiery sermon, he asked 
his captive audience “[w]ho is a better man, he who laid the foundation of his building on 
righteousness from the deity and his approval, or one who laid the foundation of his 
building on the brink of a crumbling precipice, so that his building will fall with him into 
the fire of hell?  The deity does not guide the wrongdoing dissenters.”46  The last bastion 
of resistance went up in flames.  Abū ‘Āmir fled once more into exile; those still loyal 
who remained in southern Yathrib dissimulated.  As a sign for all to see, Amīn’s mosque 
stood alone and unchallenged in Qubā’.  Soon thereafter in 631 C.E., his political rival Ibn 
Ubayy passed away.  al-Khazraj’s leadership now fell to one loyal to Amīn: the Anṣārī 
leader Sa‘d b. ‘Ubāda (d. 636 C.E.).47  Although Amīn managed to consolidate his hold 
over Yathrib and its politics, with no supply hub to feed his trade circle, the oasis city 





The negotiations between Yathrib and al-Yamāma were born out of necessity.  Khaybar 
was the turning point in Yamāmī-Yathribī relations.  On the one hand, al-Yamāma’s 
demand outpaced its agricultural production; therefore, it increasingly required cereal and 
fruit imports.  As the second-to-last stop in the trade cycle, Nuṭāt Khaybar served to 
funnel barley and dates into al-Yamāma.  However, Amīn’s siege of Khaybar disrupted 
al-Yamāma’s secondary food source.  This created a temporary crisis at the center.  For 
the first time, supplies were redirected away from al-Yamāma to Yathrib and Makka in 
al-Ḥijāz.  For this reason, al-Yamāma turned to Najrān in northern al-Yaman.  This site 
could not only salvage and secure al-Yamāma’s network, but it could also satisfy al-
Yamāma’s food demand by means of its fertile northwestern oasis.48  To counter this 
development, Amīn opened a southern front against al-Yamāma.  In exchange for their 
protection, he forged an alliance with a group from Najrān.49  A wartime provision of 
their agreement stipulated that they equip his forces with coats of mail, horses, and 
camels.  In 630 C.E., he sent Quṭba b. ‘Āmir b. Ḥadīda on his behalf to conquer the 
settlement of Talāba in al-Yaman.  After its subjugation, Ṣurad b. ‘Abd Allāh, a nomad of 
the Azd Shanū’a, attacked the neighboring Yamanī settlement of Jurash in the name of 
Amīn.50  Following a siege, the sedentary population sued for peace.  Amīn then 
appointed (wallā) Abū Sufyān to oversee Jurash.  Despite the fact that Amīn’s forces had 
made significant inroads into al-Yaman, he had the weaker hand at the negotiating table.  
Yet he alone held the keys to the shrine (ka‘ba) of al-Raḥmān, the symbol of Aslam’s 




While Amīn conquered Makka, power in al-Yamāma changed hands.  In around 630 C.E., 
Hawdha passed away, whereupon Aslam accomplished a peaceful transfer of power.  As 
Hawdha’s heir apparent, he assumed the regal title ‘lord of al-Yamāma’ (ṣāḥib al-
yamāma).51  In his person, he combined the functionary and religious (al-imāma) 
leadership of al-Yamāma.  Although his succession went largely unchallenged, there 
naturally existed a silent opposition.  Leading the pack was Thumāma, the nomadic chief 
of the Banū Ḥanīfa who dwelt in the Qarqarī district.52  Other notables included the land 
magnate Mujjā‘a and those from the royal Ḥanafī clan of Hawdha, the Banū Suḥaym b. 
Murra of the Qurrān district.  Located north of Ḥajr and Jaww at the foothills of the 
Ṭuwayq escarpment, the inhabitants of Qurrān specialized in commerce and agriculture.  
This district’s main nomadic malcontents included the Banū Yashkur and the nomadic 
branch of the Banū Suḥaym.  In addition, concentrated at the Namira mine around the al-
‘Irḍ district neighboring Thumāma’s nomads were a negligible number of discontented 
Banū Kilāb.  None of these, however, posed a serious challenge to Aslam.  His ardent 
supporters included his diplomat, al-Rajjāl, and his military general, Muḥakkim.53   
In geographical terms, divided by the Ṭuwayq escarpment, al-Yamāma totaled 
eight districts, three in the west (Qarqarī, al-‘Irḍ, al-Karma) and five in the east (al-Faqī, 
Qurrān, al-‘Āriḍ, al-Khaḍārim, al-Falaj).  Aslam reigned supreme in the fertile east, while 
the desolate lands to the west fell within Thumāma’s purview.  Thumāma controlled the 
Qarqarī and al-‘Irḍ districts; whereas, al-Karma in the far north was divided between him 
and Aslam.  This district’s artisans and tradesmen favored the sedentary governance of 
Aslam; on the other hand, its semi-nomadic population who dwelt in the area’s sand 
dunes and flat plains leaned towards Thumāma.54  Also geographically caught between 
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Aslam and Thumāma, the eastern Qurrān district challenged Aslam’s authority.  Its 
sedentary inhabitants pursued an untenable policy of nonalignment.  In their midst lived 
Thumāma’s enemies, the Banū Qushayr, a subgroup of the ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a.  This semi-
sedentary clan farmed the Qurrān (northern) and al-Falaj (southern) districts of eastern al-
Yamāma.55  Although split in two, Thumāma could not stand up to Aslam in al-Yamāma; 
but then neither could Amīn in Arabia.   
 
Dirty Diplomacy 
In exchange for blockading Makka, Amīn appointed Thumāma as his agent and 
representative (‘āmil) in al-Yamāma.56  They both colluded against Aslam.  Thumāma 
proposed to lure Aslam into Yathrib: “If he will answer positively to anyone, he will 
answer me and maybe he will come.”57  Amīn agreed.  Thumāma set off straight away 
for the capital where he ingratiated himself with Aslam.  Day after day, he implored him 
to visit Yathrib.  Aslam almost acquiesced.  However, al-Rajjāl suspected foul play and 
cautioned him against this rash course of action: “Do not do this; if you go to him [viz. 
Amīn], he will kill you.”58  In his stead, Aslam dispatched a body double fully veiled 
from head to toe in the garments of a holy man.59  Led by the royalist Salmā b. Ḥanẓala 
al-Suḥaymī, this delegation went to test the waters.  Accompanied by Muḥakkim’s armed 
escort, Salmā, al-Rajjāl, Mujjā‘a, Ṭalq b. ‘Alī, and the other delegates arrived in Yathrib.  
They stayed at the home of Ramla, Aslam’s former wife.60   
When she was around the age of seventeen, Abū Sufyān had married off Ramla to 
Aslam in order to guarantee the shipment of Yamāmī grain to Makka.61  In accordance 
with Aslam’s moral law, once she bore him a son (Shuraḥbīl), he released her from 
wedlock and returned her safely to Makka.  Thereafter, Ramla remarried ‘Ubayd Allāh b. 
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Jaḥsh al-Asadī with whom she emigrated back to al-Yamāma.  She bore him a daughter, 
Ḥabība.  After their divorce, Ramla (known as Umm Ḥabība) married Khālid b. Sa‘īd b. 
al-‘Āṣ.  Once this marriage was dissolved, she repatriated to al-Ḥijāz.  In order to lift 
Thumāma’s blockade on Makka, Abū Sufyān arranged her marriage (then at the age of 
thirty-five) to Amīn.   
Under the impression that her former spouse Aslam was with the deputation, 
Amīn baited the trap.  Ramla extended her hospitality by graciously offering bread, 
yoghurt, meat, and dates.  To avoid detection by Ramla, Aslam’s double stayed behind 
with the baggage.  This behavior, however, was strange for a head of state, and no doubt 
drew suspicion.  When meeting the delegates the following day, Amīn approached the 
imposter.62  He immediately saw through the deception and treachery.  Alarmed and 
unnerved, he warned the veiled assailant not to take a single step: “If you draw near, then 
surely the deity will do something to you, and if you turn your back, then surely the deity 
will annihilate you.  I see you to be none other than him whom I saw concerning that 
which I saw,” Amīn blurted out.63  Aslam had pulled the wool over his eyes.  With the 
trap sprung, Amīn lashed out against the duplicitous delegates.  Holding a date palm 
branch in his hand, he adamantly declared, “Even if you asked me for this branch…I 
would not give it to you.”64  In a somewhat curt and abrupt manner, he then told them to 
negotiate with his spokesman, Thābit b. Qays b. Shammās (d. 633 C.E.).   
Naturally, the talks failed to produce a trade agreement.  Abiding by the policy 
that Amīn had so clearly laid out, Thābit refused to give an inch.  The deadlocked parties 
established a modus vivendi.  Amīn retained control over his possessions in the west, 
Aslam over those in the east.  During this visit, al-Rajjāl met with prospective informants.  
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When Amīn walked by, al-Rajjāl was in the company of Abū Hurayra (a disgraced 
derelict with nothing to lose) and Furāt b. Ḥayyān al-‘Ijlī (a guide captured during the 
raid at Dhāt ‘Irq who had chosen conversion over death).  Aghast at this sight, Amīn 
passed a damning judgment: “A molar tooth of one of you in hell will be as big as the 
mountain of Uḥud.”65  Still concerned about harboring potential enemy spies as well as 
to ensure Furāt’s loyalty, Amīn sweetened the offer by promising him lands in al-
Yamāma.  In the meantime, using land as an incentive for Mujjā‘a to betray Aslam, Amīn 
struck his own under-the-table deal.  He granted Mujjā‘a a written title for uncultivated 
lands:  
e herald of 
I bestow upon you al-Ghūra, Ghurāba, and al-Ḥubl.   
 
t war was imminent, 
Two rams will butt horns, the one that we love more is our ram.”69 
In the name of the merciful and compassionate deity. 
This is a document that the ‘praised one’ (muḥammad), th
the deity, wrote for Mujjā‘a b. Murāra b. Sulmī.   
Whoever demands proof from you, then refer them to me.66 
Salmā also had a sudden change of heart.  Aided and abetted by Amīn, he desired to 
throw off the yoke of Aslam and restore the royal house of Hawdha to the Yamāmī 
throne.67  In a ‘magnanimous’ gesture intended to win the other delegates to his side, 
Amīn presented each with five ounces of silver.  He even afforded this special privilege 
to Aslam’s body double whose lot, he said, was no worse than theirs.68  When the 





With the news that Amīn was intent on war, Aslam consolidated his position in al-
Yamāma.  After Heraclius’ invasion of the Persian Empire and the death of the Sāsānid 
emperor, Khusraw II (d. 628 C.E.), outside influence on Arabia had rapidly declined.   70
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Aslam was no longer able to rely on the Persians for military support.  What is more, he 
sensed something was amiss.  Thumāma and the Banū Ḥanīfa clans were plotting against 
him.  In order to counter this domestic threat, Aslam had to improvise quickly.  He 
recruited auxiliary forces from neighboring nomadic groups.  Meanwhile, as Thumāma 
stoked the fire in al-Yamāma, Amīn launched a propaganda campaign against Aslam.  
Now in a position of power, Amīn revived his counterclaim to exclusive prophetic 
uthority: He, and he alone, was Muḥammad (the ‘praised one’).   





Where Hawdha failed, Aslam succeeded.  He brought over to his side a subgroup of the 
Tamīm b. Murr confederacy.71  To accommodate them, he established a garrison in al-
Yamāma where he settled the nomadic Banū Usayyid clan of the ‘Amr (of Tamīm).  This 
clan’s mobility provided a tactical advantage in the fight against Thumāma.  However, 
his bold move to station nomads among the sedentary population had serious 
repercussions.  The farmers looked upon these ‘hamlets of the allies’ (qurā al-aḥālīf) as 
nests of criminal activity.72  These culprits were protected from retribution in the 
violence-free zone (ḥaram).  Whenever they raided orchards in the countryside, they took 
shelter in the garrison.  The angry sedentary population therefore appealed directly to 
Aslam.  He considered their case carefully.  The nomads were no doubt a nuisance, but 
on the other hand, they were a necessary evil.  The survival of al-Yamāma depended 
upon mounting an effective defense against Thumāma.  In other words, the Banū Usayyid 
formed al-Yamāma’s first line of defense.  On the verge of war, Aslam made the difficult 
decision of sidin
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By the darkest night, 
By the blackest wolf, 
By the mountain goat, 
 Once more, the farmers sued Aslam to 
hold the nomads accountable.  He a
Usayyid neve ut anything, 
 every person.  At our death their 
fate (am
Usayyid has not defiled a sacred thing.73 
 
The plowmen challenged his decision by citing the fact that the nomads were directly 
liable for the wrongful damage of property.74  He turned down their appeal.  Left to their 
own devices, the Banū Usayyid continued to operate with impunity.  This time, during 
their raid, they cut down some date palm groves. 
gain refused: 
By the obscure night, 
By the restless wolf,  
r c
Neither succulent nor dry.75 
 
The frustrated farmers insisted that “[t]he Usayyid did cut the fresh fruit of the palms and 
broke down the dry fences.”76  Well aware that the nomads were at fault, Aslam 
deliberately turned a blind eye to the plight of his fellow farmers.  He told them, “Go!  
Return, for you have no claim.”77  In their eyes, he had betrayed his sedentary roots.  To 
assure full cooperation, he issued a public proclamation urging the people of al-Yamāma 
to patiently bear all losses suffered at the hands of the Banū Usayyid (of Tamīm).  He 
reassured them that al-Raḥmān would mete out justice in the hereafter and declared that 
“Banū Tamīm is a pure and independent tribe, there should be no hatred towards them, 
nor should they pay collective compensatory damages (itāwatun).  Let us be good 
neighbors as long as we live, let us protect them from
ruhum) will be determined by al-Raḥmān.”78   
Meanwhile in al-Ḥijāz, Amīn struck an alliance with the most powerful branch of 
the Tamīm confederacy, the Banū Sa‘d b. Zayd Manāt.79  In addition to belonging to the 
Tamīm, the Banū Sa‘d also held membership in the Ribāb confederacy founded by Ḍabba 
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b. Udd.  This confederacy included the Thawr ‘Abd Manāt b. Udd, ‘Adī, Taym, and ‘Ukl 
b. ‘Awf.  Though a potent ally, nonetheless, the leadership of the Banū Sa‘d was divided 
along clan lines.  al-Zibriqān b. Badr commanded the majority of the tribe, while his 
rival, Qays b. ‘Āṣim, vied with him for power.  Consequently, Qays’ loyalty to al-
Zibriqān and Amīn wavered.  Despite this, the Banū Sa‘d sent ‘reinforcements’ to 
Thumāma.  All the while, Mālik b. Nuwayra (d. ca. 632/3 C.E.), the chief of another 
major branch of the Tamīm (i.e., the Banū Tha‘laba b. Yarbū‘ b. Ḥanẓala), treaded 
angerously between the Banū Usayyid b. ‘Amr and the Banū Sa‘d.80   




In the losing war of words against Aslam, Amīn radically altered his strategy.  Previously 
plagued by the menacing Makkans, he had refused to be associated with al-Raḥmān of al-
Yamāma.  With the conquest of Makka, the old stigma was lifted.  Rather than rejecting 
his enemy’s religion, he now embraced it.  As the earlier episode with Ibn Maẓ‘ūn made 
abundantly clear, the Muslim and Mu’min religions were commensurable; however, 
leadership authority (al-amr) was non-negotiable.  Consequently, Amīn made Islām his 
own.  He announced to his followers: “This day I have perfected your religion (dīn) for 
you and completed my favor to you.  I have chosen Islām to be your religion (dīn).”81  
No longer was Islām to be the exclusive ideological domain of Aslam.  This deep 
incursion struck at the heart of the enemy.  Amīn further held that Islām had become 
corrupt, as the illiterate masses who followed Aslam had committed the grave sin of 
association (shirk).  Identifying ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (Aslam) with al-Raḥmān (the deity), 
these erring ‘Muslims’ had violated monotheism’s basic precept by associating a partner 
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polytheists.  He himself accordingly came as a ‘renewer of religion’ to purify Islām.82  In 
February 631 C.E., he issued an ultimatum to these ‘associators’: 
A proclamation from the deity and his herald to the people (al-nās) on 
the day of the greater pilgrimage: 
 
The deity and his herald are disassociated from the ‘associators.’  If you 
repent, it shall be well with you; but if you pay no heed, know that you 
shall not be immune from the deity’s judgment…When the sacred 
months are over, slay the ‘associators’ wherever you find them.  Arrest 
them, besiege them, and lie in ambush everywhere for them…Evil is 
what they do.  They treat the Mu’min ruthlessly.  And it is they who are 
the transgressors…Fight them: The deity will chastise them at your 
hands and humble them.  He will grant you victory over them and heal 
the hearts of the neo-tribe (qawm) of Mu’mins.83 
 
By threatening violence against the ‘associators,’ he resolved to bring Aslam’s subjects 
into submission.  At the same time, he coordinated a two-pronged propaganda campaign 
with Thumāma, who was then in al-Yamāma.   
Thumāma roused the Banū Ḥanīfa to rebellion: “If you hear and obey me (amrī), 
then you will be rightly guided (turshadū).  Two prophets (nabiyyāni) never share in a 
single authority (amr wāḥid).”84  The nomadic chief proceeded to assess the relative 
merits of the two claimants;  he first cited Amīn’s verses: 
In the name of the merciful and compassionate deity.  The scripture (al-
kitāb) is sent down from the deity, the omnipotent, the omniscient, who 
forgives sin and accepts repentance.  His punishment is stern, and his 
bounty infinite.  There is no deity but him.  All shall return to him.85 
 
Unequivocally, he declaimed that “this is the speech of the deity.”86  He then mockingly 
recited Aslam’s verses: 
O immaculate frog, 
Neither do you refuse drink, 
Nor do you muddy the water.87 
 
“Surely you will see,” he concluded, “this speech does not originate from a deity.  
Muḥammad [viz. Amīn] has merited authority (al-amr).”88  He then openly denounced 
Aslam and declared his allegiance to Amīn.  This propaganda provoked discontent and 
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disagreement among the Banū Ḥanīfa.  To counteract these negative effects, Aslam 
delivered a moving speech of his own: 
O Banū Ḥanīfa!  I want you to tell me, on what [grounds] are the 
Quraysh more entitled than you to the prophethood (al-nubuwwa) and 
the imāmate (al-imāma)?  By god, they are no more numerous than you 
and no braver.  Indeed, your country (bilād) is more extensive than 
their country, and your wealth (amwāl) is greater than their wealth.89 
 
He rallied them to his cause.  The battle for the hearts and minds of the people of al-
Yamāma was well underway.   
 
Incursions 
Thumāma’s ambition brought al-Yamāma to the brink of civil war.  His public 
denunciation of Aslam proved to be a powerful propaganda weapon.  The call for 
revolution spread far and wide.  At Amīn’s behest, he instigated riots in al-Yamāma.90  
Aslam had underestimated the strength of the enemy within.  However, despite the 
prevailing social chaos, both the Banū Usayyid and Aslam’s sedentary forces stood by his 
side, ready to defend against attack.  After forcibly quelling the civil unrest, Aslam’s 
general, Muḥakkim, beat down the petty village heads responsible.  Although Aslam 
prevailed, the opposition movement continued to gain momentum.  This only encouraged 
Thumāma to take further bold action.   
 
Dissent 
The resistance attracted farmers in the heart of al-Yamāma who felt slighted by the 
favoritism shown to the Banū Usayyid nomads.  Even respected members of the 
community such as the ambitious friend of al-Rajjāl, Ibn ‘Umayr al-Yashkurī, sided with 
the dissidents and incited the population against Aslam.91  Ibn ‘Umayr secretly circulated 
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an inflammatory poem imploring the loyal subjects of al-Yamāma to bravely answer the 
call of Thumāma b. Uthāl: 
O Su‘ād (‘good fortune’) of the heart, daughter of Uthāl, my night has 
grown long by the intrigue of al-Rajjāl; 
 
Verily it, O Su‘ād (‘good fortune’), is one of the changes of fortune 
working against you, like the intrigue of the imposter (al-dajjāl);  
 
The tribe (al-qawm) was seduced (ka-fitnati) by the testimony 
(shahāda), but the deity, the possessor of power and perspicacity, is 
omnipotent;  
 
That which they say is not equal to a sabot strap, since it is not shod 
with a latchet;  
 
Verily my religion (dīn) is the religion of the prophet (al-nabī) and 
there are among the tribe (al-qawm) some men for the right guidance 
(al-hudā), like me; 
 
Muḥakkim b. Ṭufayl has destroyed the tribe (al-qawm), and has 
destroyed some men whom we do not consider to be men;   
 
Today, ‘Aslam the apostate’ (musaylima) seized from them their 
authority (amr), and they will not return to it till the end of days; 
 
I said to my soul that your contending in taking to unbelief (ta‘āṭīka lil-
kufri) is the reviling of the speech of the wretched;  
 
Perhaps the souls who are unhappy with the authority (al-amr) will 
have a delight similar to being released from the hobble;  
 
If my fate, by virtue of the natural disposition (fiṭrati llāhi) for the deity, 
is true religion (ḥanīfan), then I don’t mind!92 
 
These verses spread like wildfire among the sedentary population to the point that women 
and children sang it aloud while working in the fields.93  Incensed by these accusations, 
the authorities searched for the anonymous poet to silence him.  In the meantime, this 
popular poem took root and produced its desired effect.  It polarized the populace and 
turned public opinion against Aslam.  Yamāmīs from all walks of life suddenly came out 
of the woodwork to resist his regime.  Some defected, some spied, and others concealed 





Thumāma b. Uthāl used the perfect pretext to raid Aslam’s territory and ignite a civil war 
in al-Yamāma.  His father, Uthāl, had been slain by the Banū Qushayr.  As a subgroup of 
the ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a, they alone withheld their allegiance to Amīn after the Battle of 
Ḥunayn.  Thumāma then approached Amīn saying, “O herald of the deity, the Banū 
Qushayr killed Uthāl in the days of ignorance.  So permit me to make a raid against 
them.”95  Amīn authorized the first strike.  The Banū Ḥanīfa clans under Thumāma 
mobilized.  Reinforced by the Banū Sa‘d and the Banū Suḥaym nomads, they attacked 
villages loyal to Aslam.  At the same time, Mujjā‘a and the royal clan of Hawdha staged 
a palace coup on behalf of Hawdha’s son.96  They hoped to install this prince, Ṣabira, to 
the throne.  While Aslam subdued the royalists, Muḥakkim took the field.  He clashed 
with Thumāma’s coalition at Duran and Sihām.97  In both battles, victory fell to Aslam.  
The Banū Sa‘d retreated.  Falling back west of the Ṭuwayq escarpment, Thumāma made 
haste to dispatch couriers to Amīn with word of this major setback.  Barely escaping, 
Mujjā‘a fled to Yathrib.  The tide had turned. 
Amīn had committed an unprovoked act of aggression.  His proxy war 
jeopardized the modus vivendi between them.  Aslam sent a clear message to Amīn, 
reminding him of their standing agreement.  Upon their arrival in Yathrib, his two 
messengers requested an audience.  In Amīn’s presence, the first envoy read aloud the 
letter: 
In the name of the merciful deity, al-Raḥmān. 
 
From: ‘Abd al-Raḥmān [viz. Aslam], the herald of the deity 
To: Amīn 
 
To us belongs half the earth, and to the Quraysh belongs half of it.   
However, the Quraysh are unjust.  
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Peace be upon you. 
 
Scribed by ‘Amr b. al-Jarūd al-Ḥanafī.98 
 
Amīn’s blood boiled when he heard the messenger profess his allegiance to Aslam’s 
prophetic authority.  He said: “You lie!  Seize this one and kill him!”99  When his men 
rushed to collar the messenger, the other messenger held on tightly to his companion’s 
waist.  After an intense tug of war, Amīn cooled down and released both messengers.  
They returned to al-Yamāma bearing Amīn’s reply: 
In the name of the merciful and compassionate deity. 
 
From: Muḥammad [viz. Amīn], the herald of the deity 
To: ‘Aslam the apostate’ (musaylima), the mendacious (al-kadhdhāb) 
 
The earth belongs to the deity.  It is inherited by whomever he wills 
from among his servants.  The end belongs to the god-fearing.100 
 
Peace be upon those who heed the right guidance. 
 
Scribed by Ubayy b. Ka‘b.101 
 
It became crystal clear to Aslam that Amīn had no intent to cease and desist.   
At about this time, Mujjā‘a arrived in Yathrib.  He had with him Khawla bt. 
Ja‘far, a highborn Yamāmī woman from the royal household, whom ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib 
later wed.102  Mujjā‘a held Amīn responsible for the death of his brother, who had been 
killed in the crossfire by Amīn’s Banū Sa‘d and Asad allies.  He wanted compensation in 
blood money (diya) amounting to one hundred camels.  This, however, was by far the 
least of Amīn’s concerns.103  More bad news reached him from the battlefront.  
Thumāma’s forces had lost the battle for Ḥajr.  When Amīn’s attempt to take al-Yamāma 
by direct assault failed, he prepared for a massive strike on several fronts.104  He 
redoubled his efforts to cut Aslam’s supply line at Najrān.  In December 631 C.E., he 
deployed ‘Alī from Qubā’ with a force of three hundred against al-Yaman.  He then sent 
reinforcements there under the command of Khālid b. al-Walīd.  Simultaneously, he tried 
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to outflank al-Yamāma by going around it by way of greater al-Baḥrayn.  When these 
efforts met with little success, he developed a fallback position.  He was determined to 
open the northern route to Syria in order to resupply his own forces.  To fund this war 
effort, he began to collect annual taxes from loyal nomads neighboring Yathrib and 
Makka; in effect, this centralized the nascent city-state (al-madīna) of Yathrib.105  All the 
while, he coordinated a full-scale war against al-Yamāma.  But right before launching 




The major north Arabian tribes of ‘Adnān claimed descent from either of two ancestors, 
Rabī‘a or Muḍar.  The Banū Ḥanīfa belonged to the Rabī‘a, the Banū Quraysh to the 
Muḍar.106  When Amīn disseminated his propaganda, it was infused with a virulent form 
of tribal chauvinism.  The violent nature of his and Aslam’s rivalry intensified and took 
on a life of its own.  As a result, their contested claims were overwhelmed by tribal 
identity.  Irrespective of the veracity of their claims, nomads affiliated with the Muḍar 
paid homage to Amīn.  Those of Rabī‘a threw their lot in with Aslam.  As one tribesman 
of the Rabī‘a aptly phrased it, “A liar (kadhdhāb) of Rabī‘a is dearer to me than a liar 
(kadhdhāb) of Muḍar.”107  Truth was in the tribe.  Therefore, chauvinism, and not 
legitimacy, determined loyalty.  Consequently, legitimacy developed “in an anti-
authoritarian direction.”108  ‘Recognition’ was no longer based upon the ‘legitimacy’ of 
the claimant to authority (al-amr); rather, ‘legitimacy’ was now based upon the 




In June 632 C.E., Amīn passed away.109  As a matter of course, the death of the tribal 
prophet and chief signaled the dissolution and split of the Mu’min neo-tribe into its 
constituent elements.  The Anṣār neo-clan under Sa‘d b. ‘Ubāda – the head of the old al-
Khazraj clan of Banū Qayla – decided to go their own way.  The Qurayshī-Muhājirūn 
neo-clan opposed their secession.  Appealing to tribal chauvinism, Abū Bakr argued that 
“...the Arabs [viz. Muḍar] will recognize this leadership authority (hādhā al-amr) only in 
this clan (al-ḥayy) of Quraysh, they being the best of the Arabs in descent (nasaban) and 
territory (dāran).”110  He then presented two Qurayshī ‘candidates’ for the chieftaincy, 
‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb and Abū ‘Ubayda b. al-Jarrāḥ.  The first was a Mu’min disciple of 
Amīn, and the second was an early ‘Muslim’ disciple of ‘Uthmān b. Maẓ‘ūn.  Naturally, 
neither met with the universal approval of the Anṣār.  They insisted on dividing Amīn’s 
leadership authority (al-amr) two-ways: “A leader (amīr) from us and a leader (amīr) 
from you.”111  As Sa‘d b. ‘Ubāda’s rival, Bashīr b. Sa‘d (d. 633 C.E.) openly supported 
his Qurayshī candidate, Abū Bakr.  He said, “In truth Muḥammad [viz. Amīn] was from 
Quraysh [Muḍar], and his people are more entitled to [hold] (authority) and more 
suitable.  I swear by the deity that he shall never see me contesting the leadership 
authority (amr) with them.  So fear the deity and do not oppose them or dispute with 
them.”112  As the architect behind the first Mu’min-Muslim coalition in Makka, Abū 
Bakr had a foot in both camps.  Bashīr accordingly paid him homage, recognizing his 
claim to authority.  Since a group of Anṣār still refused to concede, ‘Umar roughed up 
their leader, Ibn ‘Ubāda.  Even after this harsh treatment, Ibn ‘Ubāda remained 
recalcitrant to the end.  Nonetheless, others followed Bashīr’s lead and recognized the 
authority (al-amr) of Abū Bakr. 
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The new chief was backed by a young generation of Makka’s Qurayshī elite.  
Among the Makhzūm clan were ‘Ikrima b. Abī al-Ḥakam, Khālid b. al-Walīd b. al-
Mughīra, and al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayya.  Abū Bakr’s supporters from the ‘Abd Shams 
clan included Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān, ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ, Khālid b. Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ, Khālid b. 
Asīd b. Abī al-‘Īṣ, and their client, al-‘Alā’ b. al-Ḥaḍramī.113  Abū Sufyān, meanwhile, 
opposed his impetuous son’s choice of joining the rival Makhzūm clan in support of Abū 
Bakr.  Instead, Abū Sufyān proposed to cast his lot with another chief, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib.  
‘Alī, however, declined his support.  For good measure, Abū Bakr neutralized this 
potential threat.114  He made Fadak public property, thereby rejecting the inheritance 
claim of Fāṭima, the daughter of Amīn and wife to ‘Alī.  Abū Bakr had critical need of 
provisions from Fadak in order to launch an offensive campaign on multiple fronts.  As a 
result, he killed two birds with one stone.  When word reached Makka of his rise to 
power, Abū Bakr’s father – Abū Quḥāfa – inquired, “Are the Banū ‘Abd Shams and the 
Banū Mughīra [viz. Banū Makhzūm] pleased with this?”  The answer was “Yes.”115  
Accordingly, Abū Bakr relentlessly pursued Amīn’s expansionist policy, together with 
the Quraysh.   
 
Default 
At the time of his death, Amīn was finalizing his ambitious and costly war plans against 
al-Yamāma.  When Abū Bakr became chief, loyal tribes requested exemption from taxes.  
Since he urgently needed these revenues to fund his massive expeditions, Abū Bakr 
firmly said no.  “If they withheld only a hobbling-cord of what they gave the prophet, I 
would fight them for it.”116  Thereafter, he dispatched three thousand men under Usāma, 
the son of Zayd b. Ḥāritha, to go on a second expedition to Mu’ta.  Usāma raided the 
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village of Ubnā but pulled back before risking a direct engagement with the Banū Kalb 
and their Quḍā‘a kinsmen.117  The northern route to Syria therefore remained closed.  
Meanwhile, Abū Bakr waited and directed affairs in al-Madīna (Yathrib) until Usāma’s 
return.  When news of Amīn’s death first reached al-Yamāma, Thumāma sent Abū Bakr 
an urgent letter cautioning him that Aslam was growing stronger by the minute.118  The 
Rabī‘a from all quarters of Arabia were joining Aslam’s ranks.  At this time, Mujjā‘a also 
approached Abū Bakr.  In exchange for his continued loyalty and services against al-
Yamāma, the new chief promised him land in al-Khiḍrima.119   
In August 632 C.E., Abū Bakr marched over 120 miles northeast of al-Madīna to 
al-Rabadha at al-Abraq.  After taking possession of this site from the Banū Tha‘laba (of 
Saʿd b. Dhubyān), he secured it as a staging ground and base of operations.120  From here 
he dispatched eleven commanders.  Nine of these were directed against each and every 
one of al-Yamāma’s trading outposts, including Ḥajr.121  After appointing (i) Khālid b. 
al-Walīd as field commander, Abū Bakr ordered him to march on Dūmat al-Jandal.  (ii) 
‘Ikrima b. Abī al-Ḥakam and (iii) Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana, accompanied by Mujjā‘a, were 
sent to reinforce Thumāma in al-Yamāma.  (iv) Ḥudahyfa b. Miḥṣan and (v) ‘Arfaja were 
assigned detachments to wage war in ‘Umān.  Against al-Yaman and Ḥadramawt was 
sent (vi) al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayya.  Passing through Makka, he was reinforced by (vii) 
Khālid b. Asīd.  These two commanders fought the Bajīla, thereby forcing their way 
through the Sarāt mountains.  They ultimately advanced against Ṣan‘ā’ and Najrān in the 
south.  To greater al-Baḥrayn, (viii) al-‘Alā’ b. al-Ḥaḍramī was dispatched.  Lastly, (ix) 
‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ, (x) Khālid b. Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ, and (xi) Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān were sent to 
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resume the Syrian campaign.  At a later date, Khālid b. Sa‘īd was reassigned to the area 
around Najrān. 
En route to Dūmat al-Jandal, Khālid b. al-Walīd attacked the mountain 
strongholds of the Ṭayy’ near Taymā’.  Thereafter, he switched his attack pattern.122  
Rather than marching on Dūma as ordered, he headed west.  Towards the end of October 
632 C.E., he arrived at al-Buzākha accompanied by the recently subdued Ṭayy’.  From 
here he conducted extensive raids throughout the northern plateau.  Once central Najd 
was firmly under his control, he raided the camp of the chief Mālik b. Nuwayra at Buṭāḥ.  
There he captured Mālik’s beautiful wife, Umm Tamīm bt. al-Minhāl.  After executing 
this chief of Banū Yarbū‘ (of Tamīm), he wed the widow.  Meanwhile, ‘Ikrima 
established a ‘garrison’ in Thumāma’s ‘territory’ where he was lured into a premature 
war with the enemy.  With word from Mujjā‘a of ‘Ikrima’s defeat at the hands of Aslam, 
Khālid announced, “By god, I will not stop until I have crushed Musaylima [viz. 
Aslam].”123  However, not everyone shared the same sentiment.  Part of the Anṣār clan 
under Thābit b. Qays expressed their reservations about waging a patricidal war against 
Aslam.  They insisted on returning to al-Madīna for further instructions.  Khālid rejected 
their request outright and broke camp.  Worried that noncooperation might cast doubt on 
their loyalty to Abū Bakr, they hurried to join Khālid’s march against al-Yamāma.  In the 
meantime, ‘Ikrima withdrew with his tail between his legs.  After regrouping and 
rebuilding his forces with aid from the Ka‘b b. Rabī‘a (Hawāzin), he joined al-Muhājir’s 
campaign in the south.  Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana received his long-awaited orders to redeploy 
against the Banū Kalb who were protecting Dūmat al-Jandal.124  From central Arabia, 
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‘Iyād b. Ghanm was dispatched by Abū Bakr with standing orders to stage a frontal 
assault on the emporium.125   
 
Deliverance 
After ‘Ikrima and Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana left western al-Yamāma, tensions ran high in the 
camp of the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads.  Thumāma reassured them that Abū Bakr had neither 
forsaken nor forgotten them.126  In anticipation of Khālid’s arrival, Thumāma broadcast 
one last damning poem against Aslam: 
Musaylima [viz. Aslam], turn back!  And do not be contentious, for you 
were not made a partner in the authority (al-amr); 
 
You lie to the deity concerning your divine inspiration (waḥy); your 
bizarre fantasy is the bizarre fantasy of an idiotic imbecile;   
 
Your tribe will try to defend you, but if Khālid comes, then you will be 
discovered;  
 
You have no ascent into the heavens (al-samā’), neither do you have 
any path on the earth (al-arḍ).127 
 
In response, Aslam issued Khālid b. al-Walīd a moral warning in verse: 
O Ibn al-Walīd, you are in my view [a mere] sinner, 
And an ungrateful infidel (kāfir) and a dissenter (munāfiq) to the lord 
(rabb).128  
 
Shortly after this politically charged poetic exchange, Thumāma and the Banū Suḥaym 
mobilized.  In an effort to outflank al-Yamāma, they planned to join al-‘Alā’ b. al-
Ḥaḍramī in al-Baḥrayn.129  Before departing, Thumāma raised the spirits of his nomads 
and subtly warned those who were wavering.  He then set off.  al-Baḥrayn, however, 
proved resilient.  Only a direct assault on al-Yamāma was possible.  On his return 
journey, Thumāma passed through the territory of the Banū Qays b. Tha‘laba (of Bakr b. 
Wā’il) where members of the Rabī‘a had allied themselves with Aslam.  As revenge for 
his part in the death of their tribesman and leader, al-Ḥuṭam b. Ḍubay‘a, they pounced 
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upon him at a spring.130  Thumāma was dead, but the war was not.  Wartime propaganda 
continued to emanate from al-Madīna.  Ḥassān b. Thābit sent a verse warning his former 
companion, Muḥakkim b. al-Ṭufayl, of the impending doom: 
O Muḥakkim b. Ṭufayl!  It has already been destined for you.  Success 
is due to the deity.  He willed [for] you ‘the serpent of death’ [viz. 
Khālid].131 
 
Hard on the heels of this message, Khālid arrived in al-Yamāma. 
 
Clash 
It was commerce, and not culture, that brought the conflict to a head.  While Khālid 
marched into the eye of the storm, Abū Bakr’s forces fanned out throughout the 
peninsula, targeting the major trade centers.  Back in al-Yamāma, Aslam, Muḥakkim, and 
other notables (ashrāf) identified the anonymous propaganda-poet in their midst.  Ibn 
‘Umayr fled for his life and took refuge with Khālid’s advancing forces.  He divulged 
sensitive tactical information to the enemy.132  In particular, he updated Khālid on 
conditions in al-Yamāma and Aslam’s troop movements.  Aslam, he said, was planning 
to camp in front of his farm estates (al-amwāl) in Ubāḍ.  Strategically located in the rear, 
these villages functioned as supply hubs.  Aslam, however, had not yet taken up position.  
Khālid quickly forced his way through the mountain pass, executed its guard detail, and 
camped opposite Aslam’s estates.  On the plain of ‘Aqrabā’, the two armies fought a 
pitched battle.     
 
War 
Aslam fielded an army of seven thousand that included three thousand tribal auxiliaries 
recruited from the Banū Yashkur, Banū ‘Ijl, and Banū Qays b. Tha‘laba.133  Although 
largely composed of the Rabī‘a from the Bakr b. Wā’il, he also included the Banū 
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Usayyid b. Tamīm (Muḍar) cavalry in his ranks.  Whereas Hawdha had once commanded 
ten thousand, the size and strength of Aslam’s forces were greatly diminished by internal 
dissent.  Locked safely in their fortresses, the landed aristocracy lent no assistance.  
Notwithstanding, Aslam’s coalition held together.  Muḥakkim and al-Rajjāl took the 
field.  On the other side, Khālid committed his men to an unequal battle.  With a force of 
four thousand drawn from the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads, Banū Quraysh, Asad, and Ṭayy’, he 
charged headlong into the fray.134  The Banū Sa‘d (of Tamīm) – the archenemies of 
Hawdha – swelled Khālid’s ranks.  On the eve of battle, Shuraḥbīl b. Aslam warned his 
father’s men against failure:  “O [sedentary] Banū Ḥanīfa, today is the day of vigilance; 
today, if you are defeated, [your] womenfolk will be carried off on horseback as captives, 
and will be taken as wives without being demanded in marriage.  So fight for your noble 
[viz. Rabī‘a] descent and defend your women.”135  At the sight of Aslam’s men 
brandishing their swords, Khālid urged his men not to lose heart, “O troop of neo-
Muslims!  The deity has furnished you with comparable means to that of your enemy, so 
that you are not overwhelmed by them.  Do you not see them unsheathe their swords one 
against one another?  I believe they disputed and that strife is amongst them.”136  
However, Khālid had jumped to the wrong conclusion.  Mujjā‘a objected, saying: “By no 
means!  Rather these are Indian swords (al-hundūwāniyya).  They fear breaking them, so 
they brandish them to the sun, in order that their blades become flexible.”137  Thereafter, 
the two armies advanced to the plain of ‘Aqrabā’.   
Muḥakkim and al-Rajjāl’s forces deflected Khālid’s initial attack.  Despite 
suffering heavy casualties, Khālid stubbornly pressed on with the offensive.  al-Rajjāl 
fell.  After repelling several more attacks, Aslam declared: 
In fact we are steadfast and steadfast! 
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The [enemy] tribe (qawm) became stubborn like us. 
Our authority (amr) is so far still persistent. 
The moral character of our troop does not weaken.138 
 
Khālid’s men were forced to fall back to their camp where they leveled accusations of 
cowardice against one another.  Meanwhile, Muḥakkim’s men staged a raid deep into the 
enemy camp.  They wounded and killed the leader of the Anṣār, Thābit b. Qays.  During 
the fighting, Mujjā‘a valiantly defended Khālid’s bride and shouted, “How excellent is 
the mistress of the tent!”139  The tables soon turned.  Khālid rallied his men.  Suddenly, 
the Banū Usayyid (of Tamīm) cavalry deserted to their Muḍar kinsmen in Khālid’s camp.  
This shift resulted in a complete reversal.  The second engagement at ‘Aqrabā’ therefore 
went to Khālid.  Muḥakkim gave the order for immediate retreat to the oasis of al-
Raḥmān.  En route, an arrow pierced through him.  His terror-stricken men hoped to 
escape a similar fate: 
If I escape from it, I would have escaped mightily, 
Since otherwise I would be drinking from the cup of Muḥakkim.140 
 
Khālid’s forces charged the oasis.  The slaughter was great.  Aslam was surrounded.  
Wounded by Waḥshī’s spear, he received the final blow from an Anṣārī.141  Blood and 
water flowed in the oasis of death.  Fifteen hundred of Aslam’s men had fallen by his 
side.  Twenty-five hundred were taken captive.  In like manner, twelve hundred of 
Khālid’s men lay among the corpses.142  Khālid had won a pyrrhic victory.   
 
Conquests 
Having suffered heavy casualties, Khālid lacked the manpower necessary to overcome al-
Yamāma and its countless fortresses of which only two had fallen.  He raided the 
countryside and captured nineteen villages.  Unable to seize the remaining fortresses, he 
initiated peace talks through the mediation of Mujjā‘a.  Salama b. ‘Umayr al-Ḥanafī, 
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however, refused to capitulate.143  He urged his fellow Yamāmīs to hold out in their 
strongholds.  After his body was found at the bottom of a well, the negotiations continued 
uninterrupted.  Playing both ends against the middle, Mujjā‘a shrewdly negotiated Khālid 
down from half to one quarter of the neo-Muslim captives, and half of the gold, silver, 
coats of mail, and herd.  The treaty exempted the villages and fortresses captured 
beforehand.  Khālid made peace on these terms and married Mujjā‘a’s daughter.144  
Seeing that al-Yamāma was not completely subjugated, the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads 
remained as a garrison force.  While still camped in al-Yamāma, Khālid sent 
‘reinforcements’ to greater al-Baḥrayn.  In the meantime, the assault on Dūmat al-Jandal 
in the north failed.  Although al-Walīd b. ‘Uqba had brought additional men, the enemy 
had ‘Iyād pinned down.  Upon his return to al-Madīna, Khālid received orders to march 
on Dūmat al-Jandal.  Arriving on the scene, he lent his assistance to ‘Iyād.  Their 
combined forces crashed down on Dūmat al-Jandal from two directions, and 
overpowered the oasis.  The defenders were executed, and their women and children 
enslaved.  The conquest of Dūmat al-Jandal signaled the end of one era and the beginning 
of another.  Abū Bakr was now master of the single most important north Arabian transit 
zone, well-situated for deploying armies and supplies.145  After an extended stay, Khālid 
made his way to al-Ḥīra where the merchants of Dūmat al-Jandal stored their goods.  He 
entered unopposed.  By early 634 C.E., the flames of war in eastern and southern Arabia 
were extinguished.146  In March 634 C.E., Khālid returned to Dūmat al-Jandal.  From 
there he marched to al-Buṣrā, the gateway to Syria.  The herald of the deity (rasūl allāh) 
was dead and the conquest of the Near East had begun.  Covered by the blood of Aslam, 
Abū Bakr assumed the title, ‘the successor (caliph) of the herald of the deity’ (khalīfat 
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rasūl allāh).147  This resulted in the paradox of late proto-Islāmic history: Abū Bakr 




The question of historical reconstruction has drawn a great deal of skepticism.  In the 
“Historiographical Introduction” to Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic 
Polity, P. Crone asserted with respect to the first sesquicentennial of Islāmic 
historiography: 
Unsurprisingly, it is full of contradictions, confusions, inconsistencies 
and anomalies, and if these could be ordered a certain meaning might 
emerge.  But the debris is dejectingly resistant to internal criticism, and 
because it cannot be ordered, nothing much can be proved or 
disproved…and that there is so much pointless information; but all one 
can do is to note that there are oddities, and in time one gets inured to 
them.  It is a tradition in which information means nothing and leads 
nowhere; it just happens to be there and lends itself to little….148 
 
Crone denied the possibility of internal criticism given the “disparate” nature of the 
“source material”; but, as demonstrated above through the application of the Morellian 
method, it is just such heterogeneous material that is ideal for internal criticism as 
opposed to a homogenous body of evidence.  Moreover, Crone’s unchecked skepticism 
led to the wholesale rejection of the early Islāmic historical tradition since it exhibited no 
stratified “layers” of generation as yielded by the procedure of biblical criticism.149  
Crone claimed that the transference of this model by Wellhausen, in his “Prolegomena 
zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams,” and in a modified form by Noth, is ‘fallacious.’150  
As a result, Crone ‘abandoned’ the Islāmic sources in favor of non-Islāmic sources.151  
However, for reconstructing the history (and internal development) of early Islām in 
Arabia before the conquests (futūḥ), these non-Islāmic sources are of limited utility.  
Accordingly, Islāmic historical materials prove to be indispensible.  In fact, as 
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demonstrated above, it is precisely the marginal reports and events preserved in the 
Islāmic narrative sources that allow for a reconstruction of the history of early Islām.   
 
Narrative Method 
Largely in response to the skeptical approach, form-criticism advanced a “critique” and 
reformulation of Wellhausen’s source-criticism.152  Noth and Conrad observed that the 
source-critical school (represented by Wellhausen, Caetani, de Goeje et al.) strove to 
write coherent historical accounts of early Islāmic history.153  The flaw in the combined 
method of these historians, according to Noth and Conrad, was that they joined source 
criticism with “…a presentation of early history.”154  Therefore, the combined method 
resulted in a negative outcome: the negotiation of analysis and synthesis.  That is, the 
combined method necessitates the resolution of criticism with narrative coherence.155  
Consequently, the works of nineteenth-century source-critics “…still bear the traces of 
this process.”156  In light of this observation, Noth and Conrad decided not to employ the 
combined method,157 and for that reason alone, form-criticism precluded the possibility 
of writing a descriptive history of early Islām.  Nevertheless, despite this problem 
inherent in the nature of their research project, Noth and Conrad introduced powerful 
analytic ‘tools’ with great potential applications, as demonstrated above. 
Form-criticism’s inability to synthesize a narrative history was not only a serious 
limitation, but it also clearly established the fact that any criticism (or skepticism) not 
grounded in historical reconstruction leads to an imbalance resulting in an overemphasis 
on theoretical considerations.  As a methodological corrective against this analytic 
tendency, R.G. Collingwood cogently argued that history is the product of two stages: 
analysis and synthesis.158  In the first stage, the historian sifts through the sources and 
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“[b]y criticism of the documents, the historian establishes the ‘framework’ of his 
narrative, the set of facts out of which a ‘story’ is to be fashioned in his narrative account 
of them.”159  Thereafter, within the “structural” limits imposed by this skeletal frame, the 
historian applies “constructive” fillers to flesh out the narrative.  “[A]s in the structure of 
an organised body, the purpose of every member can only be deduced from the complete 
concept of the whole.”160  As demonstrated in this dissertation, the “twofold” narrative 
method makes possible the historical reconstruction of early Islām.161 
 
Research Prospects 
Form-criticism has demonstrated that eighth and ninth-century Islāmic historiographers 
schematized and systematized the early Islāmic conquest narratives.  Accordingly, the 
primary theme of futūḥ is reducible to a number of identifiable topoi.162  Islāmic 
historians plugged these topoi into an “ideal form” that ultimately represented the 
conquests as “Gesta Dei per Arabos,” that is, deeds of God accomplished through the 
Arabs.163  Thus, they narrated how the conquests “should be remembered,” but not how 
they occurred.164  Consequently, this casts doubt on the “historicity” of the conquest 
narratives.  In fact, scholarly consensus considers the Battle of Buwayb to be nothing 
more than a series of topoi strung together to serve later interests.165  Comparative 
research can aid historians in reconstructing these conquests.  Detribalization and re-
tribalization, for instance, throw into sharp relief the transformative social processes at 
work in the Islāmic conquests and the subsequent rise of the early Islāmic state. 
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